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ABSTRACT
The dissertation studies intermediary asset pricing, including two chapters. The first chapter
examines how heterogeneity in intermediary capital – the equity capital ratio of the largest financial
intermediaries in the U.S. – affects the cross-section of stock returns. I estimate the exposure (i.e.,
beta) of individual stocks to a shock in the dispersion of intermediary capital and find that stocks
in the lowest beta decile generate an additional 6.8% - 8.2% annual return relative to stocks in
the highest beta decile. Using data from Institutional (13F) Holdings, I also find evidence that
low-capital intermediaries, who hold riskier assets than high-capital intermediaries, face leverage-
induced fire sales during bad times. I propose a model of heterogeneous intermediary capital
in which heterogeneous risk preference between high- and low-capital intermediaries leads to a
countercyclical variation in aggregate risk aversion and a risk premium. The model states that the
dispersion of intermediary capital is priced in the cross-section of asset prices, which supports the
empirical findings.
The second chapter focuses on how bank capital affects bank stock performance. We show
that capital does not affect returns unconditionally, but high-capital banks have higher risk-adjusted
stock returns (alphas) than low-capital banks in bad times in and out of sample. Trading strategies
earn 3.60% - 4.44% annually. The results are robust to: using different bad times and capital defini-
tions, alternative asset pricing models, and ex-ante expected returns; controlling for performance-
type delistings, short-sale constraints, and trading costs; and dropping the largest or smallest banks.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Traditionally, asset pricing models are based on household’s consumption and assume that
household consumers are marginal investors. These models are called consumption-based asset
pricing models. The role of financial intermediation has not been emphasized in these models.
Therefore, a pricing kernel specific to financial intermediaries’ preference has not been carefully
explored. In addition, the factors that determine stock prices of those intermediaries are ignored
in asset pricing models since most asset pricing studies exclude financial firms from their samples.
After the financial crisis in the late 2000’s, as a new attempt to understand asset pricing through the
lens of financial intermediaries, an “intermediary asset pricing” model has emerged.1 Intermediary
asset pricing argues that rather than household consumers, who are susceptible to behavioral biases,
financial intermediaries are “true” marginal investors.
The purpose of the dissertation is to extend the intermediary asset pricing model by studying
the cross-sectional difference in intermediary capital and its effect on stock returns in the U.S. The
first chapter (Section 2) investigates how heterogeneous intermediary capital is priced in industrial
firm stocks. The second chapter (Section 3) identifies how heterogeneous intermediary capital
(particularly bank capital) is priced in its own stocks.
The first chapter constructs a stochastic discount factor that incorporates the dynamics of
heterogeneous intermediary capital. In particular, intermediaries have different levels of capital in
the cross-section while previous studies in intermediary asset pricing assume that intermediaries
are identical. Thus, the time variations of capital held by high- and low-capital intermediaries may
be different. This paper examines how the heterogeneity of intermediary capital plays a role in
asset markets.
Using intermediary capital as a proxy for their risk aversion, I argue that risk aversion is
positively related to intermediary capital: risk-averse intermediaries would build up precautionary
capital whereas risk-tolerant intermediaries would invest more in risky assets, taking higher lever-
1See He and Krishnamurthy (2018) for the detail.
1
age. Combined with the different time variations of their capital, it is expected that aggregate risk
aversion increases (decreases) when high- (low-) capital intermediaries hold more capital. Since
investors want to hedge against this time-varying risk aversion, heterogeneous intermediary capital
will be priced in the cross-section of asset returns. This paper provides theoretical and empirical
evidence that supports the above-mentioned argument.
The second chapter examines how bank capital affects its own stock prices. Bank capital has
been an important topic for researchers, regulators, and practitioners. Bank capital helps to improve
bank stability, but it is costly to hold. Thus, previous studies find that the effect of bank capital on
bank performance (e.g., survival, market share) can be either positive or negative. However, during
bad times, the benefit of holding additional capital particularly outweighs the cost of it. This paper
studies asset pricing implications of bank capital during bad times versus normal times.
If investors are able to correctly price such a beneficial effect of bank capital during bad
times, we would not predict any abnormal returns on bank stocks during bad times. However,
to the extent that investors fail to correctly value bank stocks in anticipation of future bad times,
non-zero abnormal returns may appear. We find that high-capital banks outperform low-capital
banks conditionally during bad times. The result is highly robust to numerous specifications of
both in-sample tests and out-of-sample trading strategies.
The rest of the dissertation is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the first chapter, “Het-
erogeneous Intermediary Capital and the Cross-Section of Stock Returns.” Section 3 explains the
second chapter, “Bank Capital and Bank Stock Performance.” Section 4 concludes. The Appendix
offers proofs of Propositions and other supporting material.
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2. HETEROGENEOUS INTERMEDIARY CAPITAL AND THE CROSS-SECTION OF
STOCK RETURNS
2.1 Introduction
The role of financial intermediation has been emphasized in recent literatures to understand
business cycles and financial markets. In particular, the financial crisis in the late 2000’s has
highlighted that frictions in financial intermediation help to explain the movement of asset prices,
which in turn has led to the growing popularity of “intermediary asset pricing”. Different from
the traditional perspective of consumption-based asset pricing models,1 intermediary asset pricing
models argue that financial intermediaries are the marginal investors who can trade across various
sophisticated asset classes and account for a major portion of trades. As intermediary capital
affects their trading decisions, a stochastic discount factor should include the time variation in
intermediary capital (He and Krishnamurthy, 2013; Brunnermeier and Sannikov, 2014).
Financial intermediaries have different levels of capital in the cross-section. Intuitively, low-
capital intermediaries will have higher (lower) return on capital than high-capital intermediaries
during good (bad) times due to leverage, implying that the time variation in capital of high- and
low-capital intermediaries will be different. Heterogeneous agent models highlight that the cross-
sectional difference of marginal investors in various aspects is important in asset pricing. For
example, a risk premium can be driven by the cross-sectional distribution of agents’ income and
consumption (Constantinides and Duffie, 1996) or risk preference (Chan and Kogan, 2002; Gâr-
leanu and Panageas, 2015). Existing studies in an intermediary asset pricing literature ignore het-
erogeneity in intermediary capital, though it seems important to examine heterogeneity of marginal
investors under the framework of intermediary asset pricing models. This leads to the following
research question: Can the dynamics of the heterogeneity in intermediary capital play an important
1The limitation of consumption-based asset pricing models has been reviewed extensively in prior studies. For
example, household consumers are lazy in making consumption and investment decisions (Jagannathan and Wang,
2007), they rebalance portfolios very infrequently (Brunnermeier and Nagel, 2008), or information-averse households
are inattentive to savings (Andries and Haddad, 2018).
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role in determining a stochastic discount factor?
In this paper, I study the cross-sectional distribution of intermediary capital and its effect on
asset pricing. My first empirical analysis focuses on how heterogeneity in intermediary capital
affects the cross-section of stock returns. In detail, I measure the heterogeneity in intermediary
capital as dispersion of capital ratios, that is, the difference between the 75th and the 25th per-
centile of the quasi-market capital ratio of the largest 30 intermediaries in the U.S.,2 scaled by
its 50th percentile. It is important to note that the dispersion of capital ratios is defined so as to
capture the fraction of capital controlled by high- versus low-capital intermediaries: the dispersion
increases (decreases) when low-capital intermediaries lose (earn) more capital than high-capital
intermediaries during bad (good) times. Consistently, I find that it is highly countercyclical. Next,
using all stocks listed on NYSE, AMEX, or NASDAQ, I estimate each stock’s exposure to a shock
in the dispersion of capital ratios (i.e., dispersion beta, βDISP ). I find strong evidence that the
dispersion of capital ratios is negatively priced in the cross-section of stock returns. Stocks in
the lowest dispersion beta decile generate an additional 6.8% - 8.2% annual risk premium relative
stocks in the highest dispersion beta decile, after controlling for various risk factors including the
level of intermediary capital.
The results are consistent with Chan and Kogan (2002) and Gârleanu and Panageas (2015)
who argue that when agents are heterogeneous in risk aversion, aggregate risk aversion exhibits
a countercyclical variation due to compositional changes in aggregate wealth. Given that less
risk-averse intermediaries who want to invest more into risky assets use higher leverage (equiva-
lently, maintain lower capital), intermediary capital is positively associated with risk aversion of
intermediaries.3 Then, the aggregate risk aversion increases (decreases) in bad (good) times when
low-capital intermediaries with lower risk aversion hold less (more) capital. This implies that risk
captured by the dispersion beta is each stock’s exposure to a shock in the aggregate risk aver-
2The financial intermediaries comprise mutual funds, hedge funds, broker-dealers, commercial banks, investment
banks, or their holdings companies. Participation of these intermediaries in stock markets is sizable. Based on my
sample, their stock holdings in the U.S. are over $3.3 trillion, and the average ratio of stock holdings over book assets
is 26.0% in 2012.
3Section 2.2 discusses the positive relation between intermediary capital and risk aversion in detail.
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sion. Therefore, stocks with the high dispersion beta exhibit a lower risk premium, providing a
hedge against the heightened risk aversion, and stocks with the low dispersion beta are riskier and
therefore earn a higher premium.
To rationalize this conjecture, I propose a model of heterogeneous intermediary capital in
an economy populated with two specialists and one household. A key feature of the model is
that specialists have a power utility function with internal habits but exhibit heterogeneity in habit
persistence, which leads to heterogeneous risk aversion of specialists. The constraint in raising
capital allows a more risk-averse specialist to attract more equity capital from the household to
form an intermediary, a feature consistent with the positive relation (documented in this paper)
between capital of intermediaries and their risk aversion.
In addition, it is likely that low-capital intermediaries would face scarce funding liquidity
in bad times, incurring a hike in margin requirements (liquidity spirals as in Brunnermeier and
Pedersen, 2009). More importantly, if the shock is systematic, all low-capital intermediaries may
be forced to deleverage by selling off assets, and this may lead leverage-induced fire sales (Bian,
He, Shue, and Zhou, 2018). In contrast, high-capital intermediaries who have sufficient capital
can potentially absorb these asset sales, as argued in Acharya and Viswanathan (2011). Given
that high-capital intermediaries have higher risk aversion than low-capital intermediaries, they will
not buy those assets unless the prices drop sufficiently. This further triggers fire sales during bad
times. As a result, low- (high-) capital intermediaries may sell (buy) assets at prices lower than
fundamental values, implying that the net worth of low-capital intermediaries would transfer to
high-capital intermediaries during bad times.
To examine the aforementioned arguments, I perform tests to analyze the trading activity of
financial intermediaries by using the Thomson Reuters Institutional (13F) Holdings database. At
each quarter end, I manually match managers in the Institutional (13F) Holdings database with
their holding companies in the Compustat Quarterly database. The matched data allow me to
directly examine how different capital ratios of financial intermediaries affect their holdings of
nonfinancial firm stocks and trades, especially during bad times (i.e., when the dispersion of capital
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ratios is high). I document the following results.
First, low-capital intermediaries sell substantial amounts of stocks during bad times while
high-capital intermediaries do not. However, by tracking the types of stocks bought and sold by
financial intermediaries, I show that high-capital intermediaries purchase significantly more stocks
that low-capital intermediaries sell, and low-capital intermediaries sell significantly more stocks
that high-capital intermediaries purchase during such times. This is consistent with the notion that
there are asset transfers from low-capital intermediaries to high-capital intermediaries during bad
times.
Second, to test whether the stocks sold by low-capital intermediaries are indeed fire-sold, I
examine trading gains of financial intermediaries during bad times. Since the Thomson Reuters
Institutional (13F) Holdings database provides neither the exact transaction date nor the parties in-
volved in the transaction, I am only able to infer fire sales by observing trading gains (i.e., abnormal
returns) of financial intermediaries in the following quarter. I find that high-capital intermediaries
earn positive trading gains on stock purchases while low-capital intermediaries lose in terms of
forgone returns on stock sales in the following quarter. That is, consistent with a fire sales inter-
pretation, stocks are sold at prices lower than fundamental values.
Finally, when they trade stocks, there is a “trade mismatch” between high- and low-capital
intermediaries. To see this, note the following. High-capital intermediaries may be so risk-averse
that they are only willing to buy assets that have fallen in price (i.e., stocks with low dispersion
betas). At the same time, low-capital intermediaries may hesitate to sell those assets if they believe
prices have temporarily dropped below their fundamental values and will recover again. They may
therefore choose to sell stocks that have experienced a modest price drop (i.e., stocks with moderate
dispersion betas). In support of this argument, I show that during bad times, high-capital interme-
diaries tend to purchase more stocks with low dispersion betas whereas low-capital intermediaries
are likely to sell more stocks with medium dispersion betas.
My paper adds to the literature on intermediary asset pricing. After the theoretical ground
established (He and Krishnamurthy, 2013; Brunnermeier and Sannikov, 2014), Adrian, Etula, and
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Muir (2014) and He, Kelly, and Manela (2017) test empirically that the level of intermediary cap-
ital (equivalently, the inverse of intermediary leverage) prices the cross-section of asset returns,
including returns on equity portfolios. I provide the empirical evidence supporting the importance
of the dispersion of intermediary capital in predicting stock returns, controlling for the level of in-
termediary capital. In the theoretical perspective, the level of intermediary capital captures wealth
from a given utility function while the dispersion of intermediary capital captures the shape (i.e.,
curvature) of the utility function of a representative agent through compositional changes among
heterogeneous agents.
There are also other studies that emphasize the important role of heterogeneous intermediaries
in asset markets. While my paper addresses the heterogeneity in risk preference of intermediaries,
financial intermediaries are modeled to be heterogeneous in terms of Value-at-Risk constraints in
Coimbra and Rey (2018) or funding constraints in Ma (2018). These studies, including my work,
feature the cross-sectional distribution of assets among intermediaries, which ultimately drives the
risk premium. In the banking literature, the cross-sectional difference in bank capital has been
shown to affect bank stock returns indirectly through the market beta (Baker and Wurgler, 2015)
or conditionally during bad times (Bouwman, Kim, and Shin, 2018).
My work also complements the literature on heterogeneous agents and time-varying risk aver-
sion. Chan and Kogan (2002) and Gârleanu and Panageas (2015) argue in their theoretical models
that although agents’ risk aversion is not time-varying, the aggregate risk aversion of the market can
vary over time if agents are heterogeneous in risk aversion. Using intermediary capital as a proxy
for risk aversion, I find empirical evidence that is consistent with their predictions; the aggregate
risk aversion and the risk premium are countercyclical. Related, Brunnermeier and Nagel (2008)
use micro-level data (i.e., Panel Study of Income Dynamics) to test how changes in risk aversion
through a habit preference affect individuals’ asset allocation. Gârleanu and Pedersen (2011) doc-
ument that risk-tolerant agents operate with high leverage and that in bad times, a premium may
rise once margin requirement starts to bind, reflecting scarce funding liquidity.
This paper is, to my best knowledge, the first attempt to directly investigate stock holdings
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of financial intermediaries in the U.S. By manually matching 13F managers with their holding
companies, I am able to observe how financial intermediaries (and their subsidiaries) trade stocks,
which enables me to analyze fire sales during bad times. While adverse selection prevents uncon-
strained investors from buying assets unless prices of those assets drop sufficiently in Dow and Han
(2018), I argue that it is high risk-aversion that induces high-capital intermediaries buy assets only
at discounted prices. This work is also consistent with Santos and Veronesi (2018), who argue in
their model that levered agents fire-sell their risky assets to reduce leverage as asset prices decline
during bad times. In addition, Bian, He, Shue, and Zhou (2018) empirically test leverage-induced
fire sales in the Chinese stock market using proprietary account-level trading data for margin ac-
counts in the middle of 2015 and find that investors whose leverage is close to the maximum level
strongly sell their assets during the stock market crash.
2.2 Heterogeneous Intermediary Capital
In this section, I discuss the role of the heterogeneous intermediary capital in explaining
the cross-section of stock returns. Prior studies on intermediary asset pricing have focused on
the level of intermediary capital. He and Krishnamurthy (2013) argue that intermediary capital
represents the health of the intermediary sector: When an intermediary’s constraint to raise capital
is binding, intermediary capital becomes scarce, which leads to a higher risk premium. Based on
this theoretical motivation, He, Kelly, and Manela (2017) find that intermediary capital, measured
using market values, is positively priced in the cross-section of asset returns. In contrast, Adrian,
Etula, and Muir (2014) use book leverage as a proxy for intermediary leverage to capture funding
liquidity and find the positive price of risk for the leverage of financial intermediaries. Because
intermediaries lower their leverage when funding constraints tighten (Brunnermeier and Pedersen,
2009), intermediary leverage, measured using book values, is procyclical as documented in Adrian
and Shin (2010, 2014).
Since leverage is simply the inverse of the capital ratio, the two strands of studies seem to
contradict each other.4 However, as argued in Santos and Veronesi (2018), while deleveraging
4Note that Adrian, Etula, and Muir (2014) and He, Kelly, and Manela (2017) use different definitions for financial
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of low capital intermediaries in bad times causes book leverage to decrease, market leverage can
increase if a high discount rate would push down the market value of capital faster than the decrease
in debt. Therefore, the book capital ratio is expected to be procyclical, while the market capital
ratio is to be countercyclical.
I argue that it is important to look beyond the level of intermediary capital: Intermediary
capital appears to vary in the cross-section as well. From a principal component analysis of the
quasi-market capital ratio based on the largest 30 intermediaries in the U.S., I find that the first
two factors have eigenvalues greater than one. The first factor appears to represent the level of
intermediary capital as standardized scores of the 25th percentile and the 75th percentile for the
first factor are similar (i.e., 0.058 and 0.053, respectively). In contrast, the second seems to be
the dispersion of intermediary capital as standardized scores of the 25th percentile and the 75th
percentile for the second factor are in the opposite signs (i.e., -0.097 and 0.151, respectively). If
the key features that drive this cross-sectional difference are associated with intermediaries’ trading
behaviors, it is potentially important to incorporate the heterogeneity in intermediary capital to
examine the role of financial intermediaries in asset markets.
How does heterogeneous intermediary capital affect the trading behavior of intermediaries?
As mentioned in the Introduction, I postulate that intermediary capital is closely related to the risk
preference of intermediaries and that the intermediary capital appears to be positively associated
with risk aversion of intermediaries. Specifically, risk aversion may induce intermediaries to have
high capital in that risk-averse intermediaries want to build up precautionary capital against an
adverse shock in economic downturns. In terms of a portfolio choice, risk-tolerant intermediaries
want to invest more into risky assets than risk-averse intermediaries do, thereby leading them to
borrow more and take higher leverage. On the other hand, capital can also reduce risk-taking
behavior of intermediaries. For example, low-capital intermediaries with a limited liability have
risk-shifting incentives and are likely to take an excessive risk at the expense of debt holders. Ac-
cording to the banking literature, as capital increases, banks’ incentives to pursue high risk decline
intermediaries; the former defines intermediaries as security broker-dealers from the Federal Reserve Flow of Funds,
and the latter defines intermediaries as Primary Dealers - Federal Reserve Bank of New York
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(Furlong and Keeley, 1989), and their incentives to monitor borrowers strengthen (Holmstrom
and Tirole, 1997; Allen, Carletti, and Marquez, 2011).5 Whether intermediary capital is indeed
positively related to risk aversion could ultimately be an empirical question. Thus, as suggestive
evidence, it is worthwhile investigating stock holdings of high- and low-capital intermediaries to
empirically link their capital and risk preferences.
Figure 2.1 shows the relation between intermediary capital ratios and the risk characteristics
of stocks owned by the largest 9 intermediaries in the U.S. that span at lease 30 quarters in the
sample. It supports the channel in which intermediary capital is negatively associated with risk-
taking behaviors (i.e., high risk aversion). It appears that high-capital intermediaries tend to hold
stocks with lower market betas (in Panel A), lower return volatility (in Panel B), and larger market
capitalization (in Panel C). Such differences are potentially more pronounced during bad times.
For instance, in 2007, Lehman Brothers has a market capital ratio of 4.9% and holds stocks with
a market beta of 2.70 on average whereas Bank of New York Mellon has a market capital ratio
of 24.8% and holds stocks with a market beta of 0.79 on average. More generally, intermediaries
holding stocks with distinctive risk characteristics played a critical role in the pricing of these
stocks during the crisis as we have experienced after the Lehman failure in 2008.
Given that low-capital intermediaries are more highly leveraged and hold riskier stocks than
high-capital intermediaries, it is expected that low-capital intermediaries will be more adversely
affected by a negative shock in the stock market than high-capital intermediaries. Thus, the relative
difference in capital ratios (measured in market values) should be higher during bad times. Figure
2.2 supports this notion. It presents the level and the dispersion of intermediary capital ratios,
based on the largest 30 intermediaries in the U.S., from 1973/Q1 to 2016/Q4. In Panel A, the 25th
percentile of intermediary capital increases (decreases) faster during good (bad) times than the 75th
percentile of intermediary capital. Likewise, dispersion of capital ratios, defined as the difference
5There is an opposite view that intermediary capital is negatively associated with risk aversion, arguing that
intermediaries have more capital in equilibrium if they hold riskier assets in their balance sheets. To mitigate this
concern, I measure intermediary capital based on marker values. A higher discount rate due to having riskier assets
will discount their market capital. Thus, the effect of having extra book capital would be largely canceled out when
intermediary capital is measured based on market values.
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Figure 2.1
Intermediary Capital and Risk Preference
This figure depicts the relation between intermediary capital of the largest 9 intermediaries in the U.S. and three risk
characteristics of the nonfinancial firm stocks they hold. The 9 intermediaries include Bank of America, Bank of New
York Mellon, Citigroup, Goldman Sachs, JP Morgan Chase, Lehman Brothers, Merrill Lynch, Morgan Stanley, and
Wells Fargo & Company. Intermediary capital is measured using the quasi-market capital ratio, that is, the market value
of equity over the sum of the book value of debt and the market value of equity. The risk characteristics are: market
beta, estimated from monthly regressions using 5-year rolling windows (Panel A); stock return volatility, defined as
the quarterly standard deviation of daily stock returns (Panel B); and the log of market capitalization, the number of
shares outstanding times the share price (Panel C). At the end of each quarter, risk characteristics are averaged within
each intermediary and then averaged over the sample period. The nonfinancial firms are identified as all firms listed
on NYSE, AMEX, or NASDAQ excluding financial firms (header SIC code or historical SIC code 6). The solid line
represents the fitted regression line, and two dashed lines represent the 95% confidence limits. The sample period
covers 1980/Q1 to 2012/Q4.
Panel A: Average Market Beta of Stock Held
Panel B: Average Volatility of Stock Held
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Figure 2.1 Continued
Panel C: Average Market Cap of Stock Held
between the 75th and the 25th percentile of intermediary capital, scaled by its 50th percentile, shows
a countercyclical variation in Panel B. Hence, the negative shock in the stock market induces the
dispersion of capital ratios (as well as a portion of stocks held by high-capital intermediaries) to
rise, which then drives up the aggregate risk aversion.6 In the end, the shock in the dispersion of
capital ratios generates a risk premium and is priced in the cross-section of stock returns.7
Furthermore, if a negative shock is sufficiently large and systematic, low-capital intermedi-
aries may be faced with binding margin constraints (Brunnermeier and Pedersen, 2009)8 and are
forced to deleverage by selling off assets. In contrast, high-capital intermediaries do not face such
constraints and may be able to buy those assets (Acharya and Viswanathan, 2011). As shown
in Panel A of Figure 2.2, high-capital intermediaries experienced a rise in market capital while
low-capital intermediaries lost their capital during the financial crisis. This is consistent with the
6Note that if intermediaries are homogeneous in risk preference, the negative shock would alter the dispersion of
capital ratios but not affect the aggregate risk aversion.
7In Section 2.6, I provide a model of heterogeneous intermediary capital where a more risk-averse specialist
form an intermediary with higher capital and show that how the dispersion in an intermediary capital is priced in the
cross-section of stock returns.
8The shock incurs losses in positions of low-capital intermediaries. If a cushion against the shock is not enough,
low-capital intermediaries are likely to hit the margin constraints.
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Figure 2.2
Level and Dispersion of Intermediary Capital Ratio
This figure depicts intermediary capital of the largest 30 intermediaries in the U.S. Panel A plots the level of interme-
diary capital. The dashed line represents the 75th percentile of intermediary capital while the solid line represents the
25th percentile of intermediary capital. Panel B plots the dispersion of intermediary capital, measured as the difference
between the 75th and the 25th percentile of intermediary capital of the largest 30 intermediaries in the U.S., scaled
by its 50th percentile, in the solid line. The change in the dispersion of intermediary capital is shown by the dashed
line. Intermediary capital is measured using the quasi-market capital ratio, that is, the market value of equity over the
sum of the book value of debt and the market value of equity. The intermediaries are identified as all firms listed on
NYSE, AMEX, or NASDAQ whose header SIC code or historical SIC code is 6000-6200 or 6712. The largest 30
intermediaries are identified based on their market capitalization at the end of each quarter. The shaded areas represent
NBER recessions. The sample period covers 1973/Q1 to 2016/Q4.
Panel A: Capital Ratios of High- and Low-Capital Intermediaries
Panel B: Dispersion of Intermediary Capital Ratios
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argument that low-capital intermediaries sell their assets to high-capital intermediaries at prices
lower than fundamental values during bad times.
2.3 Data
I use the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) database to obtain stock-level data
for nonfinancial firms and intermediaries, the Compustat database to obtain nonfinancial firm- and
intermediary-level data. I also use the Thomson Reuters Institutional (13F) Holdings database to
retrieve holdings of intermediaries and their subsidiaries. To obtain the stock holdings of inter-
mediaries, I manually match managers (mgrno) in the Institutional (13F) Holdings database and
financial intermediaries (gvkey) in the Compustat database. In particular, I use a name match-
ing algorithm of the Levenshtein distance to match names of the 13F managers with names of
their holding companies up to ten and then review the initial matched-sets manually to finalize the
matching.
The sample period covers January 1973 to December 2016. I choose January 1973 as the start
because there was a large influx of intermediaries in the CRSP database in 1972. The empirical
tests with the Institutional (13F) Holdings database cover 1980/Q1 to 2012/Q4. I exclude the
period of 2013/Q1 - 2016/Q4 from the sample due to data quality problems in the Institutional
(13F) Holdings database.9
2.3.1 Financial Intermediaries
The intermediaries are identified as all firms listed on NYSE, AMEX, or NASDAQ whose
header SIC code or historical SIC code are 6000-6200 or 6712. The main empirical analyses
focus on the largest 30 intermediaries based on market capitalization at the end of each quarter.
This yields a list of 118 unique intermediaries over the sample period (See Table C.1 for the list).
Since the largest 30 intermediaries hold the majority of assets in financial markets, their capital
would be more relevant to determine the pricing kernel for financial assets. It seems defensible
to focus on the largest 30 given that the number of U.S. primary dealers used in He, Kelly, and
9In 2013 onward, institutional 13F reports are often stale and omitted, certain securities may be excluded, and the
number of shares are often reported inconsistently with splits.
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Manela (2017), ranges from 17 to 46, and there are 29 U.S. banks among the Global Systemically
Important Banks (G-SIB) and the Systemically Important Financial Institution (SIFI) in 2017.10
Intermediary capital is measured using the quasi-market capital ratio, that is, the market value
of equity over the sum of the book value of debt and the market value of equity:
Capr =
market value of equity
market value of equity + book value of debt
. (2.3.1)
Using intermediary capital defined in (2.3.1), I measure the dispersion of capital ratios in quater t
as the difference between the 75th and the 25th percentile of intermediary capital of the largest 30











Table 2.1 Panel A presents summary statistics for intermediaries. The statistics are averaged
over quartiles based on intermediary capital. Several things are noteworthy. First, there are sub-
stantial variations in intermediary capital. High-capital intermediaries have six times higher capital
ratio than low-capital intermediaries: 36.02% versus 5.68%. Second, high-capital intermediaries
are far smaller than low-capital intermediaries, both in market value and in book value terms.
Moreover, high-capital intermediaries tend to have lower book-to-market ratio and higher prof-
itability and prior returns (i.e., momentum) than low-capital intermediaries. Market beta and asset
growth are relatively stable across quartiles.
Note that book assets reported in Panel A do not comprise assets under management (AUM),
which is an off-balance sheet item. In particular, AUM are the total market value of assets held by
financial intermediaries on behalf of their clients while book assets are assets which they actually
own in their balance sheet. The amount of AUM is not trivial relative to their book assets. In 2017,
for instance, JP Morgan Chase had total AUM of $2.03 trillion and book assets of $2.53 trillion,
10In Section 2.5.6, I also test using the largest 40 or 50 intermediaries.
15
and BlackRock had total AUM of $6.29 trillion and book assets of $0.22 trillion.11 Importantly,
stock holdings of financial intermediaries out of total AUM have grown significantly. Based on
my sample of the largest 30 intermediaries in the U.S., the value-weighted average of the ratios
of total stock holdings reported in the Institutional (13F) Holdings database over book assets was
6.5% in 1980 but increased to 26.0% in 2012.12 Thus, it appears that trading behaviors of financial
intermediaries for stocks (primarily by their asset management arms) are sizable to their overall
business operations.
Figure 2.2 shows intermediary capital over time. The shaded areas represent NBER reces-
sions. Panel A shows that intermediary capital is closely related to the economic cycle. However,
capital of high-capital intermediaries is countercyclical whereas that of low-capital intermediaries
is procyclical. This becomes more stark when plotting the dispersion of capital ratios between
high- and low-capital intermediaries and changes in the dispersion. Panel B illustrates that the
dispersion of capital ratios is highly countercyclical, as discussed in Section 2.2. The dispersion of
capital ratios is mostly less than one in good times whereas it peaks at 3.7 in the financial crisis.
Consistently, changes in the dispersion become volatile in bad times.
2.3.2 Nonfinancial Firm Stocks
Test assets are common stocks of nonfinancial firms, identified as all firms listed on NYSE,
AMEX, or NASDAQ excluding financial firms (header SIC code or historical SIC code 6). I also
exclude tiny stocks (price less than $5). For each stock, I estimate its exposure to the shock or




















t is the quarterly return on nonfinancial firm stock, r
f
t is the one-month
11See annual reports of JP Morgan Chase and BlackRock.




This table reports the summary statistics. Panel A shows the statistics for intermediaries. At the end of each quarter,
the largest 30 intermediaries in the U.S. are sorted into quartiles based on intermediary capital. Panel B shows the
statistics for nonfinancial firm stocks. At the beginning of each month, nonfinancial firm stocks are sorted into deciles
based on the dispersion beta. The statistics presented in each column indicate the value-weighted averages within each
group, which are then averaged over time. Intermediary capital is measured using the quasi-market capital ratio, that
is, the market value of equity over the sum of the book value of debt and the market value of equity. The dispersion
beta is estimated from quarterly regressions using 5-year rolling windows. rit is a monthly returns on nonfinancial firm
stock. DISPCaprt is the dispersion of intermediary capital measured as the difference between the 75
th percentile and
the 25th percentile of intermediary capital of the largest 30 intermediaries in the U.S., scaled by its 50th percentile.
Capital Ratio (Market) is the quasi-market capital ratio. Capital Ratio (Book) is defined as book equity over total assets.
βMKT is the market beta, estimated from monthly regressions using 5-year rolling windows. Market capitalization
and book assets (i.e., total assets) are represented in billion dollars. B/M is the book-to-market ratio, book equity over
market capitalization. Profitability is measured as ROE, income before extraordinary items over lagged book equity.
Asset growth is measured as the percentage change in total assets. Momentum is a cumulative return over the previous
one year, skipping the last month. Stock Returns are valued-weighted at the monthly frequency. The intermediaries
are identified as all firms listed on NYSE, AMEX, or NASDAQ whose header SIC code or historical SIC code is
6000-6200 or 6712. The largest 30 intermediaries are identified based on their market capitalization at the end of each
quarter. The nonfinancial firms are identified as all firms listed on NYSE, AMEX, or NASDAQ excluding financial
firms (header SIC code or historical SIC code 6). The sample period covers January 1973 to December 2016.
Panel A: Summary Statistics for the Largest 30 Intermediaries by Capital Ratio Quartile
Low 2 3 High
Capital Ratio (Market) 5.68% 9.24% 13.57% 36.02%
Capital Ratio (Book) 5.43% 6.99% 8.18% 23.57%
βMKT 1.30 1.12 1.10 1.25
Market Cap ($B) 27.83 21.49 20.27 13.27
Book Assets ($B) 380.29 170.38 108.78 33.66
B/M 1.22 0.90 0.69 0.52
Profitability (ROE) 2.82% 3.44% 3.98% 5.99%
Asset Growth (I/A) 3.98% 3.26% 3.97% 4.59%
Momentum 11.40% 14.39% 16.25% 24.00%
Panel B: Summary Statistics for Nonfinancial Firm Stocks by Dispersion Beta Decile
Low 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 High
βDISP −0.45 −0.21 −0.13 −0.08 −0.03 0.02 0.07 0.12 0.19 0.39
βMKT 1.30 1.14 1.07 1.03 1.00 0.99 0.99 1.00 1.04 1.23
Market Cap ($B) 1.24 2.46 3.06 3.45 3.81 3.91 3.86 3.82 3.12 1.91
Book Assets ($B) 1.23 2.36 2.86 3.10 3.38 3.48 3.43 3.58 3.34 1.95
B/M 0.70 0.74 0.74 0.74 0.73 0.74 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.67
Profitability (ROE) 1.77% 2.19% 2.41% 2.64% 2.68% 2.63% 2.62% 2.63% 2.48% 1.90%
Asset Growth (I/A) 3.39% 2.69% 2.46% 2.52% 2.43% 2.49% 2.56% 2.73% 2.80% 3.62%
Momentum 33.12% 21.55% 19.29% 17.96% 17.58% 17.34% 17.40% 18.08% 18.67% 25.65%
Stock Return 2.67% 2.10% 1.88% 1.69% 1.85% 1.68% 1.78% 1.68% 1.76% 2.08%
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Treasury bill rate compounded over a quarter, MKTt is the quarterly return on the market (i.e., the
CRSP value-weighted index) less rft .
Table 2.1 Panel B shows summary statistics for nonfinancial firm stocks based on the disper-
sion beta decile. First, there are substantial variations in the dispersion beta. While stocks in the
lowest decile have dispersion beta of -0.45, stocks in the highest decile have the dispersion beta of
+0.39. Second, stocks in the lowest decile tend to have higher market beta, book-to-market ratio,
and prior returns, and smaller size than those in the highest decile. However, the differences in
these characteristics are not so remarkable that one would argue that variations in the dispersion
beta are simply spanned by other risk characteristics. Finally, stocks in the lowest decile earn
annually 7.08%13 higher (t-statistics = 5.04) than those in the highest decile.
2.4 Main Results
2.4.1 Intermediary Capital Ratios and Risk Preferences
Section 2.2 showed how intermediary capital is related to risk aversion of intermediaries,
and Figure 2.1 provided preliminary evidence that intermediary capital seems to be negatively
associated with risk-taking behavior of intermediaries. To formally test this, I estimate the risk
preference of intermediaries from risk characteristics of stocks that intermediaries hold.
Table 2.2 presents how intermediary capital affects the risk characteristics of their holdings.
I regress the risk characteristics of stocks held by intermediaries on their capital ratios. I use
three risk measures: market beta, return volatility, and size (i.e., log of market capitalization)
of stocks that the largest 30 intermediaries in the U.S. hold, reported in the Institutional (13F)
Holdings database. Since stocks may be held by multiple intermediaries, intermediary capital and
size are averaged within each stock using the number of shares held as a weight. I find the evi-
dence that high-capital intermediaries tend to hold stocks with significantly lower betas and return
volatility and higher market capitalization. This suggests that high-capital intermediaries seem
to have higher risk aversion than low-capital intermediaries. In terms of economic significance,
high-capital intermediaries hold stocks which exhibit 0.04 lower beta and 1.15% lower annual
137.08% = (2.67%− 2.08%)× 12
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volatility14 than low-capital intermediaries.15
If low-capital intermediaries (who are more highly leveraged) hold riskier stocks on their
balance sheets, they would be more sensitive to an adverse shock than high-capital intermediaries,
and then the price of their assets would drop further than that of high-capital intermediaries in bad
times. Moreover, such an adverse shock would cause low-capital intermediaries facing margin
constraints to sell their assets to deleverage (Brunnermeier and Pedersen, 2009). If the shock is
large and systematic enough to induce all low-capital intermediaries to sell assets together, they
have to sell at fire-sales prices. On the other hand, high-capital intermediaries, who do not face
such margin constraints, may have sufficient capacity to absorb these assets and can buy these
assets (Acharya and Viswanathan, 2011) at prices lower than fundamental values. As a result, net
worth will be transferred from low- to high-capital intermediaries in bad times.
Figure 2.2 suggested that the dispersion of capital ratios is countercyclical. I now test this
formally by regressing the dispersion of capital ratios on bad time dummy. I use two time measures:
the financial crisis (from July 2007 to December 2009) and NBER recessions.
Table 2.3 shows that the dispersion of capital ratios increases to 2.51 (= 1.76 + 0.75) during
the financial crisis in Column (1) and 1.85 (= 1.06 + 0.79) during NBER recessions in Column
(4). Both findings are consistent with the dispersion of capital ratios being countercyclical. Im-
portantly, it seems that this countercyclicality can be attributed to both high- and low-capital inter-
mediaries. In Columns (2) and (3), low- (high-) capital intermediaries tend to have significantly
lower (higher) capital during the financial crisis. Similarly, in Columns (5) and (6), low- (high-)
capital intermediaries tend to have significantly lower (higher) capital during NBER recessions.
As a result, high-capital intermediaries end up with even higher capital ratios whereas low-capital
intermediaries have even lower capital ratios in bad times.
140.04 = (36.02%− 5.68%)× (−0.129); 1.15% = (36.02%− 5.68%)× (−0.019)×
√
4
15The economic significance presented in Table 2.2 appears to be smaller than in Figure 2.1. It is possible that these




Risk Preferences of Intermediaries
This table reports the results of OLS regressions in which the risk characteristics of nonfinancial firm stocks held in the
largest 30 intermediaries in the U.S. are regressed on the capital ratios of these intermediaries plus controls. Three risk
characteristics include: market beta, estimated from monthly regressions using 5-year rolling windows; stock return
volatility, defined as the quarterly standard deviation of daily stock returns; and the log of market capitalization, the
number of shares outstanding times the share price. Since stocks can be held by multiple intermediaries, intermediary
capital and size are averaged within each stock using the number of shares held as a weight. Intermediary capital is
measured using the quasi-market capital ratio, that is, the market value of equity over the sum of the book value of debt
and the market value of equity. Intermediary size is measured as the log of the intermediary’s market capitalization.
Other controls measured in the stock level include B/M (book-to-market ratio, book equity over market capitalization),
MOM (momentum, a cumulative return over the previous one year, skipping the last month), ROE (profitability,
income before extraordinary items over lagged book equity), and I/A (asset growth, the percentage change in total
assets). The intermediaries are identified as all firms listed on NYSE, AMEX, or NASDAQ whose header SIC code
or historical SIC code is 6000-6200 or 6712. The largest 30 intermediaries are identified based on their market
capitalization at the end of each quarter. The nonfinancial firms are identified as all firms listed on NYSE, AMEX, or
NASDAQ excluding financial firms (header SIC code or historical SIC code 6). The sample period covers 1980/Q1 to
2012/Q4. Standard errors are clustered by stock. t-statistics are in square brackets. ***, **, and * indicate statistical
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
(1) (2) (3)
βMKT Return Volatility Market Cap
Intermediary Capital -0.129∗∗∗ -0.019∗∗∗ 0.167∗∗∗
[-3.73] [-3.28] [3.51]
Intermediary Size 0.020∗∗∗ -0.001 0.184∗∗∗
[3.02] [-0.95] [19.42]
B/M -0.009 -0.143∗∗ 0.197
[-0.33] [-2.56] [1.30]
MOM 0.009∗∗ -0.009∗∗∗ 0.232∗∗∗
[2.25] [-10.27] [24.38]
ROE 0.005 0.004∗∗ 0.001
[0.57] [2.39] [0.08]
I/A -0.020 0.001 0.044
[-1.15] [0.22] [0.78]
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes
Year × Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes
N 458,183 458,183 458,183
adj. R2 0.608 0.532 0.889
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Table 2.3
Countercyclicality in Dispersion of Intermediary Capital Ratios
This table reports the results of OLS regressions showing how the dispersion of intermediary capital changes during
bad times. I use two bad time measures: the financial crisis (from July 2007 to December 2009) and NBER reces-
sions. 1(t = Bad Time) is one if month t is in a bad time and zero otherwise. The dispersion of intermediary capital
(DISPCapr) is measured as the difference between the 75th percentile (Capr75
th
) and the 25th percentile (Capr75
th
)
of intermediary capital of the largest 30 intermediaries in the U.S., scaled by its 50th percentile. Intermediary capital is
measured using the quasi-market capital ratio, that is, the market value of equity over the sum of the book value of debt
and the market value of equity. The intermediaries are identified as all firms listed on NYSE, AMEX, or NASDAQ
whose header SIC code or historical SIC code is 6000-6200 or 6712. The largest 30 intermediaries are identified based
on their market capitalization at the end of each quarter. The sample period covers 1973/Q1 to 2016/Q4. t-statistics
are in square brackets. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
Bad Time Def. Financial Crisis NBER Recessions









1(t = Bad Time) 1.76*** −0.02* 0.23*** 1.06*** −0.02** 0.12***
[16.09] [−1.86] [9.67] [7.37] [−2.28] [4.64]
Intercept 0.75*** 0.10*** 0.19*** 0.79*** 0.10*** 0.20***
[24.01] [30.66] [28.38] [16.71] [30.67] [23.46]
N 121 121 121 121 121 121
adj. R2 0.682 0.020 0.436 0.308 0.034 0.146
2.4.2 Asset Pricing Tests
In this section, I investigate how the dispersion of capital ratios is priced in the cross-section of
stock returns. As discussed earlier, asymmetric responses to an adverse shock between high- and
low-capital intermediaries lead to compositional changes in stock ownership, which in turn pro-
duce (countercyclical) time-varying risk aversion of a representative agent given that high-capital
intermediaries are more risk-averse than low-capital intermediaries. Thus, a rise in the dispersion
of capital ratios in bad times causes asset prices to decline and a risk premium to increase. This
further implies that stocks that covary negatively with the shock in the dispersion of capital ratios
would earn a higher risk premium and that stocks that covary positively with the shock in the dis-
persion of capital ratios would be hedging and should exhibit a lower risk premium. To test this
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hypothesis, I estimate the following Fama-MacBeth regressions:
rit+1 − r
f







where the dependent variables are monthly returns on nonfinancial firm stocks in excess of the
one-month Treasury bill rate. Also, λDISP is the price of risk in the dispersion of capital ratios,
and βDISP,i is the dispersion beta defined in Section 2.3.
Table 2.4 presents the results. After controlling for various risk characteristics, including the
betas for the level of intermediary capital from Adrian, Etula, and Muir (2014) and He, Kelly, and
Manela (2017), I find that stocks with low dispersion betas earn significantly higher returns than
stocks with high dispersion betas. In other words, dispersion of capital ratios is negatively priced
in the cross-section of stock returns. In terms of economic significance, difference between the
dispersion betas from the highest and the lowest deciles is 0.84 (= 0.39− (−0.45)), and estimated
price of risk in the dispersion of capital ratios ranges from -0.81 to -0.33. This implies that relative
to stocks in the highest dispersion betas, stocks in the lowest dispersion betas earn an additional
premium of 3.3% - 8.2% per annum.
Table 2.5 uses portfolio approaches to see if portfolios based on the dispersion beta earn
abnormal returns. At the beginning of each month, stocks are sorted in deciles based on their
dispersion betas (using NYSE breaks). Next, the portfolios are value-weighted in Panel A and
equal-weighted in Panel B. I use five different factor models: FF5 is the Fama-French five factor
model (Fama and French, 2015); FF5+PS adds the liquidity factor (Pástor and Stambaugh, 2003)
to FF5; FF5+MOM adds the momentum factor (Jegadeesh and Titman, 1993) to FF5; FF5+AEM
adds the intermediary leverage factor (Adrian, Etula, and Muir, 2014) to FF5; and FF5+HKM
adds the intermediary capital factor (He, Kelly, and Manela, 2017) to FF5. Regardless of the
model, I find that stocks with low dispersion betas earn significantly higher abnormal returns than
stocks with high dispersion betas. Again, investors are likely to pay lower prices for stocks that




This table reports the estimation results for the Fama-MacBeth regressions. Dependent variables are monthly returns
on nonfinancial firm stocks in excess of the one-month Treasury bill rate. The dispersion beta, defined in Table 2.1,
is estimated from quarterly regressions using 5-year rolling windows. βMKT is the market beta, estimated from
monthly regressions using 5-year rolling windows. βAEM represents the beta for the intermediary leverage factor
in Adrian, Etula, and Muir (2014), and βHKM represents the intermediary capital factor in He, Kelly, and Manela
(2017), both estimated from quarterly regressions using 5-year rolling windows. Following Carhart (1997) and Fama
and French (2015), I also control for Size (the log of market capitalization), B/M (book-to-market ratio, book equity
over market capitalization), MOM (momentum, a cumulative return over the previous one year, skipping the last
month), OP (operating profitability, annual revenues minus cost of goods sold, interest expense, and selling, general,
and administrative expenses divided by lagged book equity), and I/A (asset growth, the percentage change in total
assets). The intermediaries are identified as all firms listed on NYSE, AMEX, or NASDAQ whose header SIC code
or historical SIC code is 6000-6200 or 6712. The largest 30 intermediaries are identified based on their market
capitalization at the end of each quarter. The nonfinancial firms are identified as all firms listed on NYSE, AMEX, or
NASDAQ excluding financial firms (header SIC code or historical SIC code 6). The sample period covers January
1978 to December 2016. Standard errors are adjusted using the Newey-West method. t-statistics are in square brackets.
***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Dep. Var. ri − rf ri − rf ri − rf ri − rf ri − rf ri − rf ri − rf
βDISP −0.81*** −0.78*** −0.49*** −0.46*** −0.33*** −0.33*** −0.35**
[−4.25] [−4.57] [−3.25] [−3.49] [−2.69] [−2.72] [−2.55]
βMKT 0.29 0.30* 0.27* 0.30** 0.13 0.20
[1.61] [1.71] [1.83] [2.00] [0.98] [1.28]
βAEM 0.32*** 0.15*** 0.13*** 0.15***
[4.71] [3.38] [3.01] [3.32]
βHKM 0.17*** 0.11** 0.11** 0.10*
[3.19] [2.33] [2.33] [1.85]
Size −0.47*** −0.47*** −0.36*** −0.33***
[−12.22] [−12.20] [−11.49] [−9.64]
B/M 0.10 0.09 0.13 0.14
[0.96] [0.85] [1.43] [1.24]
MOM 0.04 0.04 0.03 −0.16
[0.19] [0.24] [0.17] [−0.80]
OP −0.04 −0.04 0.04 −0.06
[−0.32] [−0.35] [0.34] [−0.57]
I/A −0.77*** −0.76*** −0.81*** −0.83***







Abnormal Returns based on Dispersion Beta: Portfolio Approach
This table reports abnormal returns of decile portfolios based on the dispersion beta. Portfolios are value-weighted in
Panel A and equal-weighted in Panel B. FF5 is the Fama-French five factor model (Fama and French, 2015), FF5+PS
adds the liquidity factor (Pástor and Stambaugh, 2003) to FF5, FF5+MOM adds the momentum factor (Jegadeesh and
Titman, 1993) to FF5, FF5+AEM adds the intermediary leverage factor (Adrian, Etula, and Muir, 2014) to FF5, and
FF5+HKM adds the intermediary capital factor (He, Kelly, and Manela, 2017) to FF5. The dispersion beta, defined in
Table 2.1, is estimated from quarterly regressions using 5-year rolling windows. The intermediaries are identified as all
firms listed on NYSE, AMEX, or NASDAQ whose header SIC code or historical SIC code is 6000-6200 or 6712. The
largest 30 intermediaries are identified based on their market capitalization at the end of each quarter. The nonfinancial
firms are identified as all firms listed on NYSE, AMEX, or NASDAQ excluding financial firms (header SIC code or
historical SIC code 6). The sample period covers January 1978 to December 2016. Standard errors are adjusted using
the Newey-West method. t-statistics are in square brackets. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%,
5%, and 10% level, respectively.
Panel A: Abnormal Returns of Value-Weighted Portfolios based on Dispersion Beta
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
FF5 FF5 + PS FF5 + MOM FF5 + IVOL FF5 + AEM FF5 + HKM
H−L −0.58%*** −0.62%*** −0.62%*** −0.57%*** −0.58%*** −0.57%***
[−3.20] [−3.48] [−3.37] [−3.15] [−3.17] [−3.13]
Low 0.51%*** 0.52%*** 0.56%*** 0.49%*** 0.52%*** 0.52%***
[4.09] [4.31] [4.39] [4.03] [4.17] [4.10]
2 0.18% 0.17% 0.26%** 0.17% 0.17% 0.16%
[1.35] [1.32] [2.00] [1.25] [1.23] [1.21]
3 0.06% 0.05% 0.10% 0.06% 0.05% 0.06%
[0.60] [0.44] [0.86] [0.56] [0.43] [0.52]
4 0.07% 0.07% 0.09% 0.07% 0.07% 0.06%
[0.77] [0.86] [1.00] [0.82] [0.83] [0.69]
5 0.17%** 0.17%** 0.16%** 0.17%** 0.18%** 0.18%**
[2.07] [2.07] [2.02] [2.00] [2.12] [2.19]
6 0.11% 0.10% 0.10% 0.11% 0.10% 0.11%
[1.45] [1.33] [1.31] [1.48] [1.29] [1.43]
7 0.00% −0.01% −0.02% 0.00% 0.00% 0.01%
[0.07] [−0.11] [−0.22] [0.04] [0.02] [0.16]
8 −0.10% −0.10% −0.11% −0.09% −0.10% −0.10%
[−1.19] [−1.14] [−1.36] [−1.11] [−1.13] [−1.15]
9 −0.08% −0.09% −0.11% −0.08% −0.08% −0.08%
[−0.79] [−0.90] [−1.09] [−0.75] [−0.82] [−0.83]
High −0.07% −0.10% −0.06% −0.08% −0.06% −0.05%
[−0.52] [−0.74] [−0.45] [−0.60] [−0.44] [−0.41]
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Table 2.5 Continued
Panel B: Abnormal Returns of Equal-Weighted Portfolios based on Dispersion Beta
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
FF5 FF5 + PS FF5 + MOM FF5 + IVOL FF5 + AEM FF5 + HKM
H−L −0.62%*** −0.63%*** −0.68%*** −0.61%*** −0.60%*** −0.61%***
[−4.62] [−4.71] [−5.03] [−4.56] [−4.42] [−4.60]
Low 1.46%*** 1.46%*** 1.56%*** 1.44%*** 1.44%*** 1.46%***
[11.36] [11.83] [11.98] [11.56] [11.06] [11.23]
2 0.85%*** 0.84%*** 0.94%*** 0.84%*** 0.84%*** 0.84%***
[9.71] [9.73] [10.88] [9.75] [9.59] [9.61]
3 0.64%*** 0.62%*** 0.71%*** 0.63%*** 0.63%*** 0.64%***
[8.92] [9.06] [10.59] [9.01] [8.81] [8.80]
4 0.46%*** 0.44%*** 0.53%*** 0.46%*** 0.45%*** 0.46%***
[6.90] [6.83] [8.88] [7.01] [6.82] [6.70]
5 0.65%*** 0.62%*** 0.70%*** 0.65%*** 0.64%*** 0.64%***
[8.24] [8.22] [9.38] [8.32] [8.32] [8.15]
6 0.43%*** 0.41%*** 0.47%*** 0.44%*** 0.42%*** 0.43%***
[7.25] [7.03] [7.86] [7.25] [7.26] [7.17]
7 0.53%*** 0.52%*** 0.57%*** 0.53%*** 0.52%*** 0.52%***
[10.26] [9.80] [11.14] [10.39] [10.22] [10.11]
8 0.44%*** 0.43%*** 0.46%*** 0.44%*** 0.43%*** 0.44%***
[6.52] [6.12] [6.65] [6.55] [6.39] [6.56]
9 0.45%*** 0.44%*** 0.50%*** 0.45%*** 0.45%*** 0.46%***
[5.87] [5.65] [6.54] [5.90] [5.91] [5.93]
High 0.84%*** 0.83%*** 0.89%*** 0.83%*** 0.84%*** 0.85%***
[9.68] [9.79] [10.96] [9.79] [9.70] [10.24]
premium. H - L portfolio earns monthly abnormal returns of -0.57% to -0.68%, which implies that
estimated risk premium is 6.8% - 8.2% per annum.16 Overall, the results show that dispersion of
capital ratios indeed is priced in the cross-section of stock returns.
16A trading strategy that buys stocks in the lowest decile and sells short stocks in the highest decile can earn positive
abnormal returns. To test whether the ‘L - H’ portfolio is actually profitable, two issues need to be addressed. First,
short-sale constraints may limit the ability of making profits from short-selling stocks. As shown in Table 2.5, most of
the trading profits are attributed to the long-leg rather than the short-leg. Thus, short-sale constraints have little impact
on the trading profits. Second, trading stocks entails costs. Therefore, it is important to check if the portfolio is still
profitable after controlling for trading costs. Frazzini, Israel, and Moskowitz (2015) document that each trade costs up
to 10 bps for large cap stocks and 20 bps for small cap stocks. Assuming 20 bps as an average trading cost, I find that
trading-cost-adjusted profits (i.e., α of the L-H portfolio) are significant at the 1% level with an annual risk premium
of 6.0% - 7.2%.
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2.4.3 Trading Activity of Intermediaries
As shown in Panel B of Figure 2.2, the dispersion of intermediary capital is countercyclical,
which in turn leads to a countercyclical variation in aggregate risk aversion. As long as low-capital
intermediaries experience more severe declines in their capital than high-capital intermediaries
during bad times, asymmetric responses to the shock and compositional changes in the stock own-
ership can induce countercyclical variation in the aggregate risk aversion.17 Interestingly, Table 2.3
shows that capital increases in high-capital intermediaries in spite of the fact that the high cost of
capital would discount their market value and make it difficult for them to raise new capital during
bad times. I argue that this pattern is consistent with low-capital intermediaries being forced to
deleverage and selling off their assets to high-capital intermediaries at fire-sales prices during such
times.
I now explore whether the trading activity of both sets of intermediaries is consistent with
this. Ideally, I would like to identify the exact transaction date and the parties involved in the
transaction to establish whether or not assets are fire-sold. Since the Thomson Reuters Institutional
(13F) Holdings database provides neither the exact transaction date nor the parties involved in the
transaction, I can only indirectly infer whether they are fire-sold from the trading volumes during
the quarter and the trading gains, or abnormal returns, in the following quarter.18 Note that the list
of the largest 30 intermediaries can change every quarter and therefore an entry to (an exit from)
the list may result in a spurious increase (decrease) in stock holdings, which potentially biases
trading activities of the intermediaries. To avoid this issue, I include all intermediaries that have
been listed as the largest 30 intermediaries at least once.
17That means increase in capital of high-capital intermediaries is not a necessary condition for the countercyclical
variation in the aggregate risk aversion.
18That is, the agents who bought (sold) an asset at a price lower than the fundamental value would earn positive
(negative) abnormal returns in the subsequent period.
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I perform the following regressions:
Stock PurchasesIm,t = γ0 + γ1DISP
Capr
t + Controlsm,t + FE + ε
I
m,t (2.4.2)
Stock SalesIm,t = γ0 + γ1DISP
Capr
t + Controlsm,t + FE + ε
I
m,t (2.4.3)
where m represents 13F managers, and Stock PurchasesIt and Stock Sales
I
t , I ∈ {H,L}, are de-
fined as the total amount of stocks bought and sold, respectively, in quarter t, measured in billion
dollars. High- and low-capital intermediaries are the ones above and below the 50th percentile of
intermediary capital. The dispersion of capital ratios (DISPCaprt ), defined in (2.3.2), is a proxy
for bad times, as aggregate risk aversion increases with the dispersion of capital ratios. Control
variables include intermediary size (measured as the log of market capitalization) and portfolio
size (measured as the log of portfolio size of 13F manager). For trading gains, I run the following
regression:
Trading GainsIm,t+1 = θ0 + θ11(Intermediary Capitalt = Low)×DISP
Capr
t
+ θ21(Intermediary Capitalt = Low) + θ3DISP
Capr
t + Controlsm,t + FE + ε
I
m,t+1. (2.4.4)




, nt is the signed number of shares traded, pt is the
price at the end of quarter t, and αt+1 is the abnormal return in the quarter t+1, estimated using the
Fama-French five factor model (Fama and French, 2015).19 1(Intermediary Capitalt = Low) is an
indicator function which takes the value of one if the intermediary capital ratio of a 13F manager
is lower than the median in quarter t and zero otherwise.
Table 2.6 shows the regressions results for trading volume from Equations (2.4.2) and (2.4.3)
for high-capital intermediaries (Panel A) and low-capital intermediaries (Panel B). First, as the
dispersion of capital ratios increases, high-capital intermediaries do not significantly reduce stock
19Note that nt > 0 represents stock purchases and nt < 0 represents stock sales. Thus, Trading GainsIm,t+1
from stock purchases are defined as
∑
1(nt>0)|nt|pt×αt+1∑
|nt|pt , and Trading Gains
I






This table reports the results of OLS regressions for trading volume of 13F institutional investment managers who
belong to the largest 30 intermediaries in the U.S. based on market capitalization. Panels A and B show the results using
subsamples of managers who belong to high- and low-capital intermediaries, ones above and below the 50th percentile
of intermediary capital. Dependent variables are trading volume of managers from stock trades (i.e., purchases and
sales) in quarter t, measured in billion dollars. For each stock, trading volume is computed as the number of shares
traded during the quarter t times the price at the end of quarter t. The trading volume for All Stocks is defined as the
sum of trading volumes of all stocks traded during the quarter. The trading volume for Stocks (∆IOL < 0) is the
sum of trading volumes of stocks traded in which low-capital intermediaries reduce their holdings during the quarter.
Similarly, the trading volume for Stocks (∆IOH > 0) is the sum of trading volumes of stocks traded in which high-
capital intermediaries raise their holdings during the quarter. DISPCapr is the dispersion of intermediary capital,
defined in Table 2.1. Intermediary size is measured as the log of the intermediary’s market capitalization. Portfolio
size is the log of the total portfolio size of the manager. The intermediaries are identified as all firms listed on NYSE,
AMEX, or NASDAQ whose header SIC code or historical SIC code is 6000-6200 or 6712. The nonfinancial firms are
identified as all firms listed on NYSE, AMEX, or NASDAQ excluding financial firms (header SIC code or historical
SIC code 6). The sample period covers 1980/Q1 to 2012/Q4. Standard errors are clustered by 13F manager. t-statistics
are in square brackets. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
Panel A: Trading Volume for Managers of High-Capital Intermediary
Stock Purchases Stock Sales
(1) (2) (3)
All Stocks Stocks (∆IOL < 0) All Stocks
DISPCapr -0.255 1.666∗∗ 2.715
[-0.37] [2.53] [0.89]
Intermediary Size 0.044 -0.376 1.088
[0.08] [-0.67] [1.27]
Portfolio Size 1.251∗∗∗ 0.659∗∗∗ 0.373
[2.82] [2.73] [0.90]
Manager FE Yes Yes Yes
Year and Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes
N 2,072 2,057 2,072
adj. R2 0.298 0.230 0.239
Panel B: Trading Volume for Managers of Low-Capital Intermediary
Stock Purchases Stock Sales
(1) (2) (3)
All Stocks All Stocks Stocks (∆IOH > 0)
DISPCapr -6.470∗∗ 9.645∗ 8.310∗∗
[-2.58] [1.95] [2.16]
Intermediary Size -0.280 2.114∗∗ 1.399∗∗∗
[-0.19] [2.59] [2.75]
Portfolio Size 3.755∗∗∗ 0.271 0.048
[2.71] [0.30] [0.09]
Manager FE Yes Yes Yes
Year and Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes
N 1,575 1,575 1,574
adj. R2 0.440 0.338 0.207
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purchases and raise stock sales (Columns (1) and (3) in Panel A). However, as the dispersion of
capital ratios increases, low-capital intermediaries do significantly reduce their stock purchases
and raise their stock sales (Columns (1) and (2) in Panel B). These results provide evidence that
low-capital intermediaries deleverage by selling off assets while high-capital intermediaries do not
exhibit similar behavior.
More importantly, I am interested in whether high-capital intermediaries purchase stocks that
low-capital intermediaries sell during bad times and, similarly, whether low-capital intermediaries
sell stocks that high-capital intermediaries buy during such times. Since the identity of the parties
involved in the transaction is not observable from the data, I use the change in ownership by high-
and low-capital intermediaries to classify the stocks that high-capital intermediaries purchase and
low-capital intermediaries sell. Specifically, I identify the stocks that high-capital intermediaries
purchase as ones in which they raise their holdings during quarter t (∆IOH > 0); and the stocks
that low-capital intermediaries sell as ones in which they reduce their holdings during quarter t
(∆IOL < 0).
Column (2) of Panel A shows that as the dispersion of capital ratios increases, high-capital in-
termediaries purchase significantly more stocks that low-capital intermediaries sell. Also, Column
(3) of Panel B indicates that as the dispersion of capital ratios increases, low-capital intermediaries
sell significantly more stocks that high-capital intermediaries purchase. It is apparent that there are
asset transfers from low-capital intermediaries to high-capital intermediaries during bad times.
Table 2.7 summarizes the trading gains of high- and low-capital intermediaries to show at
what price they trade stocks during bad times, estimating Equation (2.4.4). There are two sources
of trading gains that intermediaries can earn: stocks bought can appreciate in value, and stocks
sold can depreciate in value. The latter is not a realized return, but more related to forgone returns
on sales. If low-capital intermediaries sell stocks to high-capital intermediaries at fire-sale prices
(i.e., at prices lower than fundamental values), one would expect that high-capital intermediaries
earn positive returns on stock purchases, and low-capital intermediaries lose in terms of forgone
returns on sales in the following period when stock prices return to their fundamental values.
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In Pane A, I find the evidence that is consistent with the argument above. As the dispersion of
capital ratios increases, low-capital intermediaries earn lower abnormal trading gains than high-
capital intermediaries in the following quarter. Also, the difference is mainly attributed to the price
depreciation of stocks sold in Column (3), implying that low-capital intermediaries suffer losses
from stock sales.
Panels B and C present the trading gains separately for high- and low-capital intermediaries.
In both panels, buying (selling) stocks would result in positive (negative) returns during bad times,
implying that stock prices, in general, deflate during bad times. However, the trading gains, re-
ported in Panel A, are mainly attributed to positive returns from purchases on stocks by high-capital
intermediaries (Column (2) of Panel B) and negative returns from forgone losses on stock sales by
low-capital intermediaries (Column (3) of Panel C). As the dispersion of capital ratios rose to 2.51
in the financial crisis as in Table 2.3, high- (low-) capital intermediaries earn (lose) abnormal re-
turns of 1.51% (1.81%)20 from purchases (sales) of stocks over the following quarter t + 1 in the
financial crisis.21
Altogether, the findings in Tables 2.6 and 2.7 are consistent with the hypothesis that low-
capital intermediaries sell their stocks to high-capital intermediaries at fire-sale prices during bad
times.
2.5 Additional Tests and Robustness Checks
This section presents the results of additional tests to establish the robustness of the empirical
findings in Section 2.4.
2.5.1 Comparison with Other Risk Aversion Measures
Since the dispersion of capital ratios in Equation (2.3.2) captures time-varying weights of cap-
ital held by intermediaries who are different in risk aversion, it is (positively) related to aggregate
risk aversion. Therefore, it is important to compare the dispersion of capital ratios with other risk
201.51% = 2.51 × 0.60% and 1.81% = 2.51 × 0.72%
21As an extreme case, for 2008/Q3-Q4, high-capital intermediaries earned abnormal trading gains of 4.8% while




This table reports the results of OLS regressions for trading gains of 13F institutional investment managers who belong
to the largest 30 intermediaries in the U.S. Panel A shows the results using the whole sample. Panels B and C show
the results using subsamples of managers who belong to high- and low-capital intermediaries. Dependent variables
are abnormal trading gains for stock purchases (sales) by managers in quarter t + 1 from stocks purchased (sold) in
quarter t, estimated using the Fama-French five factor model (Fama and French, 2015). The sum of trading gains
from stock purchases and sales is total grading gains. 1(Intermediary Capital = Low) is one if the manager belongs
to a low-capital intermediary and zero otherwise. High- and low-capital intermediaries are the ones above and below
the 50th percentile of intermediary capital. DISPCapr is the dispersion of intermediary capital, defined in Table 2.1.
Intermediary size is measured as the log of the intermediary’s market capitalization. Portfolio size is the log of the
total portfolio size of the manager. The intermediaries are identified as all firms listed on NYSE, AMEX, or NASDAQ
whose header SIC code or historical SIC code is 6000-6200 or 6712. The nonfinancial firms are identified as all firms
listed on NYSE, AMEX, or NASDAQ excluding financial firms (header SIC code or historical SIC code 6). The
sample period covers 1980/Q1 to 2012/Q4. Standard errors are clustered by 13F manager. t-statistics are in square
brackets. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
Panel A: Trading Gains by Intermediary Capital
(1) (2) (3)
Total (%) Buy (%) Sell (%)
1(Intermediary Capital = Low) × DISPCapr -0.401∗∗ -0.025 -0.375∗∗∗
[-2.14] [-0.21] [-2.92]
1(Intermediary Capital = Low) 0.408 -0.002 0.411∗∗
[1.28] [-0.01] [2.27]
DISPCapr 0.177 0.503∗∗ -0.326∗
[0.68] [2.43] [-1.92]
Intermediary Size 0.197 0.063 0.135
[0.85] [0.45] [0.93]
Portfolio Size 0.278∗ -0.020 0.299
[1.88] [-0.24] [1.40]
Manager FE Yes Yes Yes
Year and Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes
N 3,660 3,660 3,660
adj. R2 0.009 0.005 0.029
Panel B: Trading Gains for Managers of High-Capital Intermediary
(1) (2) (3)
Total (%) Buy (%) Sell (%)
DISPCapr 0.245 0.600∗∗ -0.355
[0.77] [2.14] [-1.64]
Intermediary Size 0.732 0.266 0.467
[1.04] [0.64] [1.26]
Portfolio Size 0.289 -0.049 0.338
[1.37] [-0.33] [1.02]
Manager FE Yes Yes Yes
Year and Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes
N 2,072 2,072 2,072
adj. R2 0.006 -0.009 0.014
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Table 2.7 Continued
Panel C: Trading Gains for Managers of Low-Capital Intermediary
(1) (2) (3)
Total (%) Buy (%) Sell (%)
DISPCapr -0.367 0.357∗ -0.724∗∗∗
[-1.39] [1.90] [-4.05]
Intermediary Size -0.180 -0.105 -0.074
[-0.78] [-0.58] [-0.52]
Portfolio Size 0.283∗∗ 0.055 0.228∗∗
[2.38] [0.49] [2.38]
Manager FE Yes Yes Yes
Year and Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes
N 1,575 1,575 1,575
adj. R2 0.046 0.073 0.052
aversion measures in existing studies.
The first set of measures is sentiment indices, including the Investor Sentiment Index of Baker
and Wurgler (2006) and the Michigan Consumer Sentiment Index (MCSI) from the Surveys of
Consumers, conducted by the University of Michigan. Although risk aversion measures an in-
vestors’ attitude towards risk, the sentiment index is based on psychological and behavioral biases
because it captures how much investors/consumers are optimistic or pessimistic about future mar-
ket and economic conditions. However, at least empirically, we may expect that sentiment is likely
to be high in the state of the world in which aggregate risk aversion is low. The second measure is
the variance risk premium, a well-known indicator of risk aversion (Rosenberg and Engle, 2002;
Bollerslev, Gibson, and Zhou, 2011; Bekaert and Hoerova, 2016). The premium is defined as
the difference between the risk-neutral variance and the realized variance, where the risk-neutral
variance is the square of the Chicago Board Options Exchange (CBOE)’s VIX and the realized
variance is the sum of squared 5-minute returns of the S&P 500 Index. Finally, I use the Risk
Aversion Index developed by Bekaert, Engstrom, and Xu (2019).22
Table 2.8 shows a correlation matrix among various risk aversion measures. Consistent with




Correlation with Other Risk Aversion Measures
This table reports a correlation matrix among risk aversion measures. DISPCapr is the dispersion of intermediary
capital, defined in Equation (2.3.2); Investor Sentiment is defined in Baker and Wurgler (2006); the Michigan Con-
sumer Sentiment Index (MCSI) is from the Surveys of Consumers, conducted by the University of Michigan; Variance
Risk Premium is defined as the difference between the risk-neutral variance and the realized variance of S&P 500
Index; and BEX Risk Aversion is obtained from Bekaert, Engstrom, and Xu (2019). The sample period covers from
1972/Q4 to 2016/Q4. Due to limited data availability, Variance Risk Premium and BEX Risk Aversion start from
1990/Q1 and 1986/Q2, respectively. p-values are in square brackets.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)





1.000 -0.149 -0.534 0.117 0.306
[0.048] [0.000] [0.226] [0.001]







the arguments mentioned above, the dispersion of capital ratios is negatively correlated with the
sentiment indices and positively correlated with the variance risk premium and the BEX risk aver-
sion index.
2.5.2 Trading Activity of Intermediaries and Risk Characteristics of Stocks
Section 2.4.3 investigated trading activity by intermediaries with different capital ratios during
bad times. This leads to a question of which stocks these intermediaries trade. In particular,
when low-capital intermediaries are forced to sell assets after being hit by an adverse shock, they
may be reluctant to sell stocks that have experienced severe price collapses (i.e., stocks with low
dispersion betas) to avoid huge losses from selling those stocks. However, risk-averse high-capital
intermediaries may not be interested in buying assets from low-capital intermediaries unless prices
have dropped sufficiently. I now address this by directly investigating changes in holdings of
intermediaries at the stock-level.
Table 2.9 presents the trading volume of stocks by high- and low-capital intermediaries in
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Panel A and B, respectively. Trading volume is defined as the dollar amount of net purchases in
a stock for a quarter t scaled by the manager’s portfolio size. As in Tables 2.6 and 2.7, high- and
low-capital intermediaries have capital ratios above and below the 50th percentile, respectively, of
the largest 30 intermediaries in the U.S. High- (Low-) βDISP stocks belong to the highest (lowest)
three deciles in the dispersion beta. Stocks in the middle four deciles are denoted as Med-βDISP .
Panel A shows that high-capital intermediaries purchase significantly larger amounts of stocks
with Low-βDISP than those with Med- or High-βDISP when the dispersion of capital ratios is high
(i.e., during bad times). In contrast, Panel B provides evidence that low-capital intermediaries sell
significantly larger amounts of stocks with Med-βDISP than those with Low- or High-βDISP when
the dispersion of capital ratios is high. Interestingly, the findings in Table 2.9 document that there
is a trade mismatch between high- and low-capital intermediaries during bad times. High-capital
intermediaries are so risk averse that they are willing to buy only stocks that have sufficiently
fallen in price. At the same time, low-capital intermediaries do not want to sell those assets if they
believe that prices have temporarily dropped below fundamental values and will recover again.
Rather, they choose to sell stocks that have experienced modest price drop.
2.5.3 Long-Term Predictability of Abnormal Returns
In this section, I investigate how the abnormal returns based on the dispersion beta are per-
sistent by analyzing the long-term predictability. If the abnormal returns found in Table 2.5 are
due to market mispricing, they will be arbitraged away in a short period of time given that markets
are sufficiently complete. To rule out this possibility, it is necessary to test whether the abnormal
returns are persistent in the long-term.
Table 2.10 shows the long-term predictability of the abnormal returns based on the dispersion
beta. In particular, portfolios are formed at the beginning of month t + i, for i = 1, 3, · · · , 24,
using the dispersion beta available at the end of month t. The portfolios are either value-weighted
(Panel A) or equal-weighted (Panel B). The spreads between high-dispersion beta stocks and low-
dispersion beta stocks are statistically significant almost up to 24 months. The magnitude of the
abnormal returns of H-L portfolios is stable over 12 months (with an annual risk premium in the
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Table 2.9
Trading Activity of Intermediaries and Risk Characteristics of Stocks
This table reports the results of OLS regressions for the trading activity of intermediaries. Panel A presents the trading
activities of high-capital intermediaries, and Panel B presents those of low-capital intermediaries. High- and low-
capital intermediaries have capital ratios above and below the 50th percentile. Dependent variables are trading volume,
defined as the dollar-value of net purchases in a stock during a quarter scaled by the manager’s portfolio size. 1(βDISP
= High) is one if stocks belong to the highest three deciles in the dispersion beta and zero otherwise. 1(βDISP = Med)
is one if stocks belong to the middle four deciles in the dispersion beta and zero otherwise. 1(βDISP = Low) is one
if stocks belong to the lowest three deciles in the dispersion beta and zero otherwise. DISPCapr is the dispersion
of intermediary capital, defined in Table 2.1. Intermediary size is the log of the intermediary’s market capitalization.
βMKT is the market beta, estimated from monthly regressions using 5-year rolling windows. Market Cap is the log
of the stock’s market capitalization. B/M is the book-to-market ratio, book equity over market capitalization. MOM
is momentum, the cumulative return over the previous one year, skipping the most recent month. ROE is income
before extraordinary items over lagged book equity. I/A is asset growth, the percentage change in total assets. Return
Volatility is the quarterly standard deviation of daily stock returns. The intermediaries are identified as all firms listed
on NYSE, AMEX, or NASDAQ whose header SIC code or historical SIC code is 6000-6200 or 6712. The largest 30
intermediaries are identified based on their market capitalization at the end of each quarter. The nonfinancial firms are
identified as all firms listed on NYSE, AMEX, or NASDAQ excluding financial firms (header SIC code or historical
SIC code 6). The sample period covers 1980/Q1 to 2012/Q4. Standard errors are clustered by 13F manager and
stock. t-statistics are in square brackets. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level,
respectively.
Panel A: Trading Volume of High-Capital Intermediary
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Volume Volume Volume Volume
1(βDISP = Low) × DISPCapr 6.787∗∗∗ 6.986∗∗∗
[2.72] [2.74]
1(βDISP = Med) × DISPCapr 0.498 0.491
[0.32] [0.52]
1(βDISP = High) × DISPCapr -1.310 0.707
[-1.00] [0.47]
1(βDISP = Low) -8.491∗∗∗ -8.393∗
[-4.46] [-1.80]
1(βDISP = Med) -3.547∗∗∗ -3.106
[-4.28] [-1.08]
1(βDISP = High) 4.315∗∗∗ 0.444
[6.44] [0.16]
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Manager FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year × Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 1,687,770 1,687,770 1,687,770 1,687,770
adj. R2 0.058 0.058 0.058 0.058
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Table 2.9 Continued
Panel B: Trading Volume of Low-Capital Intermediary
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Volume Volume Volume Volume
1(βDISP = Low) × DISPCapr 1.646 1.912
[0.73] [1.09]
1(βDISP = Med) × DISPCapr -4.813∗∗ -4.907∗∗∗
[-2.32] [-5.07]
1(βDISP = High) × DISPCapr 1.597 0.145
[0.58] [0.06]
1(βDISP = Low) 0.831 -1.071
[0.60] [-0.66]
1(βDISP = Med) 6.566∗∗ 4.582∗
[2.49] [1.72]
1(βDISP = High) -6.601 -5.099
[-1.33] [-0.90]
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Manager FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year × Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 1,927,980 1,927,980 1,927,980 1,927,980
adj. R2 0.114 0.114 0.114 0.114
range of 6.8% to 8.6%) and then gradually attenuates afterwards.
The persistent abnormal returns reported in Table 2.10 are also related to the persistence of
the dispersion beta. The (untabulated) results indicate that the probability that stocks in the lowest
decile stay in the same decile after one quarter, one year, and two years is 84.2%, 63.8%, and
46.3%, respectively and that the probability that stocks in the highest decile stay in the same decile
after one quarter, one year, and two years is 83.1%, 60.2%, and 43.0%, respectively. Such a
slow-moving beta is consistent with the persistent abnormal returns of the portfolios based on the
dispersion beta.
2.5.4 Controlling Industry Effect
Equation (2.4.1) can be misspecified if the dispersion beta is clustered by industry. As dis-
cussed in Lyon, Barber, and Tsai (1999) and Johnson, Moorman, and Sorescu (2009), this industry
clustering may lead to a spurious relation between risk characteristics being tested and stock re-
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Table 2.10
Long-Term Abnormal Returns based on Dispersion Beta
This table reports abnormal returns of long-short portfolios that buy high-dispertion beta stocks and sell short low
-dispersion beta stocks (H-L) up to 24 months. Portfolios are value-weighted in Panel A and equal-weighted in Panel
B. FF5 is the Fama-French five factor model (Fama and French, 2015), FF5+PS adds the liquidity factor (Pástor and
Stambaugh, 2003) to FF5, FF5+MOM adds the momentum factor (Jegadeesh and Titman, 1993) to FF5, FF5+AEM
adds the intermediary leverage factor (Adrian, Etula, and Muir, 2014) to FF5, and FF5+HKM adds the intermediary
capital factor (He, Kelly, and Manela, 2017) to FF5. The dispersion beta, defined in Table 2.1, is estimated from quar-
terly regressions using 5-year rolling windows. The intermediaries are identified as all firms listed on NYSE, AMEX,
or NASDAQ whose header SIC code or historical SIC code is 6000-6200 or 6712. The largest 30 intermediaries
are identified based on their market capitalization at the end of each quarter. The nonfinancial firms are identified as
all firms listed on NYSE, AMEX, or NASDAQ excluding financial firms (header SIC code or historical SIC code
6). The sample period covers January 1978 to December 2016. Standard errors are adjusted using the Newey-West
method. t-statistics are in square brackets. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10%
level, respectively.
Panel A: Long-Term Abnormal Returns of H-L Portfolios (VW) based on Dispersion Beta
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
FF5 FF5 + PS FF5 + MOM FF5 + IVOL FF5 + AEM FF5 + HKM
t+ 1 -0.58%*** -0.62%*** -0.62%*** -0.57%*** -0.58%*** -0.57%***
[-3.20] [-3.48] [-3.37] [-3.15] [-3.17] [-3.13]
t+ 3 -0.62%*** -0.65%*** -0.61%*** -0.61%*** -0.61%*** -0.61%***
[-3.31] [-3.44] [-3.29] [-3.25] [-3.28] [-3.27]
t+ 6 -0.67%*** -0.69%*** -0.66%*** -0.66%*** -0.66%*** -0.68%***
[-3.64] [-3.73] [-3.59] [-3.55] [-3.59] [-3.62]
t+ 9 -0.58%*** -0.60%*** -0.56%*** -0.57%*** -0.57%*** -0.58%***
[-3.35] [-3.45] [-3.26] [-3.25] [-3.32] [-3.32]
t+ 12 -0.59%*** -0.62%*** -0.58%*** -0.58%*** -0.59%*** -0.60%***
[-3.54] [-3.71] [-3.44] [-3.43] [-3.52] [-3.53]
t+ 15 -0.53%*** -0.56%*** -0.51%*** -0.53%*** -0.53%*** -0.52%***
[-2.76] [-2.89] [-2.67] [-2.72] [-2.80] [-2.76]
t+ 18 -0.41%** -0.43%** -0.39%** -0.40%** -0.41%** -0.40%**
[-2.14] [-2.22] [-2.08] [-2.07] [-2.19] [-2.13]
t+ 21 -0.40%** -0.40%** -0.32%* -0.40%** -0.42%** -0.39%**
[-2.24] [-2.21] [-1.85] [-2.25] [-2.37] [-2.24]
t+ 24 -0.27% -0.31% -0.26% -0.27% -0.30% -0.27%
[-1.22] [-1.34] [-1.17] [-1.21] [-1.38] [-1.25]
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Table 2.10 Continued
Panel B: Long-Term Abnormal Returns of H-L Portfolios (EW) based on Dispersion Beta
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
FF5 FF5 + PS FF5 + MOM FF5 + IVOL FF5 + AEM FF5 + HKM
t+ 1 -0.62%*** -0.63%*** -0.68%*** -0.61%*** -0.60%*** -0.61%***
[-4.62] [-4.71] [-5.03] [-4.56] [-4.42] [-4.60]
t+ 3 -0.58%*** -0.58%*** -0.61%*** -0.58%*** -0.57%*** -0.57%***
[-4.46] [-4.44] [-4.77] [-4.40] [-4.36] [-4.50]
t+ 6 -0.70%*** -0.69%*** -0.72%*** -0.69%*** -0.68%*** -0.68%***
[-5.75] [-5.74] [-5.93] [-5.66] [-5.63] [-5.85]
t+ 9 -0.69%*** -0.69%*** -0.70%*** -0.68%*** -0.66%*** -0.68%***
[-5.75] [-5.80] [-5.72] [-5.67] [-5.61] [-5.82]
t+ 12 -0.67%*** -0.67%*** -0.67%*** -0.66%*** -0.65%*** -0.66%***
[-5.99] [-6.12] [-6.10] [-5.91] [-5.87] [-5.98]
t+ 15 -0.59%*** -0.60%*** -0.57%*** -0.59%*** -0.59%*** -0.59%***
[-4.93] [-5.12] [-4.85] [-4.91] [-5.06] [-4.98]
t+ 18 -0.47%*** -0.47%*** -0.44%*** -0.47%*** -0.47%*** -0.47%***
[-4.14] [-4.26] [-3.95] [-4.11] [-4.22] [-4.19]
t+ 21 -0.43%*** -0.42%*** -0.39%*** -0.43%*** -0.44%*** -0.43%***
[-3.87] [-3.89] [-3.41] [-3.90] [-4.04] [-3.93]
t+ 24 -0.24%** -0.25%** -0.22%* -0.24%** -0.25%** -0.24%**
[-2.07] [-2.15] [-1.89] [-2.07] [-2.23] [-2.12]
turns. To rule out the possibility of the industry clustering in the dispersion beta, I include industry
fixed effect in the Fama-MacBeth regressions as follows:
rit+1 − r
f





j + εit+1 (2.5.1)
where Zj is the industry fixed effect. For each month, stocks are assigned to each industry based
on SIC codes and the Fama-French 10-industry classification.
Table 2.11 shows the estimation results of Equation (2.5.1). The dispersion beta (βDISP )
appears to be negatively priced in the cross-section of stock returns. The estimated price of risk
for the dispersion beta is similar to the one without the industry effect in Table 2.4, implying that
the relation between the dispersion beta and stock returns is hardly influenced by any unobserved
heterogeneity across industry (e.g., the industry clustering).
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Table 2.11
Fama-MacBeth Regressions: Controlling for Industry Effect
This table reports the estimation results for the Fama-MacBeth regressions controlling for the industry effect. De-
pendent variables are monthly returns on nonfinancial firm stocks in excess of the one-month Treasury bill rate. The
dispersion beta, defined in Table 2.1, is estimated from quarterly regressions using 5-year rolling windows. I control
for βMKT , βAEM (Adrian, Etula, and Muir, 2014), βHKM (He, Kelly, and Manela, 2017), Size (the log of market
capitalization), B/M (book-to-market ratio), MOM (momentum), OP (operating profitability, and I/A (asset growth),
defined in Table 2.4. To control unobserved heterogeneity across industry, I also include industry fixed effect based
on the Fama-French 10-industry classification. The intermediaries are identified as all firms listed on NYSE, AMEX,
or NASDAQ whose header SIC code or historical SIC code is 6000-6200 or 6712. The largest 30 intermediaries
are identified based on their market capitalization at the end of each quarter. The nonfinancial firms are identified as
all firms listed on NYSE, AMEX, or NASDAQ excluding financial firms (header SIC code or historical SIC code
6). The sample period covers January 1978 to December 2016. Standard errors are adjusted using the Newey-West
method. t-statistics are in square brackets. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10%
level, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Dep. Var. ri − rf ri − rf ri − rf ri − rf ri − rf ri − rf ri − rf
βDISP −0.75*** −0.73*** −0.49*** −0.44*** −0.35*** −0.34*** −0.38***
[−5.13] [−5.21] [−3.92] [−3.87] [−3.12] [−3.16] [−3.01]
βMKT 0.19 0.19 0.26** 0.28** 0.13 0.18
[1.25] [1.28] [2.05] [2.10] [1.13] [1.36]
βAEM 0.32*** 0.15*** 0.13*** 0.14***
[5.19] [3.67] [3.29] [3.31]
βHKM 0.13*** 0.08** 0.08* 0.08*
[3.03] [2.05] [1.94] [1.74]
Size −0.46*** −0.45*** −0.36*** −0.33***
[−12.49] [−12.47] [−11.67] [−9.90]
B/M 0.22** 0.22** 0.24*** 0.24**
[2.58] [2.50] [3.03] [2.48]
MOM −0.10 −0.10 −0.10 −0.26
[−0.57] [−0.56] [−0.60] [−1.35]
OP 0.08 0.07 0.14 0.03
[0.64] [0.63] [1.23] [0.30]
I/A −0.85*** −0.85*** −0.88*** −0.87***







Alternative Dispersion of Capital Ratios: Balancing Size of High- and Low-Capital Intermediaries
This table reports the estimation results for the Fama-MacBeth regressions. Dependent variables are monthly returns
on nonfinancial firm stocks in excess of the one-month Treasury bill rate. The dispersion beta, defined in Table 2.1, is
estimated from quarterly regressions using 5-year rolling windows. To account for the difference in size (i.e., market
capitalization) of high- and low-capital intermediaries, the dispersion of intermediary capital is defined differently so
that the total market capitalizations of high- and low-capital intermediaries are similar: the difference between the
75th percentile and the 10th percentile of intermediary capital of the largest 30 intermediaries in the U.S., scaled by its
50th percentile. I control for βMKT , βAEM (Adrian, Etula, and Muir, 2014), βHKM (He, Kelly, and Manela, 2017),
Size (the log of market capitalization), B/M (book-to-market ratio), MOM (momentum), OP (operating profitability,
and I/A (asset growth), defined in Table 2.4. The intermediaries are identified as all firms listed on NYSE, AMEX,
or NASDAQ whose header SIC code or historical SIC code is 6000-6200 or 6712. The largest 30 intermediaries
are identified based on their market capitalization at the end of each quarter. The nonfinancial firms are identified as
all firms listed on NYSE, AMEX, or NASDAQ excluding financial firms (header SIC code or historical SIC code
6). The sample period covers January 1978 to December 2016. Standard errors are adjusted using the Newey-West
method. t-statistics are in square brackets. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10%
level, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Dep. Var. ri − rf ri − rf ri − rf ri − rf ri − rf ri − rf ri − rf
βDISP −0.51*** −0.49*** −0.28** −0.30*** −0.19** −0.20** −0.21**
[−3.54] [−3.71] [−2.38] [−3.06] [−2.14] [−2.30] [−2.20]
βMKT 0.32* 0.33* 0.28* 0.31** 0.14 0.20
[1.74] [1.82] [1.86] [2.04] [1.03] [1.32]
βAEM 0.35*** 0.16*** 0.13*** 0.16***
[4.90] [3.42] [3.09] [3.58]
βHKM 0.14*** 0.10** 0.11** 0.10*
[2.67] [2.18] [2.26] [1.79]
Size −0.47*** −0.47*** −0.36*** −0.33***
[−12.19] [−12.19] [−11.48] [−9.64]
B/M 0.11 0.10 0.14 0.15
[1.06] [0.94] [1.51] [1.32]
MOM 0.04 0.05 0.03 −0.16
[0.21] [0.25] [0.17] [−0.78]
OP −0.05 −0.04 0.04 −0.06
[−0.35] [−0.34] [0.35] [−0.56]
I/A −0.77*** −0.76*** −0.82*** −0.84***






2.5.5 Balancing Size of High- and Low-Capital Intermediaries
When the dispersion of capital ratios is defined in Equation (2.3.2), the X th percentile of the
intermediary capital of the largest 30 intermediaries in the U.S. is simply based on the number
of the intermediaries and does not account for the size of the intermediaries. Summary statistics
in Panel A of Table 2.1 report that high-capital intermediaries tend to be smaller than low-capital
intermediaries. Therefore, total size of intermediaries above the 75th percentile of intermediary
capital is lower than that below its 25th percentile.23
To measure theX th percentile of the intermediary capital by incorporating the size of interme-
diaries, I redefine the dispersion of capital ratios so that the total market capitalization of high- and
low-capitalization are similar: the difference between the 75th percentile and the 10th percentile of











Table 2.12 reports the results based on Equation (2.5.2). Similar to Table 2.4, I continue to find
that the dispersion beta (βDISP ) is significantly and negatively priced in the cross-section of stock
returns.
2.5.6 Using Largest 40 or 50 Intermediaries
The main results in Section 2.4 define financial intermediaries to be the largest 30 intermedi-
aries. Ideally, I would like to include all intermediaries that are large enough to make their capital
important in characterizing the pricing kernel. However, there is no clear-cut way to determine how
many intermediaries are marginal investors. To test if my choice of the number of intermediaries
affects the results, I now alternatively measure the dispersion of capital ratios using the largest 40
or 50 intermediaries.
23Total market capitalizations above the 75th percentile and below the 25th percentile of intermediary capital of
the largest 30 intermediaries in the U.S. are $93 billion and $223 billion on average.
24Total market capitalizations below the 10th and 11th percentile are $71 billion and $103 billion, respectively, on
average. For simplicity, I report the results based on the 10th percentile, but the results based on the 11th percentile
are also significant at the 1% or 5% level.
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Table 2.13
Alternative Dispersion of Capital Ratios: Using Largest 40 or 50 Intermediaries
This table reports the estimation results for the Fama-MacBeth regressions. Dependent variables are monthly returns
on nonfinancial firm stocks in excess of the one-month Treasury bill rate. The dispersion beta, defined in Table
2.1, is estimated from quarterly regressions using 5-year rolling windows. However, the dispersion of intermediary
capital is defined using the largest 40 or 50 intermediaries. I control for βMKT , βAEM (Adrian, Etula, and Muir,
2014), βHKM (He, Kelly, and Manela, 2017), Size (the log of market capitalization), B/M (book-to-market ratio),
MOM (momentum), OP (operating profitability, and I/A (asset growth), defined in Table 2.4. The intermediaries are
identified as all firms listed on NYSE, AMEX, or NASDAQ whose header SIC code or historical SIC code is 6000-
6200 or 6712. The largest 40 or 50 intermediaries are identified based on their market capitalization at the end of each
quarter. The nonfinancial firms are identified as all firms listed on NYSE, AMEX, or NASDAQ excluding financial
firms (header SIC code or historical SIC code 6). The sample period covers January 1978 to December 2016. Standard
errors are adjusted using the Newey-West method. t-statistics are in square brackets. ***, **, and * indicate statistical
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
Top 40 Intermediaries Top 50 Intermediaries
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dep. Var. ri − rf ri − rf ri − rf ri − rf ri − rf ri − rf
βDISP −0.47*** −0.67*** −0.26* −0.41*** −0.26* −0.17
[−2.72] [−4.07] [−1.91] [−2.89] [−1.96] [−1.40]
βMKT 0.30* 0.32* 0.15 0.34* 0.32* 0.13
[1.68] [1.82] [1.17] [1.85] [1.79] [1.02]
βAEM 0.29*** 0.11** 0.35*** 0.15***
[3.93] [2.15] [5.15] [3.60]
βHKM 0.17*** 0.12** 0.20*** 0.13***














Table 2.13 summarizes the results. In Columns (1) - (3), I find that the dispersion beta (βDISP )
based on the largest 40 intermediaries is still significantly priced in the cross-section of stock
returns, but the price of risk is rather smaller than in Table 2.4. In Columns (4) - (6), the results
based on the largest 50 intermediaries are marginally significant or insignificant. It appears that at
least some intermediaries outside the largest 40 intermediaries can be inappropriate to be viewed
as marginal investors.
2.5.7 Using Book Capital Ratio
In Section 2.4, I measure intermediary capital based on market values. It is interesting to
examine if consistent results are obtained when the book capital ratio is used to estimate the dis-
persion beta. As discussed in He, Kelly, and Manela (2017), if intermediaries perfectly implement
mark-to-market for their holdings of financial assets, intermediary capital measured based on mar-
ket values and book values should be aligned. When the intermediaries are selling off assets to
reduce debt, the book capital ratio continues to rise. However, if a high discount rate during bad
times pushes down the market value of capital faster than the debt decreases, the market capital
ratio declines (Santos and Veronesi, 2018). Therefore, the book capital ratio could move in the op-
posite direction as the market capital ratio. Furthermore, it may seem hard to argue that the change
in intermediaries’ book capital ratio matters in the pricing kernel, because the book capital ratio is
largely determined endogenously by intermediaries. Nevertheless, I now rerun my analyses using
book capital ratios.
Figure 2.3 shows the level and the dispersion of capital ratios measured using book values.
Different from Figure 2.2, which uses market values, low-capital intermediaries raise their capital
ratios in the financial crisis (i.e., they deleverage) (See Panel A). Nevertheless, the dispersion of
capital ratios in Panel B indicates countercyclical variation, although it seems less volatile than the
dispersion of capital ratios in market values shown in Panel B of Figure 2.2.25
Table 2.14 repeats Table 2.4 but uses the book capital ratio to define intermediary capital. Not
25The 75th (25th) percentile of the quasi-market capital ratio of the largest 30 intermediaries in the U.S. and the
75th (25th) percentile of the book capital ratio of the largest 30 intermediaries in the U.S. are positively correlated at
0.86 (0.56). Also, the correlation between the dispersion of capital ratios in market value and book value terms is 0.78.
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Figure 2.3
Level and Dispersion of Intermediary Capital Ratios: Book Capital Ratio
This figure depicts intermediary capital of the largest 30 intermediaries in the U.S. Panel A plots the level of interme-
diary capital. The dashed line represents the 75th percentile of intermediary capital while the solid line represents the
25th percentile of intermediary capital. Panel B plots the dispersion of intermediary capital, measured as the difference
between the 75th and the 25th percentile of intermediary capital of the largest 30 intermediaries in the U.S., scaled
by its 50th percentile, in the solid line. The change in the dispersion of intermediary capital is shown by the dashed
line. Intermediary capital is measured using the book capital ratio, that is, the book value of equity over the sum of the
book value of debt and the book value of equity. The intermediaries are identified as all firms listed on NYSE, AMEX,
or NASDAQ whose header SIC code or historical SIC code is 6000-6200 or 6712. The largest 30 intermediaries are
identified based on their market capitalization at the end of each quarter. The shaded areas represent NBER recessions.
The sample period covers 1973/Q1 to 2016/Q4.
Panel A: Capital Ratios of High- and Low-Capital Intermediaries
Panel B: Dispersion of Intermediary Capital Ratios
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Table 2.14
Alternative Dispersion of Capital Ratios: Using Book Capital Ratio
This table reports the estimation results for the Fama-MacBeth regressions. Dependent variables are monthly returns
on nonfinancial firm stocks in excess of the one-month Treasury bill rate. The dispersion beta, defined in Table 2.1, is
estimated from quarterly regressions using 5-year rolling windows. However, the dispersion of intermediary capital is
defined using the book capital ratio (instead of the quasi-market capital ratio). I control for βMKT , βAEM (Adrian,
Etula, and Muir, 2014), βHKM (He, Kelly, and Manela, 2017), Size (the log of market capitalization), B/M (book-
to-market ratio), MOM (momentum), OP (operating profitability, and I/A (asset growth), defined in Table 2.4. The
intermediaries are identified as all firms listed on NYSE, AMEX, or NASDAQ whose header SIC code or historical
SIC code is 6000-6200 or 6712. The largest 40 or 50 intermediaries are identified based on their market capitalization
at the end of each quarter. The nonfinancial firms are identified as all firms listed on NYSE, AMEX, or NASDAQ
excluding financial firms (header SIC code or historical SIC code 6). The sample period covers January 1978 to
December 2016. Standard errors are adjusted using the Newey-West method. t-statistics are in square brackets. ***,
**, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Dep. Var. ri − rf ri − rf ri − rf ri − rf ri − rf ri − rf ri − rf
βDISP −0.40** −0.36** −0.40** −0.08 −0.15 −0.14 0.01
[−2.34] [−2.25] [−2.45] [−0.67] [−1.07] [−1.06] [0.04]
βMKT 0.31* 0.32* 0.30** 0.32** 0.14 0.21
[1.72] [1.76] [1.99] [2.06] [1.08] [1.37]
βAEM 0.27*** 0.10** 0.08* 0.14***
[3.56] [2.09] [1.74] [2.73]
βHKM 0.21*** 0.13*** 0.13*** 0.12**
[4.17] [2.78] [2.79] [2.31]
Size −0.47*** −0.47*** −0.36*** −0.33***
[−12.33] [−12.19] [−11.46] [−9.71]
B/M 0.11 0.09 0.14 0.14
[1.02] [0.89] [1.45] [1.24]
MOM 0.03 0.03 0.01 −0.16
[0.17] [0.14] [0.05] [−0.81]
OP −0.04 −0.05 0.04 −0.06
[−0.34] [−0.37] [0.30] [−0.53]
I/A −0.77*** −0.76*** −0.82*** −0.83***








This table reports the estimation results for the Fama-MacBeth regressions in subsample periods. In columns (1)
- (3) of Panel A, the sample period covers January 1978 to December 1999. In columns (4) - (6) of Panel A, the
sample period covers January 2000 to December 2016. In Panel B, the financial crisis (July 2007 to December 2009)
and NBER recessions are excluded from the sample period in columns (1) - (3) and columns (4) - (6), respectively.
Dependent variables are monthly returns on nonfinancial firm stocks in excess of the one-month Treasury bill rate.
The dispersion beta, defined in Table 2.1, is estimated from quarterly regressions using 5-year rolling windows. I
control for βMKT , βAEM (Adrian, Etula, and Muir, 2014), βHKM (He, Kelly, and Manela, 2017), Size (the log of
market capitalization), B/M (book-to-market ratio), MOM (momentum), OP (operating profitability, and I/A (asset
growth), defined in Table 2.4. The intermediaries are identified as all firms listed on NYSE, AMEX, or NASDAQ
whose header SIC code or historical SIC code is 6000-6200 or 6712. The largest 30 intermediaries are identified
based on their market capitalization at the end of each quarter. The nonfinancial firms are identified as all firms listed
on NYSE, AMEX, or NASDAQ excluding financial firms (header SIC code or historical SIC code 6). Standard errors
are adjusted using the Newey-West method. t-statistics are in square brackets. ***, **, and * indicate statistical
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
Panel A: Subsample Periods Before and After 2000
Sample Period 1978 - 1999 2000 - 2016
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dep. Var. ri − rf ri − rf ri − rf ri − rf ri − rf ri − rf
βDISP −0.60*** −0.53** −0.33** −1.01*** −0.45** −0.33*
[−2.74] [−2.36] [−2.00] [−3.97] [−2.36] [−1.87]
βMKT 0.19 0.15 0.13 0.42 0.51* 0.12
[0.85] [0.66] [0.77] [1.48] [1.84] [0.63]
βAEM 0.23*** 0.06 0.44*** 0.21***
[2.95] [1.09] [3.76] [3.38]
βHKM 0.08 −0.00 0.28*** 0.25***















Panel B: Subsample Periods Excluding Bad Times
Sample Period Excluding Financial Crisis Excluding NBER Recessions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dep. Var. ri − rf ri − rf ri − rf ri − rf ri − rf ri − rf
βDISP −0.75*** −0.53*** −0.38*** −0.75*** −0.52*** −0.36***
[−4.50] [−3.42] [−3.09] [−4.47] [−3.33] [−2.83]
βMKT 0.19 0.21 0.10 0.23 0.25 0.10
[1.09] [1.23] [0.78] [1.41] [1.51] [0.82]
βAEM 0.27*** 0.12*** 0.29*** 0.13***
[4.67] [2.74] [4.52] [2.77]
βHKM 0.16*** 0.09* 0.16*** 0.10*













surprisingly, the dispersion beta (βDISP ) is not significantly priced in the cross-section of stock
returns even though the signs on the price of the risk remain negative as in Table 2.4. These results
suggest that it is more appropriate to measure intermediary capital in market values than in book
values to obtain the pricing kernel of marginal investors.
2.5.8 Subsample Tests
Table 2.15 repeats Table 2.4 for subsample periods to test the effect of the dispersion beta
(βDISP ) on the cross-section of stock returns changes over time. In Panel A, the subsample periods
are before 2000 and after 2000. I find that the dispersion beta is priced in the cross-section of stock
returns over the subsample periods. The effect remains statistically and economically significant.
As shown in Figure 2.2, dispersion of intermediary capital is unusually high during the fi-
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nancial crisis (or similarly during NBER recessions). It may be possible that the dispersion beta
is priced in the cross-section of stock returns only in economic bad times, not normal times. In
Panel B of Table 2.15, I test this possibility by excluding the financial crisis in Columns (1) - (3)
or NBER recessions in Columns (4) - (6) from the sample period. I continue to find the significant
price of risk for the dispersion beta in these subsample periods and confirm that my main results
are not driven by the bad times.
2.6 Model of Heterogeneous Intermediary Capital
Based on the empirical findings in the previous sections, I develop a model of heterogeneous
intermediary capital in which the dispersion of intermediary capital is priced in the cross-section
of stock returns. The model provides a mechanism that a risk-averse (risk-tolerant) manager forms
a high- (low-) capital intermediary and that asymmetric responses to a shock between the two
intermediaries change the proportion of capital held by a high- versus a low-capital intermediary,
thereby leading to a countercyclical variation in aggregate risk aversion. The model also shows
that the dispersion of intermediary capital generates a sizable risk premium in addition to that
attributable to the level of intermediary capital.
2.6.1 Setup
The timeline of the economy is described in Figure 2.4. The economy is populated with two
specialists {H,L} and one household {hh}. There are three periods, t = {0, 1, 2}. At t = 0,
the two specialists receive an endowment of eH = eL. As shown in Section 2.6.2, specialist
H has a more persistent habit than specialist L in their utility functions, which then gives rise
to heterogeneous risk aversion between the specialists. The household arrives at t = 1 with an
endowment of ehh. There are two types of assets, a risky asset, a, and a risk-free asset, f , available
to invest at t = {0, 1}.
Following He and Krishnamurthy (2013), the household cannot directly invest in the risky
asset,26 but can directly invest in the risk-free asset or indirectly invest in the risky asset through
26Households’ participation in financial markets can be limited due to lack of skills (van Rooij, Lusardi, and




This figure depicts the timeline of the economy described in the model. There are three agents: two specialists
I ∈ {H,L} and a household hh. The amount of wealth (wI0) and capital (κI1) available to invest by specialists and
intermediaries, respectively, is indicated above the timeline. The growth of wealth (wI0) and capital (κ
I
1) is displayed
below the timeline. At t = 0, the specialists arrive in the market with an endowment of eI and consume CI0 . At
t = 1, the household arrives in the market with an endowment of ehh and consumes Chh1 . After consuming C
I
1 at
t = 1, the specialists form intermediaries using their post-consumption wealth of wI1 = w
I
0 × (1 + rI1)− CI1 plus the
household’s contribution of ψI1w
hh
1 , where w
hh
1 = e
hh − Chh1 . Intermediary capital at t = 1, κI1 = wI1 + ψI1whh1 ,
grows to κI2 = κ
I
1× (1 + rI2), where rI2 is a return on investment at t = 2. κI2 is distributed and consumed by all agents
at their respective ratios.
Specialists {H,L} arrive. Intermediaries {H,L} are formed.
Household {hh} arrives.
t = 0 1 2









intermediaries.27 Specialists are able to invest both in the risky asset and the risk-free asset without
a short-sale constraint. Each specialist forms an intermediary using her own wealth and funds
provided by the household. Specifically, at t = 1, the household allocates ψH1 of her (post-
consumption) wealth, whh1 , to specialist H and ψ
L
1 of her wealth to specialist L to purchase equity
capital of intermediaries. Thus, intermediary capital would be κH1 ≡ wH1 +ψH1 whh1 for intermediary
H and κL1 ≡ wL1 + ψL1whh1 for intermediary L.
ipation is not completely limited in reality, I make this restriction to make sure that that households are not marginal
investors.
27One can think of a case where households entrust their investment to asset management companies, e.g. Black-
Rock, Schwab Charles, etc.
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The return on the risky asset, a, follows a stochastic process:
rat = µt + σtεt, εt ∼ i.i.d.N (0, 1). (2.6.1)
Denote αIt to be the portion of the risky asset in specialists’ portfolios. 1− αIt is the portion of the










where I ∈ {H,L} and rft is the return on the risk-free asset. The total supply of the risky asset is
















= 1. The risk-free asset, issued by

























Specialists maximize their expected utility over lifetime, t ∈ {0, 1, 2} under budget con-
straints. To incorporate time-varying risk aversion of the specialists, I consider the utility function































t is the specialists’ consumption, X
I
t is their habits, and γ is
a curvature parameter. The habits, XIt , are determined by the specialists’ history of consumption.
To account for the heterogeneous risk aversion of the two specialists, I suppose that specialist H









CIt−j if t > 0
0 if t = 0
(2.6.4)
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where 0 < φL < φH ≤ 1 and η < 1.28




















Assuming the consumption growth of the two specialists to be a random walk (Campbell and
































1 . This is intuitive, as argued in Campbell and
Cochrane (1999): existence of the habit term, XIt , would lower the lifetime marginal utility of
consumption today because consumption today reduces future utilities. Therefore, specialist H
who exhibits a more persistent habit consumes less than specialist L.
Further, the Arrow-Pratt measure of relative risk aversion for specialists is:
ΓIt = −
CIt u
′′ (CIt −XIt )





where S ≡ C−X
C
is the surplus consumption ratio. Since XH0 = X
L
0 = 0, the surplus consumption
ratio at t = 0 is equal to one, and then risk aversion of the two specialists is ΓH0 = Γ
L
0 = γ.
Importantly enough, a more persistent habit for specialistH leads to the lower surplus consumption
ratio and therefore higher risk aversion for specialist H at t = 1. Based on their risk aversion, the
specialists will choose optimal portfolios using the risky asset and the risk-free asset at t = 1. This
is presented in Proposition 1.
28Note that if φ = 0, an agent does not develop a habit. The utility function in (2.6.3) reduces to a simple CRRA
utility function.
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Proposition 1 (Risk Aversion and Portfolio Choices).









Proof : See Appendix A.1
As in He and Krishnamurthy (2013), αIt is typically greater than one, implying that specialists
take leveraged positions to invest more into the risky asset by issuing the risk-free asset to the
household. Proposition 1 shows that the risk-tolerant specialist (type = L) takes higher leverage
than the risk-averse specialist (type = H) at t = 1.
2.6.3 Household Problem
The household maximizes expected lifetime utility over t ∈ {1, 2} under the following con-
straints. First, a budge constraint asserts that the household’s (post-consumption) wealth will be
allocated into equity capital of intermediaries and the risk-free asset. Second, there is a minimum
capital requirement to have a viable intermediary sector. Thus, the household is required to pur-
chase at least a certain amount of equity capital from the intermediaries. Finally, the household
limits the amount of equity capital purchased from each intermediary.29 In particular, the house-
hold purchases equity capital of each intermediary up to a multiple (m) of wIt . w
I
t refers to “skin
in the game” for specialists (He and Krishnamurthy, 2013). The utility function of the household
29Equivalently, this implies that an intermediary faces a capital constraint.
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is given as follows:
max
















































t ≤ mwIt , I ∈ {H,L} (2.6.13)
where Chht is the household’s consumption, and A > 0 is an absolute risk aversion of the house-
hold. (2.6.11) - (2.6.13) represent the budget constraint, the minimum capital requirement, and the
capital constraint, respectively.
Given that the household’s consumption is normally distributed, the household’s objective




























subject to (2.6.12) and (2.6.13).
Using Equation (2.6.2), the first-order conditions with respect to ψHt and ψ
L
t as well as in-






















































whht = 0 (2.6.16)
θCt
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where θCt , θ
H
t , and θ
L
t are the Lagrange multipliers associated with constraints. Here, I focus on the
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most realistic case where the minimum capital requirement in (2.6.12) and the capital constraints






As discussed in Section 2.6.2, the specialist who has a more persistent habit together with
higher risk aversion consumes less at t ∈ {0, 1}. This further implies that specialist H has larger
wealth available to invest in intermediary than specialist L at t = 1, which leads to the tighter
capital constraint for specialist L than specialistH from (2.6.13). Therefore, the household is more
willing to purchase equity capital of intermediary H than that of intermediary L. I summarize the
household’s allocation in Proposition 2.











that satisfies ψHt > ψ
L
















In other words, if the minimum capital requirement is sufficiently high, say κ̃ > κ̃∗, the household




Proof : See Appendix A.1
Proposition 2 argues that the household allocates a larger portion of her wealth to intermediary
H than to intermediary L. Hence, the intermediary capital, defined as the sum of the wealth of a
specialist and the amount that the household allocates to purchase equity capital of an intermediary,
is higher in intermediary H than in intermediary L.
Proposition 3 (Intermediary Capital). If the minimum capital requirement is sufficiently high, say
κ̃ > κ̃∗, the specialist who has higher (lower) risk aversion forms an intermediary with higher
30Other cases will be considered in Appendix A.2.
31To guarantee that ψHt > 0 and ψ
L
t > 0, I impose additional assumptions on the risk aversion of household, such






















, respectively. These assumptions imply
that the household’s risk aversion should be sufficiently high (low), so that the household allocates a nonzero amount


















Proof : See Appendix A.1
Proposition 3 (combined with Proposition 1) suggests the positive relation between intermediary
capital and risk aversion, which is consistent with the discussion in Section 2.2 and empirical
evidence in Figure 2.1 and Table 2.2
2.6.4 Asset Prices
Having established that a more risk-averse specialist attracts more equity capital from the
household to form an intermediary than a less risk-averse specialist, I derive a pricing equation
for the risky asset, a. In this economy, low-capital intermediary L is more highly leveraged than
high-capital intermediary H , (i.e., αLt > α
H
t ), so the risky asset is held more in the intermediary
L than the intermediary H . When a negative shock arrives in this asset, the intermediary L loses
more capital than the intermediary H . Thus, the fraction of capital controlled by the intermediary
H (intermediary L) increases (decreases), which induces the relative difference in capital between
the two intermediaries and consequently the aggregate risk aversion to rise in bad times. In order
for the intermediary H , who are more risk-averse, to take a larger portion of the risky asset in bad
times, the risk premium should rise as well.
Suppose an agent’s risk-bearing capacity is a function of her consumption and risk aversion.
Following Bhamra and Uppal (2009), Gârleanu and Pedersen (2011), and Gârleanu and Panageas
(2015) among others, the sum of each agent’s risk-bearing capacity is the risk-bearing capacity of




















where Γ is the aggregate risk aversion of the economy.
From Equation (2.6.1), a shock, εt, arrives in the risky asset at t = 2. Because of the different
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leverage positions of the two intermediaries, the shock is negatively related to the dispersion in
intermediary capital, defined as DISPCaprt ≡
κHt −κLt
κt
.32 Note that a consumption function is a
monotonic transformation of wealth. This results in the negative relationship between the shock
in the risky asset and the dispersion in specialists’ consumption. In other words, upon arrival of a
positive (negative) shock, the portion of capital held by intermediary L increases (decreases), and
consequently, the portion of consumption of specialist L rises (falls) as well. These arguments are
summarized in Proposition 4.
Proposition 4 (Dispersion of Intermediary Capital and of Specialists’ Consumption).


































Proof : See Appendix A.1
Since a negative shock lowers the surplus consumption ratio (i.e., S = C−X
C
) of the agents
who exhibit habits in their utility function, risk aversion of each agent is countercyclical. More
importantly, the compositional change in specialists’ consumption induced by the shock also has
an impact on the aggregate risk aversion of the economy. That is, the aggregate risk aversion gets
closer toward that of a risk-averse (risk-tolerant) agent upon arrival of the negative (positive) shock.
Overall, if a negative shock arrives in the risky asset, ε2 < 0, then aggregate risk aversion rises,
and if a positive shock arrives in the risky asset, ε2 > 0, then aggregate risk aversion falls.









). Its empirical counterpart is shown in (2.3.2).
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Proposition 5 (Countercyclical Aggregate Risk Aversion). At t = 2, the shock in the risky asset
and aggregate risk aversion are inversely related.
ε2Γ2 < 0 (2.6.25)
Proof : See Appendix A.1
How does the dispersion of intermediary capital affect aggregate risk aversion? It is evident
from Proposition 4 that the change in the dispersion of intermediary capital gives rise to the change
in the dispersion of specialists’ consumption. Thus, during bad times when the dispersion of inter-
mediary capital rises, specialist H will enjoy a larger stake in consumption than good times. This
compositional change subsequently affects the aggregate risk aversion if specialists are heteroge-
neous in their risk aversion.
Proposition 6 (Dispersion of Intermediary Capital and Aggregate Risk Aversion). At t = 2, the





Γ2 > 0 (2.6.26)
Proof : See Appendix A.1
To emphasize the important role of heterogeneous preference between the two specialists in
the aggregate risk aversion, suppose that if specialists are homogeneous in risk preference and the
leverage position accordingly, intermediaries will be symmetrically affected from the shock. This
further implies that the shock would not change the dispersion of intermediary capital. If so, the
positive relation between the dispersion of intermediary capital and the aggregate risk aversion of
the market in Proposition 6 no longer holds, and then the dispersion of intermediary capital does
not affect the aggregate risk aversion of the market.
Next, I derive the Euler equation for the risky asset, a, that incorporates Proposition 6. In a
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e−ρt (Ct −Xt)−γ .

























































































































The difference between two equations results in Equation (2.6.29).
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t+1, ∆ct+1 = log
Ct+1
Ct

















































Shock in Dispersion of Capital
(2.6.30)
where λLEV EL > 0 and λDISP > 0 capture the prices of the risks from the shock in level of capital
and the shock in dispersion of capital. Thus, the risk premium is determined by the compensation
for the exposure to the shock in the dispersion of capital (λDISP ) in addition to the shock in the
level of capital (λLEV EL). Empirically, the negative sign for λDISP in (2.6.30) corresponds to the
negative price of risk for λDISP in the asset pricing tests of (2.4.1).
2.6.5 Calibration
Now, I present a numerical example to provide quantitative implications of the model pre-
sented in previous subsections. In this calibration, I focus on the most realistic situation in Section
2.6.3, where inequality constraints in (2.6.12) and (2.6.13) are slack.
Parameters used to calibrate are described in Table 2.16 Panel A. First, the unconditional
mean and volatility of the risky asset and the risk-free rate are chosen to match the data in the post-
war period. In detail, annualized value-weighted returns and volatilities on S&P 500 from January
1950 to December 2016 were roughly 10% and 14% on average. The annualized one-monthly
Treasury Bill rate during the same period approaches 4%. Thus, I set µ = 10%, σ = 16%, and
rf = 4%. Second, the initial endowment of all agents, including the two specialists (eH and
eL) and the household (ehh), is assumed to be 100, and their time preference (ρ) is supposed to
be 0.05. Third, in the specialists’ utility function, I use a curvature parameter γ = 2 following
Campbell and Cochrane (1999). Specialists’ risk aversion is driven by a habit process, XIt in
(2.6.4), which is a function of common habit persistence (η), and heterogeneous habit persistence




This table reports the numerical example of the model. Panel A presents parameters used in the calibration. Panel
B shows outcomes of the calibration: risk premium, E[rat+1 − r
f
t+1], risk aversion of specialists, Γ
I
1, intermediary
leverage, αI1, and intermediary capital, κ
I
1 for I ∈ {H,L}. The first column indicates the baseline outcome based on
the parameters in Panel A. In the remaining columns in Panel B, I also present how the baseline outcome varies by
changing a parameter indicated in the first row while keeping other parameters constant.
Panel A: Parameter Choices
Parameter Description Value
µ Unconditional Mean of Return on Risky Asset 10%
σ Unconditional Volatility of Return on Risky Asset 14%
rf Return on Risk-Free Asset 4%
eI Initial Endowment of Specialists 100
ehh Initial Endowment of Household 100
ρ Time Preference 0.05
γ Curvature Parameter of Specialists’ Utility Function 2
η Habit Persistence (Common) 0.95
φH Habit Persistence (type = H) 0.9
φL Habit Persistence (type = L) 0.1
A Risk Aversion of Household 3
g Consumption Growth 0.02
σc Consumption Volatility 0.02
Panel B: Simulation Outcomes
Outcome Baseline
(φH , φL) γ = 1 A = 5 η = 0.65
= (0.6, 0.3)
Risk Premium 8.44% 11.79% 4.17% 8.82% 11.79%
Risk Premium due to Capital Level 2.47% 4.36% 1.49% 2.58% 4.26%
Risk Premium due to Capital Dispersion 5.97% 7.44% 2.68% 6.24% 7.53%
Risk Aversion (type = H) 12.50 4.54 6.25 12.5 4.69
Risk Aversion (type = L) 2.21 2.78 1.10 2.21 2.14
Leverage (type = H) 0.37 1.01 0.74 0.37 0.98
Leverage (type = L) 2.08 1.65 4.16 2.08 2.15
Intermediary Capital (type = H) 105.0 105.0 88.7 88.3 95.9




This figure depicts the intermediary capital (κI2), specialists’ consumption (C
I
2 ), and the their risk aversion
(ΓI2) for I ∈ {H,L} as well as the aggregate risk aversion, implied by the model. Panel (a) indicates the re-
lation in (5.33); Panel (b) indicates the relation in (5.34); Panel (c) indicates the relation in (5.37); and Panel
(d) indicates the relation in (5.38). In Panels (a) and (b), the solid line represents the dispersion of intermedi-
ary capital and specialists’ consumption. In Panel (c), the solid line represents the aggregate risk aversion of
the economy. In Panels (a) - (c), the dashed line represents quantities of the specialist/intermediary H while
the dotted line represents quantities of the specialist/intermediary L. To simulate the economy, I generate a
random draw from the i.i.d. normal distribution for each outcome in a shock at t = 2. I repeat this exercise
10,000 times to compute average quantities represented in vertical axises.
(a) (b)


































































































































































































aversion than specialist L. Fourth, the risk aversion of the household (A) is set to be 3, so as
to make the household have higher risk aversion than specialist L but lower risk aversion than
specialist H . This choice is not sensitive to key outcomes of the model since the household is
restricted to directly invest in the risky asset. Finally, unconditional mean (g) and volatility (σc) of
consumption are chosen to be 2%.
Based on these parameters, I run a random sampling of a shock (εt) in the economy at t ∈
{1, 2}, which drives both the return on the risky asset and the consumption growth, from the i.i.d.
normal distribution. I repeat this exercise 10,000 times to obtain conditional moments.
Table 2.16 Panel B documents the outcomes of the calibration. All moments are measured
at t = 1. The baseline outcomes in the first column are based on the parameters described in
Panel A. The model produces a risk premium of 8.44%. More importantly, if I decompose the risk
premium as in Equation (2.6.30), the risk premium due to the capital level is only 2.47%, but the
dispersion of intermediary capital generates an additional risk premium of 5.97%. Furthermore,
the risk aversion of specialist H (ΓH = 12.50) is more than 5 times greater than the risk aversion
of specialist L (ΓL = 2.21). Consistent with the risk aversion, specialist L (αL = 2.08) has a
higher leverage than specialist H (αH = 0.37). The capital of intermediary H (κH = 105.0) is
almost twice the capital of intermediary L (κL = 52.6). The moments reported in this column are
consistent with the argument of the model as well as the empirical findings in Figure 2.1 and Table
2.2: a risk-averse (risk-tolerant) specialist develops a high- (low-) capital intermediary and holds
less risky (riskier) portfolio.
In the remaining columns in Panel B, I change the value of φH and φL, γ, A, or η one at
a time while keeping the other parameters constant to examine how the baseline outcome varies
accordingly. First, relative to the baseline model, I lower the habit persistence of specialist H and
raise that of specialist L to reduce the degree of heterogeneity in habit persistence (i.e., (φH , φL) =
(0.6, 0.3)). As shown in the second column, the changes in φH and φL lead to a decline in the
degree of heterogeneity in risk aversion between two specialists; the risk aversion of specialist
H is only 1.5 times greater than that of specialist L (4.54 versus 2.78). Interestingly, this is not
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accompanied with a lower risk premium; the risk premium increases to 11.79%. Specialist H now
requires a lower premium on the risky asset but raises its leverage instead, thereby increasing the
specialist H’s proportion in the risky asset market from 26.2% to 56.9%.35 The resulting increase
in aggregate risk aversion may explain the higher risk premium than that in the baseline model.
Second, since γ influences decisions of both specialists, lowering γ to 1 reduces the risk
aversion of both specialists by half and doubles the leverage of both specialists, which in turn
curtails the risk premium by half. With regard to the household’s allocation, as specialists become
more risk-tolerant, the household is less willing to purchase equity capital of intermediaries. Thus,
the capital of both intermediaries is lower than in the baseline model.
Third, as noted earlier, the risk aversion of the household, who is restricted to directly invest
in the risky asset, should not matter to the risk premium. Not surprisingly, setting A = 5 does not
affect the conditional moments, except for intermediary capital, in the fourth column. The more
risk-averse household now invests less in equity capital of intermediaries but more in the risk-free
asset, and this causes total intermediary capital to decline by 27%.
Finally, as η decreases to 0.65, internal habits (XH and XL) decreases as well. This leads to
a rise in the surplus consumption ratio and a reduction in risk aversion. Similar to the case with
(φH , φL) = (0.6, 0.3) in the second column, however, the effect of their lower risk aversion is
dampened by the increase in the portion of the specialist H (i.e., αH), who is more risk-averse, in
the risky asset market. Hence, the risk premium rises to 11.79%.
Figure 2.5 shows the variation in key quantities (e.g., the intermediary capital (κI2), the spe-
cialists’ consumption (CI2 ), the risk aversion (Γ
I
2) for I ∈ {H,L}, and the aggregate risk aversion)
in each outcome for a shock at t = 2. In Panel (a), as a positive shock hits the economy, capital of
both intermediaries grows, but the higher leverage of intermediary L makes the capital of the inter-
mediary L grow faster than that of intermediary H , which generates the negative relation between
the shock and dispersion of intermediary capital in (2.6.23). If the shock is greater than about one






intermediary H , and then the dispersion of intermediary capital turns negative. As expected, the
shock has a similar effect on the specialists’ consumption as shown in Panel (b), and this confirms
the inverse relation between the shock and dispersion of specialists’ consumption in (2.6.24).
Panel (c) confirms the notion that the habit makes agents more (less) risk-averse during bad
(good) times. More importantly, aggregate risk aversion approaches the risk aversion of specialist
H during bad times (ε < 0) and the risk aversion of specialist L during good times (ε > 0) since
the aggregate risk aversion is determined by the consumption weights of the specialists (and their
risk aversion). Finally, combining Panels (b) and (c) leads to the key implication of the model:
dispersion of intermediary capital is positively associated with the aggregate risk aversion of the
market, as shown in (2.6.26).
2.7 Conclusion
This paper studies how heterogeneity in intermediary capital, measured as the dispersion of
the market capital ratio of the largest 30 intermediaries in the U.S., affects the cross-section of
stock returns. I posit that the heterogeneity in intermediary capital would capture the countercycli-
cal variation in aggregate risk aversion, which elicits the countercyclical risk premium accordingly.
The exposure (i.e., beta) of nonfinancial stocks to shock in the dispersion of capital ratios gener-
ates an annual premium of 6.8% - 8.2%. Using the Thomson Reuters Institutional (13F) Holdings
database, I also find evidence that low-capital intermediaries, who hold riskier assets than high-
capital intermediaries, would face leverage-induced fire-sales once a sufficiently large and sys-
tematic adverse shock arrives in stock markets. I develop a model of heterogeneous intermediary
capital in which the dispersion of intermediary capital is priced in the cross-section of asset prices,
which supports the empirical findings.
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3. BANK CAPITAL AND BANK STOCK PERFORMANCE
3.1 Introduction
Bank capital is a central part of prudential regulation. Despite its importance, we do not know
much about how bank capital affects bank stock returns. Bankers often argue that the effect is nega-
tive and that higher capital leads to diminished shareholder value in banking.1 Some theories agree
that it is costly for banks to operate with higher capital (Diamond and Rajan, 2001; Gorton and
Winton, 2017). In contrast, numerous other banking theories predict that bank capital positively
affects various aspects of performance: it enhances the bank’s survival probability (Holmstrom and
Tirole, 1997; Allen, Carletti, and Marquez, 2011; Acharya, Mehran, and Thakor, 2016); improves
its market share and profitability (Allen, Carletti, and Marquez, 2011; Mehran and Thakor, 2011);2
and increases the bank’s market value (Mehran and Thakor, 2011).3
Theories on the relation between bank capital and bank performance generally do not dis-
tinguish between different economic times. The empirical literature on financial crises, however,
documents that capital is especially beneficial during crises. For example, Berger and Bouwman
(2013) study the relation between capital and performance (survival probability, market share, and
profitability) to find that capital benefits large banks (assets over $3 billion) during banking crises,
not during other times.4 Calomiris and Nissim (2014) find that the value attached by the market to
bank capital increased during the 2007-2009 financial crisis. Pérignon, Thesmar, and Vuillemey
(2016) document that capital also benefited banks in Europe during this crisis: high-capital banks
were still able to access uninsured wholesale funding during the crisis, thereby avoiding dimin-
ished access to funding that plagued their low-capital banks. While these papers do not address
1Thakor (2014) discusses six potential reasons for why bankers object to higher capital ratios: (i) resistance is
part of a negotiating game with regulators and politicians; (ii) desire to maximize the tax benefits of debt; (iii) desire
to maximize the deposit insurance put option; (iv) CEO pay is tied to ROE; (v) government protection; and (vi) debt
overhang.
2Mechanically, higher capital leads to a lower return on equity (Modigliani and Miller, 1963).
3Miles, Yang, and Marcheggiano (2013) support the view that more capital is beneficial to banks. Admati, De-
marzo, Hellwig, and Pfleiderer (2013) argue that while socially beneficial, more capital may hurt bank shareholders.
4They document that, in contrast, capital benefits small banks at all times.
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the asset pricing implications of bank capital, they suggest that an examination thereof may bene-
fit from distinguishing between times of stress and normal times. Of the small number of papers
on bank stock performance (discussed below), only one distinguishes between different economic
times, but does so with only a few years of data.
This leads to our first (and main) research question: Do high-capital banks show better risk-
adjusted stock performance than low-capital banks and does the effect of capital differ across nor-
mal times and bad economic times? Adequately controlling for risk is critical. Since bank capital
not only directly affects the bank’s risk but also influences its risk-taking propensity, banks with
higher capital may earn higher returns simply because investors view them as riskier. However, if
abnormal stock return performance persists even after including various pricing factors, then this
would mean that bank capital plays a “special” role in determining bank stock prices. In this light,
we examine alphas, adjusting for numerous sources of risk.
We find that bank capital does not predict bank stock performance unconditionally, but it does
so conditionally: high-capital banks outperform low-capital banks during bad times. During other
times, the performance differences across high-capital and low-capital banks are statistically in-
significant (alphas and t-statistics close to zero).5 This result is highly robust and is obtained using
both in-sample tests and out-of-sample trading strategies which buy high-capital banks and sell
low-capital banks during times predicted to be bad. Our main trading strategy yields risk-adjusted
returns of 0.30% - 0.37% per month (3.60% - 4.44% per year). To our knowledge, conditional
trading strategies have not been explored in the literature -our novel approach can be useful in
future studies.
Before presenting our empirical approach and results in more detail, we address two impor-
tant issues about the relationship of our paper to previous research on this topic. First, our result
is novel. Baker and Wurgler (2015), the paper most closely related to ours, examines the cost-
of-capital implication of bank capital. It finds that high-capital banks have lower (forward) betas
5It is possible to observe significant outperformance during bad times and insignificant underperformance during
other times because, based on all the bad times measures used, there are far fewer bad times than other times. However,
we find similar results even when using the union set of bad times, which roughly classifies half the periods as bad
times.
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and that bank stocks with low (realized) betas have higher realized stock returns (the “low beta
anomaly” found in other contexts). It does not directly test whether high-capital banks outperform
low-capital banks, controlling for risk. Our tests of this hypothesis reveal that this relation does not
hold. That paper also does not distinguish between normal times and bad times like we do. This
is an important distinction because we show that capital is only associated with outperformance
during bad times. Further, our result does not inadvertently pick up the “large-bank effect” doc-
umented by Gandhi and Lustig (2015). They show that implicit government guarantees (i.e., Too
Big to Fail) cause the largest commercial banks to be less risky and thus have lower risk-adjusted
returns. Since the largest banks tend to have the lowest capital ratios, we have performed every
analysis in this paper while controlling for their large-bank effect in different ways, and find that
our result is robust.
Second, our result of positive risk-adjusted stock returns of high-capital banks in bad times
is surprising for several reasons. (i) One may believe that high-capital banks are riskier than low-
capital banks (Koehn and Santomero, 1980; Besanko and Kanatas, 1996). Hence, the returns of
high-capital banks are expected to be higher than those of low-capital banks, and the return differ-
ences get larger during bad times due to higher risk. However, we show that high-capital banks
are less risky (as measured by their return volatility, market beta, and loadings on conventional
risk factors such as the value premium factor), and importantly, adding numerous risk factors in
our tests does not change the result. (ii) Taking as given that high-capital banks are safer, their ex
ante expected returns should be lower, but their ex-post realized returns during bad times can be
higher because their stock prices will drop less during such times as unexpected adverse shocks
hit the banking sector. In this case, one may argue that our econometric implementation of our
in-sample analysis is misled since we should focus on ex-ante expected returns (which are lower)
rather than on ex-post realized returns (which are higher). If true, our out-of-sample trading strate-
gies, in which we use predicted bad times, should yield no significant risk-adjusted returns because
high-capital bank stocks would be more expensive in anticipation of bad times. However, we find
that our result holds using out-of-sample trading strategies. Further and more directly, our result
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holds even when using ex-ante measures of expected returns (instead of ex-post realized returns).
Thus, our econometric specification is valid and our findings are robust.
Let us now present our empirical methodology. The main in-sample analyses compare the
stock performance of high- and low-capital banks during bad times and other times using five
asset pricing models that control for risk in alternative ways. We focus on commercial banks and
use book equity over total assets as our main capital ratio measure. We sort banks independently
into quintiles based on their capital ratios and size to form 25 portfolios, calculate value-weighted
average capital ratios and stock returns in each portfolio, and then compute the simple average
of the five size-quintile capital ratios and stock returns for each capital quintile. We view high-
capital (low-capital) banks to be banks in the top (bottom) quintile and document that they have
16.31% (6.48%) capital, on average. Our main in-sample bad-times proxy is a dummy = 1 if
month t has bank stock return volatility (modeled using an exponential generalized autoregressive
heteroscedasticity of order 1, EGARCH(1,1), model) exceeding the 80th percentile (in sample),
and zero otherwise.6 We use five linear factor models: (i) the Fama and French (1993) 3-factor
model; (ii) the Carhart (1997) 4-factor model; (iii) the Fama and French (2015) 5-factor model;
(iv) the Fama-French 5-factor model plus Pástor and Stambaugh (2003)’s liquidity factor; and (v)
the Fung and Hsieh (2001) 9-factor model.
We perform numerous checks to establish the robustness of our in-sample result that high-
capital banks show higher (risk-adjusted) abnormal returns than low-capital banks during bad
times, but not during other times. First, falsification tests show that our results do not hold for
industrial firms or non-bank financial firms, implying that bank stocks are different. Second, the
results are not driven by the largest banks: we obtain similar results when excluding these banks
or when controlling for Gandhi and Lustig (2015)’s size factor. Third, the results are robust to:
controlling for nonsynchronous trading, e.g., by dropping the smallest stocks; using time-varying
betas; controlling for differences in (market) betas; controlling for up to ten bank-specific risk
factors; using panel regressions that control for bank-specific risk in alternative ways; and using
6Since volatility is persistent with a GARCH parameter of 0.93, we show that our results are robust to using
alternative bad times stock return volatility cutoffs.
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Fama-MacBeth regressions. The Internet Appendix in addition shows that our results: (a) are not
driven by the recent crisis; (b) are robust to using seven alternative bad times proxies and even
their union and intersection sets; (c) are not caused by banks that delisted for performance-related
reasons; (d) are robust to the use of benchmark-adjusted returns; (e) are comparable using data
from the Bank Regulatory Database; (f) are robust to using regulatory and market capital ratios;
and (g) also hold when using value-added performance measures. Results void of look-ahead bias
are similar.
The out-of-sample tests are based on several alternative trading strategies. Each strategy buys
high-capital banks and sells low-capital banks during times out-of-sample predicted to be bad. Our
main trading strategy does nothing during other times, while the other trading strategies may do
the same or the opposite. Performance is assessed using the asset pricing models discussed above.
To establish the robustness of our out-of-sample result that our trading strategies yield positive
risk-adjusted returns, we perform several analyses, which all yield consistent results. First, we
show that the results are not driven by the largest banks. Second, to account for the possibility
that the commonly-used asset pricing models employed by us may not adequately capture bank-
specific risks, we add up to ten bank-specific risk factors to each factor model. Third, we relax the
assumption that investors can buy and sell portfolios of high- and low-capital banks without any
restrictions: we control for short sale constraints using three different approaches. The Internet
Appendix in addition shows that our results also hold: (a) using alternative bad-times proxies and
their union and intersection sets; (b) using regulatory and market capital ratios; (c) when taking
into account the costs of trading bank stocks; (d) when relaxing a standard assumption in asset
pricing (“realized future returns are a good proxy for expected returns”) by estimating and using
ex-ante measures of expected returns.
Having established that high-capital banks outperform low-capital banks during bad times,
we ask our second research question: What drives such outperformance? We explore two possible
channels: the “Informed Investor Channel” and the “Surprised Investor Channel.”
The “Informed Investor Channel” expects that informed investors better understand the ben-
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efits of higher capital during bad times than uninformed investors, and are also better at judging
when bad times have arrived. If so, informed investors may continue to sell low-capital stocks
to (and/or buy high-capital stocks from) uninformed investors during bad times. The relative ad-
vantage of informed investors, which affects the downward (upward) price pressure on low-capital
(high-capital) stocks, may explain the outperformance of high-capital banks during bad times. To
examine this channel, we focus on institutional investors, who are generally considered to be in-
formed and as such, they may drive stock returns (Badrinath, Kale, and Noe, 1995; Bennett, Sias,
and Starks, 2003; Boehmer and Kelley, 2009; Campbell, Ramadorai, and Schwartz, 2009). We
obtain quarterly institutional ownership of banks data from Thomson Reuters’ 13F database. Our
investigations show that institutional ownership of both high- and low-capital banks is rather stable
across normal times and bad times. This holds regardless of whether we focus on total institutional
ownership or split institutions into different groups using investor classification data from Brian
Bushee’s website. Thus, our results do not seem to be driven by an “Informed Investor Channel.”
The “Surprised Investor Channel” asserts that during bad times investors are surprised by the
better-than-expected performance of high-capital banks (relative to that of low-capital banks). This
could happen if investors are unaware of the value of high capital during bad times or underesti-
mate the likelihood and severity of bad times and revise their beliefs too sluggishly (relative to a
Bayesian rational person) as bad times evolve. If so, the spread between the prices of high- and
low-capital banks during good times is not sufficiently high, and there will be a continuing increase
in the price spread between these banks (and thus higher returns for high-capital banks) during bad
times. This behavioral explanation is consistent with recent theories of banking crises (Gennaioli,
Shleifer, and Vishny, 2015; Thakor, 2015, 2016) and nascent evidence (Baron and Xiong, 2017).
To examine this channel, we perform various analyses. We first examine if the outperformance of
high-capital banks during bad times evolves in a way consistent with the theories, and find that it
does: the outperformance is greatest initially and smallest toward the end of the bad times. Next,
we focus on earnings surprises, the normalized difference between actual and expected earnings
(proxied by analyst forecasts), and on three-day CARs around the earnings announcement date.
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We find that both are significantly higher for high-capital banks during bad times, not during other
times. Thus, the evidence seems consistent with the “Surprised Investor Channel.”
We acknowledge that significant alphas can be caused by missing risk factors or by mispric-
ing. We argue that our results are not likely to be caused by the former. First, all our tests include
numerous standard risk factors, and robustness tests add up to ten bank-related risk factors. Sec-
ond, and more importantly, if alpha is associated with missing risk factors, then higher-risk stocks
should have higher returns. However, we find that high-capital banks, which - as discussed above -
are less risky, have higher returns.7 Thus, we argue that our results seem to be caused by mispric-
ing: the stock price of high (low) capital banks is not sufficiently high (low) in anticipation of bad
times. The “Surprised Investor Channel” results also seem to confirm this interpretation.
Our paper is related to a literature on the relation between leverage and stock returns for
industrial firms (Bhandari, 1988; Fama and French, 1992; Vuolteenaho, 2002). This literature
tends to focus on default risk instead of leverage per se, and finds a negative relation (Dichev,
1998; Campbell, Hilscher, and Szilagyi, 2008), no relation (Garlappi, Shu, and Yan, 2008), or a
positive relation (Vassalou and Xing, 2004; Chava and Purnanandam, 2010).8 Unlike our paper,
this literature does not explicitly investigate the links between leverage and stock returns.
Our paper is also related to a small literature on bank stock performance.9 Fahlenbrach,
7George and Hwang (2010) show that, in the presence of market frictions, firms with higher financial distress
costs optimally choose lower leverage (i.e., higher capital) to avoid distress, but they retain exposure to the systematic
risk of bearing distress costs in low states. Expected returns to high-capital firms are therefore greater than those
to low-capital firms. According to our falsification test results for industrial firms, however, high-capital industrial
firms do not show greater risk-adjusted stock returns than low-capital industrial firms, suggesting that this effect is
controlled by the risk factors used in our empirical models. That is, our results show a sharp contrast between banks
and industrial firms even after considering risk factors related to market frictions and the resultant capital structure
choices.
8We use three approaches to address distress risk beyond the effect covered by the Fama-French book-to-market
factor. First, one of the factor models used throughout is Fung and Hsieh’s, which includes a credit spread factor
that captures distress risk to some extent. Second, we drop banks that delist for performance-type reasons in Section
IA.1.2. Third, we add bank-specific risk factors, some of which capture differences in distress risk to some extent, to
the standard factor models in Sections 3.3.1.6 and 3.3.2.3. If these analyses still do not sufficiently address distress
risk, this can bias our results. To see the direction of the potential bias, suppose we controlled for default risk by
adding a CDS spread factor. Since high- (low-) capital banks are less (more) risky in bad times, they will have low
(high) loadings on the CDS risk factor. Including this would increase our estimated alphas. Thus, our alphas are rather
conservatively estimated.
9Some papers examine theoretically how intermediary balance sheets (in particular leverage) affect asset prices
(Adrian and Boyarchenko, 2012; Brunnermeier and Sannikov, 2014). Related, He and Krishnamurthy (2013) propose
a segmented asset market model in which the representative intermediary is a marginal investor with a financial capital
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Prilmeier, and Stulz (2012) find that bank stock performance during the 1998 crisis predicts stock
performance during the subprime lending crisis. Using data from 12 countries from 2006Q1 -
2009Q1, Demirguc-Kunt, Detragiache, and Merrouche (2013) show that high-capital banks earned
higher returns during the crisis and their evidence suggests that this is driven by the largest banks.
As highlighted above, Baker and Wurgler (2015) find that high-capital banks have lower (forward)
betas and that bank stocks with low (realized) betas have higher realized stock returns, and Gandhi
and Lustig (2015) document a size effect on returns - the largest commercial banks have the lowest
risk-adjusted returns.10 Only one of these papers distinguishes between good and bad times like
our paper does (but it does so with only a few years of data), which is critical to highlight the
special role of capital in the banking sector, compared to other industries.
3.2 Data, Sample, and Factor Models
We obtain stock-related data from the monthly Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP)
database. Most accounting data are retrieved from the quarterly Compustat database. Some anal-
yses use accounting data from the quarterly Bank Regulatory database. The sample period runs
from Jan. 1994 through Dec. 2015. January 1994 is the starting point because Compustat coverage
of banks was relatively poor and subject to sample-selection bias before this month.11,12
constraint. In their model, changes in intermediary wealth become the main risk factor, and the authors focus on the
market level risk premium. Adrian, Etula, and Muir (2014) find that the measures suggested by He and Krishnamurthy
(2013) based on intermediaries’ wealth changes do not span the cross-section of average returns. In addition, Adrian,
Etula, and Muir (2014) show empirically that book leverage of broker-dealers has predictive power for asset prices.
We use their measure as one of the bank-specific risk factors in Sections 3.3.1.6 and 3.3.2.3.
10Baker and Wurgler argue that its findings are consistent with the low-beta / betting-against-beta anomaly docu-
mented for non-financial firms. We perform a robustness check to address the betting-against-beta anomaly in Section
3.3.1.7.
11Compustat coverage of banks picks up in 1989, improves dramatically in 1993Q4 (the number of banks with
total assets available more than doubles), and is "complete" soon thereafter. Standard and Poor’s Client Support
explained the reasons for this. Edgar’s electronic filing, phased in during 1994-1995, facilitated the collection of
financial statement data of all listed institutions from the mid-1990s onward. In prior years, predominantly the largest
institutions were included in the database because Compustat relied on companies mailing them financial statement
information. (Likely) due to client demand, they instigated a major data collection effort in 1993, attempting to
improve coverage of financials. They added up to five years of data when available. In particular many smaller
financials were added at this time.
12We also perform our main in-sample and out-of-sample analyses using a slightly longer sample period (1987 -
2015) and obtain qualitatively similar results to the ones reported in the paper. In those analyses, we use financial
statement data from Compustat data to the extent possible and augment these with data on listed banks and listed bank
holding companies (BHCs) from the Bank Regulatory database. Internet Appendix IA.1.4 explains how we perform
the matching. Since BHC data only starts in 1986 and we use lagged data in our analyses, we start these analyses in
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The sample includes commercial banks, identified as firms with header (i.e., current) SIC code
60 or historical (i.e., in each observation year) SIC code 6712 as in Gandhi and Lustig (2015).13
We exclude foreign banks and closed-end funds;14 and bank-months with negative capital ratios to
avoid survivorship bias.15 The number of unique institutions is 1,350 (on average 555 per month).
Our analyses focus on bank capital, defined as (common) book equity over total assets at the
beginning of month t using the most recent Compustat quarterly financials. Internet Appendices
IA.1.4 and IA.2.3 instead use two regulatory capital ratios and a market capital ratio.
Table 3.1 presents summary statistics on key variables.16 Panel A shows summary statistics on
the portfolios used in our main in-sample analyses (see Section 3.3.1). It shows characteristics of
portfolios of banks independently sorted into quintiles by Market Cap (calculated as the stock price
times the number of shares outstanding) and Capital Ratio (measured as book equity over total
assets). For each variable shown, we end up with 25 portfolios: we calculate the value-weighted
(VW) average value in each portfolio and report the simple average of the five size-quintile values
for each capital quintile. Four things are noteworthy. First, on average, high-capital banks operate
with substantially more capital than low-capital banks: 16.31% versus 6.48%. Second, there is
a negative correlation between capital and size. It is therefore important to note that our results
are robust to including the Gandhi and Lustig (2015) size factor (see Sections 3.3.1.3 and 3.3.2.2).
Third, high- minus low-capital (“H-L”) portfolios earn returns that are small and not significant: 11
basis points (t-stat = 0.72). Fourth, there is a negative relation between capital and risk measures
1987.
13As highlighted in that paper, there is no unique way to find all commercial banks in CRSP. The literature often
identifies them manually. The chosen identification approach ensures that BHCs are consistently included in our
analyses. For example, if one were to identify commercial banks using header SIC code 60, several of the largest
banks would drop out of the sample. Adding historical SIC code 6712 to the screen, correctly adds these institutions
back to the sample. Nonetheless, if we identify commercial banks with Compustat historical SIC code 60, if available,
and otherwise Compustat header SIC code 60, and rerun our main tests, we obtain results that are similar in terms of
alphas and t-statistics (available upon request).
14A small number of closed-end funds have header SIC code 60 or historical SIC code 6712, such as “American
Government Income Fd In” and “York Financial Corp.”
15Only 21 banks ever had negative capital ratios, affecting a mere 0.08% of bank-month observations.
16As indicated in the table, all variables, except Stock Return, are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels. It is
important to winsorize variables used in some analyses such as panel regressions (including Fama-MacBeth) to reduce
the impact of outliers. It is not critical to winsorize variables in the portfolio approaches used in the rest of the




Summary Statistics on Bank Fundamentals and Bank Stock Characteristics
This table reports summary statistics. Panel A shows the characteristics of portfolios of banks independently sorted into
quintiles by Market Cap and Capital Ratio, where Market Cap is market capitalization in billions of dollars calculated
as the number of shares outstanding times the stock price, and Capital Ratio is (common) book equity over total assets.
Panel A also shows: Market Capital Ratio, defined as Market Cap divided by the sum of Market Cap and the book
value of debt; Tier 1 Risk-Based Capital Ratio, defined as tier 1 capital over total risk-weighted assets; Total Risk-
Based Capital Ratio, defined as total capital (i.e., the sum of tier 1 and tier 2 capital) over total risk-weighted assets;
Total Assets, the book value of assets in billions of dollars; BETA, market beta estimated using monthly returns over a
60-month (minimum: 24-month) rolling window; Return Volatility, the realized monthly volatility; and Stock Return,
monthly stock returns. For each variable shown, we end up with 25 portfolios: we calculate the value-weighted (VW)
average value in each portfolio and report the simple average of the five size-quintile values for each capital quintile.
Panel B shows the same characteristics of portfolios of banks as Panel A, but stocks are now independently sorted into
quintiles by Total Assets (instead of Market Cap) and Capital Ratio. Panel C contains capital ratio transition matrices,
showing the probability of moving from one capital ratio quintile to another after one quarter or after one year. Banks
are commercial banks, identified as all firms listed on NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ in the CRSP database with
header SIC code (CRSP item HSICCD) 60 or historical SIC code (CRSP item SICCD) 6712. The number of unique
institutions is 1,350. All variables, except Stock Return, are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels. The sample period
is from Jan. 1994 - Dec. 2015.
Panel A: Characteristics of Portfolios of Banks Independently Sorted by Market Cap and Capital Ratio
Low Capital 2 3 4 High Capital
Capital Ratio 6.48% 8.11% 9.32% 10.79% 16.31%
Market Capital Ratio 9.38% 11.12% 12.54% 14.19% 19.80%
Tier 1 Risk-Based Capital Ratio 9.65% 10.55% 11.13% 12.35% 14.73%
Total Risk-Based Capital Ratio 12.95% 13.38% 14.10% 15.56% 21.53%
Market Cap ($B) 5.31 6.83 7.52 3.91 2.89
Total Assets ($B) 46.03 57.57 57.28 26.39 13.21
BETA 0.71 0.64 0.62 0.57 0.58
Return Volatility 2.54% 2.35% 2.30% 2.25% 2.21%
Stock Return 0.82% 1.15% 0.99% 1.03% 0.93%
Panel B: Characteristics of Portfolios of Banks Independently Sorted by Total Assets and Capital Ratio
Low Capital 2 3 4 High Capital
Capital Ratio 6.57% 8.11% 9.33% 10.82% 18.32%
Market Capital Ratio 10.11% 11.94% 13.61% 15.45% 24.87%
Tier 1 Risk-Based Capital Ratio 9.81% 10.69% 11.32% 12.52% 15.29%
Total Risk-Based Capital Ratio 12.84% 13.34% 14.06% 15.55% 22.05%
Market Cap ($B) 5.25 6.80 7.55 4.01 3.46
Total Assets ($B) 45.28 57.37 57.30 26.81 14.32
BETA 0.63 0.61 0.60 0.57 0.71
Return Volatility 2.56% 2.32% 2.23% 2.17% 2.11%
Stock Return 0.68% 1.04% 0.92% 0.94% 0.93%
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Table 3.1 Continued
Panel C: Capital Ratio Transition Matrices
Quarter t







1 Low 89.6% 11.2% 0.6% 0.2% 0.0%
2 8.9% 77.5% 13.3% 0.8% 0.2%
3 0.9% 10.1% 76.3% 12.3% 0.6%
4 0.4% 0.9% 9.1% 80.7% 8.8%







4 Low 77.2% 23.3% 3.8% 1.1% 0.5%
2 16.6% 55.9% 25.3% 5.4% 1.0%
3 4.0% 16.8% 53.0% 25.2% 3.0%
4 1.4% 3.3% 15.9% 58.0% 20.0%
High 0.8% 0.7% 1.9% 10.2% 75.5%
such as return volatility and beta (market beta estimated using monthly returns over a 60-month
rolling window, with a minimum of 24 months): banks in the lowest capital quintile have a beta of
0.71 while those in the highest capital quintile have a beta of 0.58. Similarly, the monthly return
volatility of the highest capital quintile banks is lower by 33 basis points.
Table 3.1 Panel B shows summary statistics on portfolios used in a robustness check in which
we independently sort portfolios of banks into quintiles by Total Assets (instead of Market Cap)
and Capital Ratio. The insights from this panel are similar to those obtained from Panel A, except
that the relation between capital and beta is slightly positive in this case. However, in our time-
series regression with portfolio returns, we show that high-capital banks have significantly lower
market betas. Moreover, as an important preview: all our results hold regardless of whether we
measure size as Market Cap or Total Assets.
Table 3.1 Panel C presents capital ratio transition matrices, showing the probability of moving
from one capital quintile to another after one quarter (Subpanel C1) or after one year (Subpanel
C2). They highlight that bank capital ratios are persistent. For low-capital banks, the probability of
still being a low-capital bank after one quarter and one year is 89.6% and 77.2%, respectively. For
high-capital banks, the probability of still being a high-capital bank after one quarter and one year
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is 90.4% and 75.5%, respectively. The probability that a low-capital bank becomes a high-capital
bank (or vice versa) is negligible: 0.3% (0.0%) after one quarter and 0.8% (0.5%) after one year.
The shaded areas in Figure 3.1 Panel A represent our main in-sample bad times definition,
which is based on stock return volatility (Black, 1976; Schwert, 1989; Veronesi, 1999) in the
banking sector: a bad time is a month in which VW bank stock return volatility is greater than the
80th percentile of bank stock return volatility measured over the full sample period.17 Stock return
volatility is modeled using an exponential generalized autoregressive heteroscedasticity of order 1,
EGARCH(1,1), model. Panel B shows an alternative bad times definition, used in some robustness
checks, based on equal-weighted (EW) bank stock return volatility. Many alternative in-sample
(out-of-sample) definitions are discussed and used in Internet Appendix IA.1.1 (IA.2.2).
The five linear factor models used in most analyses in Section 3.3 include: FF3, the Fama-
French 3-factor model, which includes MKT (return on the market in excess of the one-month
Treasury bill rate), SMB (the difference between the average portfolio returns of small and big
stocks), and HML (the difference between the average portfolio returns of value and growth stocks)
factors (Fama and French, 1993); FFC4, the Carhart 4-factor model, which adds a momentum
factor (UMD: the difference between the average portfolio returns of high and low prior return
stocks) to FF3 (Carhart, 1997); FF5, the Fama-French 5-factor model, which adds a profitability
factor (RMW: the difference between the average portfolio returns of stocks with robust and weak
operating profitability) and an investment factor (CMA: the difference between the average port-
folio returns of conservative and aggressive investment stocks) to FF3 (Fama and French, 2015);
FF5+LQ, which adds a liquidity factor to FF5 (Pástor and Stambaugh, 2003); and FH9, the Fung-
Hsieh 9-factor model, which includes nine hedge fund risk factors (Fung and Hsieh, 2001).18
17To avoid look-ahead bias, we also perform analyses which predict bad times using an EGARCH(1,1) or a random
walk model, and obtain comparable results (see Section 3.3.1.1). Our out-of-sample analyses also use this alternative
approach (see Section 3.3.2).
18Fung and Hsieh (2001)’s factors include two equity-oriented factors (the return on the S&P 500 and the return
spread between Russell 2000 and the S&P 500), two bond-oriented factors (the change in the 10-year Treasury yield
and the change in spread between the Baa bond yield and the 10-year Treasury yield), and five trend-following factors
(returns on bond, currency, commodity, short-term interest, and stock index lookback straddles).
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Figure 3.1
Main In-Sample Bad Times Definition: High Stock Return Volatility in the Banking Sector
The shaded areas in Panel A represent our main in-sample bad times definition. A bad time is a month in which VW
bank stock return volatility is greater than the 80th percentile of bank stock return volatility measured over the full
sample period (Jan. 1994 - Dec. 2015). Stock return volatility is modeled using an EGARCH(1,1) model. Panel
B shows an alternative bad times definition based on EW bank stock return volatility. Banks are commercial banks,
identified as all firms listed on NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ in the CRSP database with header SIC code (CRSP
item HSICCD) 60 or historical SIC code (CRSP item SICCD) 6712.
Panel A: Main In-Sample Bad Times Definition based on VW Bank Stock Return Volatility
Panel B: Alternative In-Sample Bad Times Definition based on EW Bank Stock Return Volatility
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3.3 High-Capital Banks Outperform Low-Capital Banks during Bad Times
This section addresses the first question: Do high-capital banks show better risk-adjusted
stock performance than low-capital banks and does the effect of capital differ across normal times
and bad economic times? It presents many in-sample and out-of-sample analyses which strongly
suggest that high-capital banks outperform low-capital banks during bad times only. It also in-
cludes falsification tests using industrial and non-bank financial firms which suggest that banks are
special.
3.3.1 In-sample methodology and results
3.3.1.1 Main in-sample methodology and results
To examine whether high-capital banks outperform low-capital banks during different eco-
nomic times, we use the following linear factor model:
Rpt = α0 + αBTBTt +
K∑
i=1
βifit + εit, (3.3.1)
where Rpt are monthly portfolio returns in excess of the one-month Treasury bill rate for bank
stocks sorted into capital ratio quintiles. BTt is a dummy = 1 if month t is a bad time, and zero
otherwise. As explained in Section 3.2: our main in-sample proxy defines a month to be a bad
time if VW bank stock return volatility (modeled using an EGARCH(1,1), model) exceeds its 80th
percentile. fit are factor returns in month t obtained using the five linear factor models mentioned
in Section 3.2: FF3, FFC4, FF5, FF5+LQ, and FH9.
Portfolios are rebalanced monthly: at the beginning of each month t, we independently sort
bank stocks into quintiles based on their capital ratio and size to form 25 portfolios to account
for the negative correlation between capital and size shown in Table 3.1. Capital and size (market
capitalization) are both defined in Section 3.2. Next, we compute monthly VW or EW average
returns for the 25 portfolios. We calculate returns for each capital ratio quintile as the simple
average of the five size-quintile portfolio returns.
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We do the following to ensure that capital ratios are available when investors form portfolios.
If a bank files a 10-K or 10-Q within three months of a fiscal-period end, we match the capital ratio
from that 10-K or 10-Q to stock returns starting the month after the filing date. If it files more than
three months after a fiscal-period end (2.3% of all filings) or if Compustat does not report a filing
date (7.6% of all filings), we match the capital ratio from the 10-K or 10-Q to stock returns starting
four months after the fiscal-period end to balance concerns about look-ahead bias and the possible
use of stale information.19 So if it files its Q1 10-Q on May 15, we match its Q1 capital ratio to
its stock returns in June, July, and August; but if it files its Q1 10-Q on July 17, we match its Q1
capital ratio to its stock returns in July, August, and September.
Table 3.2 Panel A presents - as a starting point - unconditional differences in risk-adjusted
returns between high- and low-capital portfolios, α of H-L, using five factor models. In the first
column, these unconditional differences are small and largely statistically insignificant, indicating
that high-capital banks do not outperform low-capital banks in general.20 The last two columns
split the sample by economic regimes into bad times and other times. The unconditional differences
are big and highly significant in bad times, yet not in other times.
Table 3.2 Panel B shows conditional risk-adjusted returns during bad times, αBT , obtained
using the Fama and French (2015) 5-factor model for bank stocks sorted into capital ratio quin-
tiles. The results show that high-capital banks outperform low-capital banks during bad times by
1.49% per month.21 Since 20% of all months are classified as bad times, this translates into an
19Using a four-month period in such cases seems defendable given that the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) requires that firms file 10-Ks (10-Qs) within 90 (45) days or less over our sample period. Roughly, they have
to file 10-Ks within 90 days of fiscal-year end (through 2002) / 75 days (in 2003) / 60 days (from 2004 onward) and
10-Qs within 45 days of fiscal-quarter end (through 2003) / 40 days (in 2004) / 35 days (from 2005 onward). For
exact details, see: http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/33-8128.htm. Thomas and Zhang (2011) use a four-month delay for
all firms.
20Cooper, Jackson, and Patterson (2003) find that changes in leverage and other bank fundamentals help predict
bank stock returns in the cross-section for the period of 1986 to 1999. To check if our result is sensitive to the time
period, we re-estimate our models using this sample period. We find that our results do not change: the estimated
α of H-L is insignificant using all five models. Specifically, FF3 α is -0.12% (t-statistic: -0.53); FFC4 α is -0.03%
(t-statistic: -0.12); FF5 α is 0.02% (t-statistic: 0.06); FF5+LQ α is 0.02% (t-statistic: 0.06); and FH9 α is -0.14%
(t-statistic: -0.55).
21The α estimates across quintiles are not completely monotonic. This is common in empirical asset pricing.
Chang, Choi, Kim, and Park (2016) show that some of the nonlinearity is associated with the time-varying and stochas-
tic nature of error volatilities. Even the most common anomalies such as the size effect and book-to-market effect
(observed using quintile or decile portfolios) show highly nonlinear patterns. In comparison, our estimates feature
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Table 3.2
Risk-Adjusted Returns of High- and Low-Capital Banks during Bad Times
This table reports risk-adjusted returns of capital ratio-sorted portfolios of bank stocks. Banks are commercial banks,
identified as all firms listed on NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ in the CRSP database with header SIC code (CRSP
item HSICCD) 60 or historical SIC code (CRSP item SICCD) 6712. The capital ratio is defined as book equity over
total assets at the beginning of month t using the most recent Compustat quarterly financial statements. The goal
is to establish the difference in risk-adjusted returns of high- and low-capital banks during bad times, αBT . Return
estimates are obtained using the following model (except in Panel E):Rpt = α0 +αBTBTt+
∑K
i=1 βifit+εit, where
Rpt are monthly portfolio returns in excess of the one-month Treasury bill rate for bank stocks sorted into capital
ratio quintiles (explained below); BTt is a dummy = 1 if month t is a bad time, defined as bank stock return volatility
(modeled using an EGARCH(1,1) model) exceeding the 80th percentile (in sample), and zero otherwise; fit are factor
returns in month t obtained using five linear factor models.
Panel A presents unconditional risk-adjusted returns for high- minus low-capital portfolios, α of H-L, using
the five factor models, restricting αBT to zero. It presents this for the full sample and for the full sample split into
economic regimes (bad times and other times). Panel B shows conditional risk-adjusted returns, αBT , obtained using
the Fama and French (2015) 5-factor model for bank stocks sorted into capital ratio quintiles. It shows results based
on VW average portfolio returns and defines bad times based on VW bank stock return volatility. Panel C shows
conditional risk-adjusted returns, αBT , for high- minus low-capital bank portfolios using the five factor models. It
shows results based on both VW and EW average portfolio returns and defines bad times alternatively based on VW
and EW bank stock return volatility. When forming portfolios, bank size is measured as Market Cap (the number
of shares outstanding times the share price measured at the beginning of month t). Panel D is comparable to Panel
C but uses Total Assets (the book value of assets) instead to measure bank size. Panel E avoids look-ahead bias:
it replaces BTt with BTpredicted,t, a dummy = 1 if month t is predicted to be a bad time, defined as bank stock
return volatility calculated using VW average bank stock returns from Jan. 1984 to month t − 1 exceeding the 80th
percentile, and zero otherwise. Volatility is modeled using an EGARCH(1,1) model and using a random walk model,
i.e., Et−1(volt) = volt−1.
Portfolios are rebalanced monthly: at the beginning of each month t, we independently sort bank stocks into
quintiles based on their capital ratio and size to form 25 portfolios. Capital is defined as above, while size is defined
as market capitalization in Panels A-C and E, and as Total Assets in Panel D. Next, we compute monthly VW or EW
average returns for the 25 portfolios. We calculate returns for each capital ratio quintile as the simple average of the
five size quintile portfolio returns. t-statistics are in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%,
and 1% level, respectively. The sample period is from Jan. 1994 - Dec. 2015.
Panel A: Unconditional Risk-Adjusted Returns of High- minus Low-Capital (H-L) Portfolios
Full Sample Split Into Economic Regimes
Economic Regimes All Times Bad Times Other Times
α of H-L α of H-L α of H-L
FF3 0.28%* 1.55%*** -0.07%
(1.84) (3.32) (-0.44)
FFC4 0.25% 1.66%*** -0.06%
(1.59) (3.67) (-0.38)
FF5 0.22% 1.34%*** -0.03%
(1.38) (2.69) (-0.17)
FF5+LQ 0.23% 1.35%*** -0.04%
(1.40) (2.73) (-0.25)




Panel B: Risk-Adjusted Returns of High- minus Low-Capital (H-L) Banks during Bad Times based on FF5
α0 αBT MKT SMB HML RMW CMA
Low Capital 0.39%* -2.18%*** 0.83*** 0.29*** 0.66*** 0.03 -0.07
(1.73) (-4.42) (15.77) (4.20) (7.05) (0.29) (-0.53)
2 0.57%*** -1.13%*** 0.71*** 0.28*** 0.65*** 0.07 -0.08
(3.02) (-2.73) (16.06) (4.76) (8.25) (0.77) (-0.72)
3 0.50%*** -1.64%*** 0.72*** 0.32*** 0.66*** 0.10 -0.09
(2.63) (-3.97) (16.16) (5.39) (8.29) (1.13) (-0.78)
4 0.46%*** -1.15%*** 0.66*** 0.28*** 0.53*** 0.11 0.05
(2.69) (-3.08) (16.57) (5.24) (7.45) (1.38) (0.49)
High Capital 0.33%** -0.68%* 0.62*** 0.27*** 0.41*** 0.07 0.05
(2.05) (-1.96) (16.75) (5.55) (6.20) (0.96) (0.51)
H - L -0.07% 1.49%*** -0.21*** -0.02 -0.25*** 0.04 0.12
(-0.38) (3.97) (-5.18) (-0.38) (-3.50) (0.50) (1.17)
Panel C: Risk-Adjusted Returns of High- minus Low-Capital (H-L) Banks during Bad Times
Average Portfolio Returns: VW EW VW EW
Bank Stock Return Volatility: VW VW EW EW
αBT of H-L αBT of H-L αBT of H-L αBT of H-L
FF3 1.54%*** 1.34%*** 2.06%*** 1.94%***
(4.14) (3.46) (5.72) (5.21)
FFC4 1.62%*** 1.39%*** 2.15%*** 2.01%***
(4.34) (3.58) (5.97) (5.36)
FF5 1.49%*** 1.27%*** 2.05%*** 1.94%***
(3.97) (3.27) (5.69) (5.19)
FF5+LQ 1.50%*** 1.27%*** 2.05%*** 1.94%***
(3.97) (3.26) (5.67) (5.18)
FH9 1.72%*** 1.55%*** 2.13%*** 2.06%***
(4.57) (3.90) (5.75) (5.28)
Panel D: Risk-Adjusted Returns of High- Minus Low-Capital (H-L) Banks during Bad Times: Use Total
Assets instead of Market Cap to Measure Bank Size when Forming Portfolios
Average Portfolio Returns: VW EW VW EW
Bank Stock Return Volatility: VW VW EW EW
αBT of H-L αBT of H-L αBT of H-L αBT of H-L
FF3 1.92%*** 1.94%*** 1.97%*** 2.16%***
(4.53) (3.82) (4.68) (4.31)
FFC4 2.03%*** 2.05%*** 2.08%*** 2.28%***
(4.78) (4.04) (4.95) (4.56)
FF5 1.93%*** 1.87%*** 1.95%*** 2.13%***
(4.51) (3.66) (4.63) (4.26)
FF5+LQ 1.94%*** 1.87%*** 1.95%*** 2.13%***
(4.52) (3.65) (4.61) (4.26)
FH9 1.95%*** 2.01%*** 1.85%*** 2.09%***
(4.86) (4.01) (4.56) (4.16)
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Table 3.2 Continued
Panel E: Risk-Adjusted Returns of High- minus Low-Capital (H-L) Portfolios during Times Predicted to
be Bad
Stock Return Volatility Forecasted using: EGARCH(1,1) Model Random Walk Model











annual outperformance by high-capital banks of 1.49% × 0.2 × 12 = 3.57%. While both types
of banks underperform during such times, the underperformance by high-capital banks is signifi-
cantly smaller (-0.68% versus -2.18% per month). Note that α0 + αBT (-0.07 + 1.49%) captures
the total effect in bad times: it is comparable to the estimated α in the second column of Panel A
(1.34% based on FF5) instead of the first column of Panel A (0.22%), which captures the average
effect in both good and bad times. Figure 3.2 shows that the outperformance of high-capital banks
during bad times is greater when the bad times cutoff is higher, but they start to outperform at the
5% level using cut-offs above the 40th percentile.
Table 3.2 Panel C shows the difference in risk-adjusted returns between high- and low-capital
banks during bad times, αBT of H-L, using five linear factor models. The four columns use al-
ternative weighting schemes (VW or EW) for portfolio returns and stock return volatility. The
first column shows our main specification, which uses VW average portfolio returns and defines
bad times based on VW bank stock return volatility.22 The emboldened result based on the Fama-
French 5-factor model is identical to that shown in Panel B. The results in the four columns are
mild nonlinearities.
22We obtain comparable results when portfolios are rebalanced annually at the end of June. As in Fama and French
(1993), the accounting variables for these sorts are for the fiscal year ending in the previous calendar year, while
market capitalization is as of June. (Results are available upon request.)
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Figure 3.2
Returns of High- and Low-Capital Banks during Bad Times: Alternative Bad Times Cut-Offs
This figure shows the difference in risk-adjusted returns of high- and low-capital banks during bad times, αBT , based
on alternative bad times percentile cut-offs using data from Jan. 1994 - Dec. 2015. Banks are commercial banks,
identified as all firms listed on NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ in the CRSP database with header SIC code (CRSP
item HSICCD) 60 or historical SIC code (CRSP item SICCD) 6712.The capital ratio is defined as book equity over
total assets at the beginning of month t using the most recent Compustat quarterly financial statements. The estimates
are obtained using a five-factor model (Fama and French, 2015): Rpt = α0 + αBTBTt +
∑K
i=1 βifit + εit, where
Rpt are monthly portfolio returns in excess of the one-month Treasury bill rate for high- and low-capital banks;
BTt is a dummy = 1 if month t is a bad time, defined as VW bank stock return volatility exceeding a cut-off that
varies here from zero to the 90th percentile (in sample), and zero otherwise; fit are the five Fama-French factors
(i = 1, · · · ,K,with K = 5) in month t.
At the beginning of each month t, we independently sort bank stocks into quintiles based on their capital ratio
and size to form 25 portfolios. Capital is defined as above, while size is defined as market capitalization, the number
of shares outstanding times the share price measured at the beginning of month t. Next, we compute monthly VW
average returns for the 25 portfolios. We calculate returns for each capital ratio quintile as the simple average of the
five size quintile portfolio returns. VW bank stock return volatility is modeled using an EGARCH(1,1) model. The
solid line indicates mean estimates, and the two dotted lines represent 5% confidence bounds.
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consistent and show that high-capital banks show higher risk-adjusted returns than low-capital
banks during bad times at the 1% level. The outperformance during bad times by high-capital
banks is 1.27% to 2.15% per month, or 3.05% to 5.16% per year.23
The results in Panel C are based on portfolio sorts by bank capital and size, measured as mar-
ket capitalization. While standard in the asset pricing literature, there are two potential concerns.
First, bank regulators measure bank size as (the book value of) total assets. Second, our results
may be driven by the well-known one-month reversal found in stock returns since monthly sorts
on market capitalization may sort past-month winners (losers) disproportionally into quintile five
(one). To address these concerns, we now measure size as total assets. Table 3.2 Panel D shows
that we obtain results that are comparable or stronger: the coefficients tend to be bigger and the
t-statistics tend to be higher than those shown in Panel C. In fact, all the results in our paper are
comparable or stronger when we use total assets (not shown for brevity but available upon request
from the authors).24 Possibly, the stronger results are driven by the fact that the difference in the
capital ratio of high- and low-capital banks is more pronounced when using total assets (18.32% -
6.57% = 11.75% in Table 3.1 Panel B versus 16.31% - 6.48% = 9.83% in Table 3.1 Panel A).
Another potential concern with the results in Panel C is that they are subject to a look-ahead
bias since bad times are defined using information from the full sample period. Table 3.2 Panel E
avoids look-ahead bias: it replacesBTt withBTpredicted,t, a dummy = 1 if month t is predicted to be
a bad time, defined as bank stock return volatility calculated using VW average bank stock returns
from Jan. 1984 to month t − 1 exceeding the 80th percentile, and zero otherwise. Volatility is
alternatively modeled using an EGARCH(1,1) model and a random walk model, i.e., Et−1(volt) =
volt−1.25 The outperformance of high-capital banks during bad times is somewhat smaller than
that presented in the first column of Table 3.2 Panel C, but remains highly significant.
23Since bad times obtained using EW return volatility put more emphasis on the recent financial crisis and less on
the dot.com bubble period (see Figure 3.1) and since the outperformance of high-capital banks is greater during the
recent financial crisis (to be shown in Internet Appendix IA.1.1), the results based on EW return volatility are stronger.
24The only exceptions are two robustness checks in which we use the VIX to measure bad times, but we still find
significance (at the 10% level) in those cases.
25Using the EGARCH(1,1) and random walk models, we have Type I errors (a good time is predicted to be a bad
time) in 8.5% and 8.5% of the cases, respectively; and we have Type II errors (a bad time is not predicted to be one)
in 22.6% and 26.4% of the cases, respectively. Thus, our out-of-sample volatility forecasts are rather reliable.
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These results have potentially important policy implications. While regulators emphasize the
role of capital in lowering default risk and related systemic risk, bankers typically view large capital
holdings as leading to lower liquidity creation and reduced shareholder value. Our results suggest
that high-capital banks’ shareholders benefit in bad times (Panel A second column and Panels B-
E) and do not suffer during other times (Panel A third column). Thus, holding more capital is
beneficial, because it helps banks outperform in bad times without hurting their stock performance
during other times.
3.3.1.2 Falsification tests: Are banks special?
It is useful to examine if our results are bank-specific. To address this, we rerun our analyses
while focusing first on industrial firms and then on non-bank financial firms. Industrial firms are
all firms listed on NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ in the CRSP database excluding financial firms,
identified as firms with header SIC code 6 or historical SIC code 6. Non-bank financial firms
are all financial firms excluding commercial banks.26 Figure 3.3 depicts stock return volatility,
modeled using an EGARCH(1,1) model, at industrial firms (Panels A-B) and non-bank financial
firms (Panels C-D). Panels A and C (B and D) show VW (EW) stock return volatility. The shaded
regions in each panel represent bad times, defined as months in which volatility is greater than its
80th percentile (in sample). Our main bad times proxies in this section are based on VW stock
return volatility being high (above the 80th percentile) in sample.
Table 3.3 presents results. Panel A shows the difference in unconditional risk-adjusted re-
turns of high- and low-capital firms using five alternative factor models. For industrial firms, the
difference is positive and significant in three cases, providing some evidence that unconditionally,
high-capital industrial firms outperform low-capital ones. The unconditional return differences are
small and not significant for non-bank financial firms. Panel B contains conditional risk-adjusted
returns based on the Fama-French 5-factor model. It shows that during bad times, the difference
26As before, commercial banks are identified as firms with header SIC code 60 or historical SIC code 6712.
We exclude firm-month observations of firms with negative capital ratios to avoid survivorship bias: 17.23% of all
industrial firms have negative capital ratios at least once during the sample period, affecting 3.20% of all firm-month
observations (for non-bank financials: 7.26% and 1.26%, respectively).
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Figure 3.3
Bad Times Definition for Falsification Tests: High Stock Return Volatility at Industrial and
Non-Bank Financial Firms
This figure depicts stock return volatility at industrial and non-bank financial firms modeled using an EGARCH(1,1)
model. Panels A and B (C and D) depict VW and EW industrial firm (non-bank financial firm) stock return volatility,
respectively. The shaded regions represent bad times, defined as months in which such volatility is greater than its
80th percentile (in sample). Industrial firm stocks are identified as all firms listed on NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ
in the CRSP database excluding financial firms, identified as firms with header SIC code (CRSP item HSICCD) 6 or
historical SIC code (CRSP item SICCD) 6. Non-bank financial firms are viewed to be all financial firms (identified as
indicated above) excluding commercial banks, identified as all firms with header SIC code (CRSP item HSICCD) 60
or historical SIC code (CRSP item SICCD) 6712. The sample period is from Jan. 1994 - Dec. 2015.
Panel A: VW Industrial Firm Stock Return Volatility
Panel B: EW Industrial Firm Stock Return Volatility
Panel C: VW Non-Bank Financial Firm Stock Return Volatility
Panel D: EW Non-Bank Financial Firm Stock Return Volatility
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Table 3.3
Falsification Tests: Risk-Adjusted Returns of High- and Low-Capital Industrial Firms and
Non-Bank Financial Firms during Bad Times
This table addresses if banks are special by using data on industrial and non-bank financial firms rather than banks.
The goal is to establish the difference in risk-adjusted returns of high- and low-capital firms during bad times, αBT
of H-L. Industrial firms are identified as all firms listed on NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ in the CRSP database
excluding financial firms, identified as firms with header SIC code (CRSP item HSICCD) 6 or historical SIC code
(CRSP item SICCD) 6. Non-bank financial firms are viewed to be all financial firms (identified as indicated above)
excluding commercial banks, identified as all firms with header SIC code (CRSP item HSICCD) 60 or historical SIC
code (CRSP item SICCD) 6712. The return estimates are obtained using the following model: Rpt = α0 +αBTBTt+∑K
i=1 βifit + εit, where Rpt are monthly portfolio returns in excess of the one-month Treasury bill rate for industrial
firm or non-bank financial firm stocks sorted into capital ratio quintiles (explained below). In most specifications
shown, BTt is a dummy = 1 if month t is a bad time, defined as VW stock return volatility of industrial firms or non-
bank financial firms exceeding the 80th percentile, and zero otherwise (in sample). Stock return volatility is modeled
using an EGARCH(1,1) model. fit are factor returns in month t obtained using five linear factor models.
Panels A-C present results separately for industrial and non-bank financial firms: Panel A shows unconditional
risk-adjusted returns, restricting αBT to zero. Panel B contains conditional risk-adjusted returns based on FF5, the
Fama-French 5-factor model, during bad times. Panel C shows the difference in risk-adjusted returns of high-and
low-capital firms during bad times, αBT of H-L, using five alternative factor models. Results are shown for the main
specification (bad times identified using VW stock return volatility over the entire sample period), but also using EW
stock return volatility, and for specifications that avoid look-ahead bias by using times predicted to be bad.
Portfolios are rebalanced monthly: at the beginning of each month t, we independently sort industrial firm or non-
bank financial firm stocks into quintiles based on their capital ratio and size to form 25 portfolios. Capital is defined as
above, while size is defined as market capitalization, the number of shares outstanding times the share price measured
at the beginning of month t. Next, we compute monthly VW average returns for the 25 portfolios. We calculate
returns for each capital ratio quintile as the simple average of the five size quintile portfolio returns. t-statistics are in
parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. The sample period is
from Jan. 1994 - Dec. 2015.
Panel A: Unconditional Risk-Adjusted Returns of High- minus Low-Capital (H-L) Industrial and
Non-Bank Financial Firms using Alternative Factor Models
Sample: Industrial firms Non-bank financial firms













Panel B1: Risk-Adjusted Returns of High- minus Low-Capital (H-L) Industrial Firms during Bad Times
based on FF5
Sample: Industrial firms
α0 αBT MKT SMB HML RMW CMA
Low Capital -0.11% 0.10% 1.09*** 0.67*** 0.47*** -0.22** -0.22**
(-0.56) (0.24) (24.53) (11.23) (5.88) (-2.50) (-2.03)
2 0.03% 0.21% 0.99*** 0.63*** 0.36*** -0.06 -0.18**
(0.19) (0.63) (28.11) (13.22) (5.68) (-0.88) (-2.07)
3 0.10% 0.47% 0.98*** 0.66*** 0.25*** -0.23*** -0.26***
(0.68) (1.44) (28.84) (14.46) (4.00) (-3.29) (-3.08)
4 0.25%* 0.10% 0.99*** 0.70*** -0.11* -0.34*** -0.26***
(1.84) (0.31) (30.68) (16.12) (-1.89) (-5.17) (-3.21)
High Capital 0.29%* 0.49% 0.97*** 0.69*** -0.30*** -0.61*** -0.36***
(1.74) (1.32) (24.74) (13.12) (-4.25) (-7.77) (-3.73)
H - L 0.40%*** 0.39% -0.12*** 0.02 -0.77*** -0.39*** -0.14
(2.67) (1.18) (-3.52) (0.39) (-12.25) (-5.52) (-1.60)
Panel B2: Risk-Adjusted Returns of High- minus Low-Capital (H-L) Non-Bank Financial Firms during
Bad Times based on FF5
Sample: Non-bank financial firms
α0 αBT MKT SMB HML RMW CMA
Low Capital 0.00% -0.19% 1.09*** 0.33*** 0.91*** -0.07 -0.20*
(-0.01) (-0.44) (23.85) (5.43) (11.00) (-0.77) (-1.80)
2 0.19% -0.21% 0.90*** 0.49*** 0.70*** 0.15** -0.24***
(1.25) (-0.66) (26.15) (10.72) (11.35) (2.24) (-2.78)
3 0.25% -0.15% 0.89*** 0.56*** 0.63*** 0.09 -0.23**
(1.37) (-0.38) (20.86) (9.82) (8.32) (1.06) (-2.21)
4 0.28%* 0.03% 0.78*** 0.47*** 0.54*** 0.13* -0.14
(1.81) (0.08) (21.36) (9.64) (8.20) (1.86) (-1.59)
High Capital 0.27%** -0.55%** 0.71*** 0.47*** 0.27*** -0.06 -0.10
(2.17) (-2.00) (24.39) (11.92) (5.06) (-1.12) (-1.31)
H - L 0.28% -0.36% -0.38*** 0.13** -0.64*** 0.01 0.11
(1.39) (-0.84) (-8.25) (2.18) (-7.74) (0.06) (0.96)
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Table 3.3 Continued
Panel C1: Risk-Adjusted Returns of High- minus Low-Capital (H-L) Industrial Firms during Bad Times
using Alternative Factor Models
Sample: Industrial Firms
Bad Times
Industrial Firm Return Volatility
VW Avg. EW Avg. VW Avg. VW Avg.
Definition: Obtained Obtained Predicted using Predicted using
in-sample in-sample EGARCH(1,1) model random walk model
αBT of H-L αBT of H-L αBT of H-L αBT of H-L
FF3 0.01% 0.00% 0.08% 0.16%
(0.04) (-0.01) (0.23) (0.47)
FFC4 0.20% 0.18% 0.12% 0.44%
(0.60) (0.53) (0.37) (1.32)
FF5 0.39% 0.24% 0.13% 0.37%
(1.18) (0.75) (0.39) (1.17)
FF5+LQ 0.39% 0.24% 0.13% 0.37%
(1.18) (0.74) (0.39) (1.18)
FH9 0.17% 0.04% 1.04%* 0.50%
(0.30) (0.07) (1.88) (0.91)
Panel C2: Risk-Adjusted Returns of High- minus Low-Capital (H-L) Non-Bank Financial Firms during
Bad Times using Alternative Factor Models
Sample: Non-Bank Financial Firms
Bad Times
Non-Bank Financial Firm Return Volatility
VW Avg. EW Avg. VW Avg. VW Avg.
Definition: Obtained Obtained Predicted using Predicted using
in-sample in-sample EGARCH(1,1) model random walk model
αBT of H-L αBT of H-L αBT of H-L αBT of H-L
FF3 -0.33% -0.60% -0.07% -0.56%
(-0.77) (-1.40) (-0.18) (-1.35)
FFC4 -0.18% -0.30% -0.17% -0.25%
(-0.42) (-0.70) (-0.43) (-0.61)
FF5 -0.36% -0.61% -0.09% -0.55%
(-0.84) (-1.42) (-0.22) (-1.33)
FF5+LQ -0.34% -0.62% 0.01% -0.65%
(-0.81) (-1.48) (0.03) (-1.60)
FH9 0.28% 0.02% 0.05% -0.13%
(0.56) (0.04) (0.10) (-0.26)
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in risk-adjusted returns between high- and low-capital firms, αBT of H-L, is insignificant for in-
dustrial firms (0.39% per month; t-stat 1.18) and for non-bank financial firms (-0.36% per month;
t-stat -0.84). Panel C shows similar evidence using five alternative factor models.27 Results are
shown using VW and EW stock return volatility, and for specifications that avoid look-ahead bias
by using times predicted to be bad (based on EGARCH and random walk models).
Combined, these results suggest that banks are special: the role of capital in banks is very
different from its role in industrial and non-bank financial firms.
3.3.1.3 Control for Gandhi and Lustig (2015)’s size effect
Table 3.1 Panels A and B document that there is a negative relation between bank capital
and bank size. This raises a concern that our results are driven by bank size rather than bank
capital. To elaborate, Gandhi and Lustig (2015) document that - controlling for all known risk
factors - the largest banks have significantly lower returns than smaller banks, and this differential
is particularly pronounced during financial crisis, or bad economic, times. They argue that this is
caused by larger banks having higher recovery rates during a crisis since these banks are deemed
too-big-to-fail and hence the government absorbs some of their tail risk. While we try to ensure
that our results are driven by bank capital rather than by bank size (by first constructing VW returns
for 25 size and bank capital portfolios and then taking the simple average across five size quintiles
to generate portfolio returns for each capital quintile), it is possible that we have not done enough.
We address this concern two ways. First, we exclude banks in the largest size quintile. Second,
we rerun our main regressions while controlling for Gandhi and Lustig (2015)’s size factor, which
is replicated as follows. At the beginning of January in each year of our sample period (1994 -
2015),28 we sort bank stocks into deciles based on their market capitalization and compute VW
average returns in each decile over the year. Using these ten portfolios, we estimate residuals from
a five factor model (Fama-French’s three factors and two bond factors)29 and extract the loadings
27For industrial firms, the difference is positive and significant at the 10% level in one case (based on FH9).
28We obtain similar results when we construct the factor using data from 1980 - 2013 as in Gandhi and Lustig
(2015) and when using data from 1980 - 2015.
29The two bond factors are: ltg, the monthly change in the 10-year Treasury constant maturity yield less the one-
month Treasury bill rate, and crd, the monthly change in Moody’s Baa yield less the one-month Treasury bill rate.
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for the principal components. Because the second principal component loads positively on small
banks and negatively on large banks, as reported by Gandhi and Lustig (2015), it is used to create
a size factor. Specifically, the size factor is defined as the product of the normalized weights for
the second principal component and the residuals of the ten portfolios.
Table 3.4 shows that both approaches yield results comparable to those in the first column of
Table 3.2 Panel C, suggesting that our results are not driven by Gandhi and Lustig (2015)’s size
effect.
3.3.1.4 Control for nonsynchronous trading
It is well-known that small firm stocks may be subject to nonsynchronous trading. We address
this possibility two ways: by including lagged factor returns as in Scholes and Williams (1977),
and by excluding the smallest size quintile when computing returns for each capital ratio quintile.
Table 3.5 uses both approaches and shows results similar to those in the first column of Table
3.2 Panel C, suggesting that our results are not significantly affected by nonsynchronous trading.
3.3.1.5 Control for time-varying betas
It is possible that the effects of some risk factors are amplified or reduced during bad times,
and that this is priced in the stock market. If so, the state-dependent nature of abnormal perfor-
mance we have documented could merely result from ignoring this conditionality of risk. To verify
that this does not drive our results, we re-estimate our models by allowing the intercept and risk
exposures to interact with bad times:30






βBTifitBTt + εit, (3.3.2)
where βBT measures the sensitivity of bank stock returns to the degree of co-movement of risk
(fit) and the economic state of the world (BTt).
Table 3.6 Panel A shows the estimates of α0 and βi, and Panel B shows the conditional coeffi-
30This is similar to a regime-switching model, used by Acharya, Amihud, and Bharath (2013) and others, in that
all regression coefficients can change depending on the regime.
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Table 3.4
Risk-Adjusted Returns of High- and Low-Capital Banks during Bad Times: Results Controlling
for Gandhi and Lustig (2015)’s Size Effect
This table reports the difference in risk-adjusted returns of high- and low-capital banks during bad times, αBT of H-L,
while controlling for Gandhi and Lustig (2015)’s size effect. Banks are commercial banks, identified as all firms listed
on NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ in the CRSP database with header SIC code (CRSP item HSICCD) 60 or historical
SIC code (CRSP item SICCD) 6712. The capital ratio is defined as book equity over total assets at the beginning of
month t using the most recent Compustat quarterly financial statements. The return estimates are obtained using the
following model: Rpt = α0 + αBTBTt +
∑K
i=1 βifit + εit, where Rpt are monthly portfolio returns in excess of
the one-month Treasury bill rate for bank stocks sorted into capital ratio quintiles (explained below); BTt is a dummy
= 1 if month t is a bad time, defined as VW bank stock return volatility (modeled using an EGARCH(1,1) model)
exceeding the 80th percentile (in sample), and zero otherwise; fit are factor returns in month t obtained using five
linear factor models.
Gandhi and Lustig (2015)’s size effect is controlled for in two ways. First, we exclude banks in the largest size
quintile when computing returns for each capital ratio quintile. Second, we control for Gandhi and Lustig (2015)’s
size factor, GL, which is replicated as follows. At the beginning of January in each year of our sample period (1994 -
2015), we sort bank stocks into deciles based on their market capitalization and compute VW average returns across
deciles over the year. Using these ten portfolios, we estimate residuals from a five factor model, which includes Fama-
French’s three factors and two bond factors: ltg, the monthly change in the 10-year Treasury constant maturity yield
less the one-month Treasury bill rate, and crd, the monthly change in Moody’s Baa yield less the one-month Treasury
bill rate.) We then run a principal component analysis for the residuals. Finally, the size factor is defined as the product
of the normalized weights for the second principal component and the residuals of the ten portfolios.
Portfolios are rebalanced monthly: at the beginning of each month t, we independently sort bank stocks into
quintiles based on their capital ratio and size to form 25 portfolios. Capital is defined as above, while size is defined
as market capitalization at the beginning of month t. Next, we compute monthly VW average returns for the 25
portfolios. We calculate returns for each capital ratio quintile as the simple average of the four smallest size quintile
portfolio returns in the first column, and as the simple average of all five size quintiles in the second column. t-statistics
are in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. The sample period
is from Jan. 1994 - Dec. 2015.
Control for a Size Effect by Control for a Size Effect by
Excluding Banks in the Largest Size Quintile Controlling for Gandhi and Lustig (2015)’s Size Factor
αBT of H-L αBT of H-L
FF3 1.72%*** FF3 + GL 1.40%***
(4.38) (3.75)
FFC4 1.73%*** FFC4 + GL 1.48%***
(4.40) (3.95)
FF5 1.66%*** FF5 + GL 1.35%***
(4.21) (3.57)
FF5+LQ 1.66%*** FF5+LQ + GL 1.35%***
(4.20) (3.57)




Risk-Adjusted Returns of High- and Low-Capital Banks during Bad Times: Results Controlling
for Nonsynchronous Trading
This table reports the difference in risk-adjusted returns of high- and low-capital banks during bad times, αBT of H-L,
while controlling for nonsynchronous trading. Banks are commercial banks, identified as all firms listed on NYSE,
AMEX, and NASDAQ in the CRSP database with header SIC code (CRSP item HSICCD) 60 or historical SIC code
(CRSP item SICCD) 6712. The capital ratio is defined as book equity over total assets at the beginning of month t
using the most recent Compustat quarterly financial statements. The return estimates are obtained using the following
model: Rpt = α0 +αBTBTt+
∑K
i=1 βifit+ εit, where Rpt are monthly portfolio returns in excess of the one-month
Treasury bill rate for bank stocks sorted into capital ratio quintiles (explained below); BTt is a dummy = 1 if month t
is a bad time, defined as VW bank stock return volatility (modeled using an EGARCH(1,1) model) exceeding the 80th
percentile (in sample), and zero otherwise; fit are factor returns in month t obtained using five linear factor models.
To account for the possibility that small bank stocks are subject to nonsynchronous trading bias, we estimate
the risk-adjusted bank stock returns after controlling for nonsynchronous trading using two approaches. Following
Scholes and Williams (1977), we add lagged factor returns on the right-hand-side of the equation. Alternatively,
portfolio returns of the smallest size quintile are excluded when computing returns for each capital ratio quintile.
Portfolios are rebalanced monthly: at the beginning of each month t, we independently sort bank stocks into
quintiles based on their capital ratio and size to form 25 portfolios. Capital is defined as above, while size is defined
as market capitalization at the beginning of month t. Next, we compute monthly VW average returns for the 25
portfolios. We calculate returns for each capital ratio quintile as the simple average of all five size quintile portfolio
returns in the first column, and as the simple average of the four largest size quintiles in the second column. t-statistics
are in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. The sample period
is from Jan. 1994 - Dec. 2015.
Control for Non-Synchronous Trading:
As in By Excluding Banks in
Scholes and Williams (1977) the Smallest Size Quintile












cients αBT and βBTi from equation (3.3.2). We continue to find that the alpha of the H-L portfolio
in bad times (1.36%) is positive and highly significant even after controlling for time-varying risk.
The alpha here is (1.49% - 1.36% =) 13 basis points lower than αBT of H-L in Table 3.2 Panel B,
which does not take conditionality of risk into account. To assess what drives this drop in alpha,
we look at the loadings on the five factors. As can be seen, the loading on the profitability factor,
RMW, changes substantially and becomes positive in bad times, implying that high-capital banks
have unexpectedly high profitability in such times. The other factor loadings change little in bad
times. Combined, this suggests that the conditional profitability factor accounts for most of the 13
basis point outperformance of high-capital banks against low-capital banks during bad times.
Table 3.6 Panel C shows that similar results obtain using the other factor models: we find
significant alpha in bad times after controlling for the conditionality of risk. Thus, high-capital
banks show greater risk-adjusted returns than low-capital banks during bad times. Panel and
Fama-Macbeth regressions (Internet Appendices IA.1.6 and IA.1.7) lend further support to this
conclusion.
3.3.1.6 Control for bank-specific risk factors
The linear factor models used so far intend to capture risks faced by firms in general. While
one could argue that these asset pricing models should also work for banks, they were not con-
structed to capture bank-specific risks. One potential concern is that we do not adequately control
for such risks, implying that we might be merely capturing that high-capital banks are riskier than
low-capital banks. Initial evidence suggests the opposite: the difference in the estimated market
beta for the highest- and lowest-capital bank quintiles is (0.62 - 0.83 =) -0.21 (Table 3.2 Panel B);
and high-capital banks have lower return volatility (Table 3.1 Panel A). Recognizing that this may
not be sufficient and given the endogeneity of bank capital (riskier banks may optimally choose
to hold more capital, implying that high-capital banks are aligned with higher bank-specific risks),
we now rerun our regressions while adding ten bank-specific risk factors to the five linear factor
models. We first add (most of) these factors one by one and then present results while adding all
ten factors to each model.
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Table 3.6
Risk-Adjusted Returns of High- and Low-Capital Banks during Bad Times: Results Controlling
for Time-Varying Betas
This table reports the difference in risk-adjusted returns of high- and low-capital banks during bad times, αBT of H-L,
while allowing risk factors to co-vary with bad times. Banks are commercial banks, identified as all firms listed on
NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ in the CRSP database with header SIC code (CRSP item HSICCD) 60 or historical SIC
code (CRSP item SICCD) 6712. The capital ratio is defined as book equity over total assets at the beginning of month t
using the most recent Compustat quarterly financial statements. The return estimates are obtained using the following




i=1 βBTifitBTt + εit, where Rpt are monthly portfolio returns in
excess of the one-month Treasury bill rate for bank stocks sorted into capital ratio quintiles (explained below); BTt is
a dummy = 1 if month t is a bad time, defined as VW bank stock return volatility (modeled using an EGARCH(1,1)
model) exceeding the 80th percentile (in sample), and zero otherwise; fit are factor returns in month t obtained using
up to five linear factor models.
Panel A shows the α0 and βi regression coefficients, obtained using FF5 for bank stocks sorted into capital ratio
quintiles (see below). Panel B shows conditional (αBT and βBTi ) regression coefficients using FF5. Panel C shows
returns of high- minus low-capital (H-L) banks during bad times, obtained while allowing betas to differ between good
and bad times using five factor models.
Portfolios are rebalanced monthly: at the beginning of each month t, we independently sort bank stocks into
quintiles based on their capital ratio and size to form 25 portfolios. Capital is defined as above, while size is defined
as market capitalization at the beginning of month t. Next, we compute monthly VW average returns for the 25
portfolios. We calculate returns for each capital ratio quintile as the simple average of the five size quintile portfolio
returns. t-statistics are in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
The sample period is from Jan. 1994 - Dec. 2015.
Panel A: Unconditional Risk-Adjusted Returns of High- minus Low-Capital (H-L) Banks based on FF5
α0 MKT SMB HML RMW CMA
Unconditional Coefficients -0.03% -0.20*** -0.02 -0.19* -0.10 0.13
(-0.15) (-3.90) (-0.29) (-1.93) (-1.00) (1.04)
Panel B: Risk-Adjusted Returns of High- minus Low-Capital (H-L) Banks during Bad Times based on
FF5: Controlling for Conditional Beta
αBT MKTBT SMBBT HMLBT RMWBT CMABT
Conditional Coefficients 1.36%*** 0.00 0.10 -0.20 0.44** 0.00
(3.36) (-0.01) (0.83) (-1.33) (2.42) (0.01)
Panel C: Risk-Adjusted Returns of High- Minus Low-Capital (H-L) Banks during Bad Times using













The bank-specific risk factors that we add in Table 3.7 Panel A include: a funding liquidity
risk factor alternatively constructed using broker-dealer leverage from the Federal Reserve’s Flow
of Funds Accounts (Adrian, Etula, and Muir, 2014)31 or using bond liquidity premiums (Fontaine
and Garcia, 2012);32 a systemic risk factor (Brownlees and Engle, 2017);33 a yield curve factor
defined as the change in the 10-year treasury constant maturity yield minus the one-year treasury
constant maturity yield; two financials’ ROE and (financials minus non-financials) return spread
factors (Adrian, Friedman, and Muir, 2016);34 a bank asset risk factor, defined as the VW return on
the highest quintile minus the VW return on the lowest quintile, constructed using non-performing
assets ratios, loan loss reserve ratios, interest income ratios,35 or loan concentration ratios.36 The
last column adds all ten bank-specific risk factors to the factor models. Panel B adds them to FF5
and displays only the coefficients on the bank-specific risk factors since the coefficients of the FF5
factors are largely unchanged.
Table 3.7 Panel A shows the results, which are similar to those in the first column of Table
3.2 Panel C. The fact that they are obtained while controlling for bank-specific risks diminishes
concerns that high-capital banks are riskier and that this somehow drives our main results. Panel
B states that higher bank capital is related to higher financials’ ROE, a lower (financials minus
non-financials) return spread, lower non-performing assets, and higher interest income, consistent
31Broker-dealer leverage is defined as total financial assets of broker-dealers divided by (their total finan-
cial assets minus their total liabilities). See Table L.130 Security Brokers and Dealers of the Flow of Funds:
http://www.federalreserve.gov/apps/fof/FOFTables.aspx. We first obtain broker-dealer leverage shocks by season-
ally adjusting log changes in the level of broker-dealer leverage. We then compute the exposures (i.e., broker-dealer
leverage betas) of bank excess returns on broker-dealer leverage shocks using 5-year rolling window time-series re-
gressions. Finally, we define the broker-dealer leverage factor as the VW return difference between the highest and
lowest broker dealer leverage beta quintile.
32Data on bond liquidity premiums are downloaded from Fontaine’s website: http://jean-sebastienfontaine.com.
33Their systemic risk variable measures the capital shortfall the financial system is expected to experience con-
ditional on a market decline. The systemic risk factor is created in a similar fashion as the broker-dealer leverage
factor.
34Financials’ ROE is defined as VW returns for financials in the highest ROE quintile minus VW returns for
financials in the lowest ROE quintile. The spread is defined as VW returns for financials in excess of the market return
for non-financials. Financials are all institutions with SIC codes 6000-6799 based on Compustat’s historical SIC code,
Compustat’s header SIC code, CRSP’s historical SIC code, and CRSP’s header SIC code (use the first non-missing
SIC code in this order).
35This is based on the rationale that a bank would charge higher interest rates on riskier loans.
















. Since details on loan portfo-
lios are not available in Compustat, we use the Bank Regulatory Database to compute loan concentration ratios.
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with lower bank-specific risks. Despite that, the results show that these bank-risk factors cannot
fully account for the special role played by bank capital in bad times.
Table 3.7
Risk-Adjusted Returns of High- and Low-Capital Banks during Bad Times: Results Controlling
for Bank-Specific Risk Factors
This table reports the difference in risk-adjusted returns of high- and low-capital banks during bad times, αBT of
H-L, while controlling explicitly for various bank-specific risk factors. Banks are commercial banks, identified as all
firms listed on NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ in the CRSP database with header SIC code (CRSP item HSICCD)
60 or historical SIC code (CRSP item SICCD) 6712. The capital ratio is defined as book equity over total assets at
the beginning of month t using the most recent Compustat quarterly financial statements. The return estimates are




i=1 βBTifitBTt + εit, where Rpt
are monthly portfolio returns in excess of the one-month Treasury bill rate for bank stocks sorted into capital ratio
quintiles (explained below); BTt is a dummy = 1 if month t is a bad time, defined as VW bank stock return volatility
(modeled using an EGARCH(1,1) model) exceeding the 80th percentile (in sample), and zero otherwise; fit are factor
returns in month t obtained using five linear factor models.
The bank-specific risk factors that are alternatively added to the five linear factor models used so far (and described
in the next paragraph) are as follows: 1) a funding liquidity risk factor constructed using broker-dealer leverage
(Adrian, Etula, and Muir, 2014); 2) a funding liquidity risk factor constructed using bond liquidity premiums Fontaine
and Garcia (2012); 3) a systemic risk factor (Brownlees and Engle, 2017); 4) a term spread risk factor; 5&6) two
financial institutions’ ROE and (financials minus non-financials) return spread factors (Adrian, Friedman, and Muir,
2016); 7) a bank asset risk factor constructed using non-performing assets ratios; 8) a bank asset risk factor constructed
using loan loss reserve ratio; 9) a bank asset risk factor constructed using interest income ratios; and 10) a bank asset
risk factor constructed using loan concentration ratios. The last column adds all ten bank-specific risk factors to the
factor models. Panel B adds all ten risk factors to FF5 and shows the factor loadings on the bank-specific risk factors
only.
Portfolios are rebalanced monthly: at the beginning of each month t, we independently sort bank stocks into
quintiles based on their capital ratio and size to form 25 portfolios. Capital is defined as above, while size is defined
as market capitalization at the beginning of month t. Next, we compute monthly VW average returns for the 25
portfolios. We calculate returns for each capital ratio quintile as the simple average of the five size quintile portfolio
returns. t-statistics are in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Risk-Adjusted Returns of High- and Low-Capital Banks during Bad Times: Results Controlling
for Differences in (Market) Betas
This table reports the difference in risk-adjusted returns of high- and low-capital banks during bad times, αBT of H-L,
while controlling for differences in (market) betas. Banks are commercial banks, identified as all firms listed on NYSE,
AMEX, and NASDAQ in the CRSP database with header SIC code (CRSP item HSICCD) 60 or historical SIC code
(CRSP item SICCD) 6712. The capital ratio is defined as book equity over total assets at the beginning of month t
using the most recent Compustat quarterly financial statements. The return estimates are obtained using the following




i=1 βBTifitBTt + εit, where Rpt are monthly portfolio returns in
excess of the one-month Treasury bill rate for bank stocks sorted into capital ratio quintiles (explained below); BTt is
a dummy = 1 if month t is a bad time, defined as VW bank stock return volatility (modeled using an EGARCH(1,1)
model) exceeding the 80th percentile (in sample), and zero otherwise; fit are factor returns in month t obtained using
five linear factor models.
We control for differences in (market) betas as follows. Portfolios are rebalanced monthly: at the beginning of
month t, we first sort bank stocks into terciles based on their betas (estimated using monthly returns over a 60-month
(minimum: 24-month) rolling window). We then independently sort bank stocks into terciles within each beta tercile
based on their capital ratio and size to form 27 portfolios. Capital is defined as above, while size is defined as market
capitalization at the beginning of month t. In this setup, banks in each capital ratio tercile have roughly comparable
betas. Next, we compute monthly VW average returns for the 27 portfolios. We calculate returns for each capital ratio
tercile as the simple average of the 9 beta-size tercile portfolio returns. t-statistics are in parentheses. *, **, and ***












3.3.1.7 Control for (market) betas
While the previous section ameliorates the concern that high-capital banks may be riskier, it
brings up a new issue. Frazzini and Pedersen (2014) and Baker and Wurgler (2015) report that
high (low) beta assets are associated with low (high) alphas. They argue that a factor based upon
differences in betas, a “betting-against-beta” factor, may be needed in addition to the typical market
factor to better explain the cross-section of stock returns.
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To formally address this concern, we perform an analysis that aims to explicitly control for the
effects of beta. Specifically, at the beginning of month t, we first sort bank stocks into terciles based
on their market betas, which are estimated using monthly returns over a 60-month (minimum:
24) rolling window. We then independently sort bank stocks within each beta tercile based on
their capital ratio and size (market capitalization) to form 27 portfolios. In this setup, banks in
each capital ratio tercile have roughly comparable betas. Next, we compute monthly VW average
returns for the 27 portfolios. We calculate returns for each capital ratio tercile as the simple average
of the 9 beta-size tercile portfolio returns. If the “betting-against-beta” factor produced our result,
the conditional alpha estimates from these tests should be insignificant.
Table 3.8 shows that our main conclusion remains: high-capital banks earn higher risk-
adjusted returns than low-capital banks in bad times, even after taking into account the anomaly
of “betting against beta.”37 Internet Appendices IA.1.6 and IA.1.7 (with panel and Fama-Macbeth
regressions) further confirm this.
3.3.1.8 Additional robustness check shown in the Internet Appendix
The Internet Appendix additionally shows that our in-sample results: are not driven by the
recent financial crisis, and are robust to using seven alternative bad times proxies and to us-
ing their union or intersection sets (Section IA.1.1); are not caused by banks that delisted for
performance-related reasons (Section IA.1.2); are robust to the use of benchmark-adjusted returns
(Daniel, Grinblatt, Titman, and Wermers, 1997) (Section IA.1.3); are comparable using data from
the Bank Regulatory Database (Section IA.1.4); are robust to using regulatory and market-based
capital ratios (Section IA.1.5), panel regressions (Section IA.1.6), and Fama-MacBeth regressions
(Section IA.1.7); and hold using value-added performance measures (Berk and van Binsbergen,
2015) (Section IA.1.8).
37The coefficients are smaller than those shown in the first column of Table 3.2 Panel C, but this is not surprising
since we triple sort by beta, capital ratio and size (3 × 3 × 3 = 27 portfolios). Sorting stocks into quintiles would
have yielded 125 (5× 5× 5) portfolios and would have raised concerns about the effects of each portfolio containing
relatively few stocks.
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3.3.2 High-capital banks outperform low-capital banks out of sample
3.3.2.1 Main out-of-sample methodology and results
To assess out-of-sample performance, it is necessary to use trading strategies conditional upon
predicted bad times. To our knowledge, conditional trading strategies have not been explored in
the literature - our approach is novel and can be useful in future studies. We create five alternative
trading strategies, summarized in Table 3.9 Panel A. Our main strategy, Strategy #1, is the simplest:
it buys high-capital banks and sells low-capital banks during times predicted to be bad (H-L), and
does nothing during other times (∅). Our main out-of-sample bad times proxy defines month t
to be bad if VW bank stock return volatility is forecasted to be greater than the 80th percentile of
bank stock return volatility from Jan. 1984 to month t− 1.
The remaining four strategies also buy high-capital banks and sell low-capital banks during
times predicted to be bad, but differ in what to do during other times. We split such times into
two regions: predicted OK times versus predicted good times (stock return volatility is forecasted
to be in between the 80th and 20th percentiles versus lower than the 20th percentile of bank stock
return volatility from Jan. 1984 to month t−1, respectively). During times predicted to be OK, the
other strategies alternatively buy high-capital banks and sell low-capital banks (H-L), do the exact
opposite (L-H), or do nothing (∅). During times predicted to be good, the other strategies do not
buy high-capital banks and sell low-capital banks: they do the exact opposite (L-H) or do nothing
(∅).
Risk-adjusted returns per trading strategy are obtained using the following factor model:
Rpt = α +
K∑
i=1
βifit + εit, (3.3.3)
where Rpt are monthly portfolio returns in excess of the one-month Treasury bill rate for bank
stocks sorted into capital ratio quintiles. fit are factor returns in month t obtained using the five
linear factor models discussed in Section 3.2. Our analyses examine which trading strategies yield
significantly positive risk-adjusted returns.
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Table 3.9
Trading Performance of High- and Low-Capital Portfolios
This table formulates five alternative trading strategies buying and selling portfolios of high- and low-capital banks
during times predicted to be bad / OK / good, and reports their performance. Banks are commercial banks, identified as
all firms listed on NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ in the CRSP database with header SIC code (CRSP item HSICCD)
60 or historical SIC code (CRSP item SICCD) 6712. The capital ratio is defined as book equity over total assets at the
beginning of month t using the most recent Compustat quarterly financial statements.
Panel A presents five trading strategies which buy and sell high- and low-capital banks (or do nothing) during
times predicted to be bad / OK / good, defined as month t in which VW bank stock return volatility is forecasted to
be greater than the 80th percentile / in between the 20th and 80th percentiles / lower than the 20th percentile of VW
bank stock return volatility from Jan. 1984 to month t− 1. Stock return volatility is modeled using an EGARCH(1,1)
model. ‘H-L’ denotes buying high-capital banks and selling low-capital banks, ‘L-H’ denotes the opposite, ‘∅’ implies
no trading. Panel B summarizes the trading performance by showing raw, risk-unadjusted returns and Sharpe ratios.
Panel C estimates risk-adjusted returns per trading strategy using a linear factor model: Rpt = α+
∑K
i=1 βifit + εit,
where Rpt are monthly portfolio returns in excess of the one-month Treasury bill rate for bank stocks sorted into
capital ratio quintiles and fit are factor returns in month t obtained using five linear factor models.
Portfolios are rebalanced monthly: at the beginning of each month t, we independently sort bank stocks into
quintiles based on their capital ratio and size to form 25 portfolios. Capital is defined above, while size is defined
as market capitalization at the beginning of month t. Next, we compute monthly VW average returns for the 25
portfolios. We calculate returns for each capital ratio quintile as the simple average of the five size quintile portfolio
returns. When forming portfolios, bank size is measured as Market Cap (the number of shares outstanding times the
share price measured at the beginning of month t). Panel D uses the book value of assets instead to measure bank
size. Panel E estimates risk-adjusted returns using FF5, the Fama-French 5-factor model, for trading strategies that
use alternative cut-offs to determine bad / OK / good times. t-statistics are in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. The sample period is from Jan. 1994 - Dec. 2015.
Panel A: Five Alternative Trading Strategies
Volatility Regime: Strategy #1 Strategy #2 Strategy #3 Strategy #4 Strategy #5
High 20% (Predicted Bad Times) H-L H-L H-L H-L H-L
Medium 60% (Predicted OK Times) ∅ H-L L-H H-L ∅
Low 20% (Predicted Good Times) ∅ ∅ L-H L-H L-H
Panel B: Summary of Trading Performance
Strategy #1 Strategy #2 Strategy #3 Strategy #4 Strategy #5
Annualized Mean Raw Returns 3.32%** 2.29% 5.33%*** 3.28%* 4.30%***
(2.59) (1.19) (2.74) (1.67) (3.22)
Annualized Sharpe Ratio 0.55 0.25 0.58 0.36 0.69
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Table 3.9 Continued
Panel C: Risk-Adjusted Returns of Trading Strategies
Strategy #1 Strategy #2 Strategy #3 Strategy #4 Strategy #5
α α α α α
FF3 0.37%*** 0.36%** 0.46%*** 0.43%*** 0.45%***
(3.66) (2.37) (2.82) (2.79) (4.19)
FFC4 0.33%*** 0.32%** 0.42%** 0.39%** 0.40%***
(3.27) (2.09) (2.55) (2.48) (3.78)
FF5 0.31%*** 0.29%* 0.40%** 0.35%** 0.38%***
(2.90) (1.82) (2.30) (2.18) (3.36)
FF5+LQ 0.30%*** 0.29%* 0.38%** 0.35%** 0.36%***
(2.82) (1.80) (2.17) (2.13) (3.22)
FH9 0.31%*** 0.26% 0.43%** 0.33%* 0.38%***
(2.72) (1.57) (2.39) (1.97) (3.23)
Panel D: Risk-Adjusted Returns of Trading Strategies Using Total Assets instead of Market Cap to
Measure Size when Forming Portfolios
Strategy #1 Strategy #2 Strategy #3 Strategy #4 Strategy #5
α α α α α
FF3 0.45%*** 0.36%** 0.63%*** 0.44%** 0.53%***
(4.31) (2.11) (3.63) (2.50) (4.68)
FFC4 0.42%*** 0.30%* 0.61%*** 0.38%** 0.49%***
(3.97) (1.77) (3.48) (2.14) (4.31)
FF5 0.41%*** 0.30%* 0.62%*** 0.39%** 0.51%***
(3.74) (1.66) (3.42) (2.13) (4.24)
FF5+LQ 0.42%*** 0.30%* 0.62%*** 0.39%** 0.50%***
(3.76) (1.68) (3.36) (2.09) (4.17)
FH9 0.36%*** 0.23% 0.57%*** 0.30%* 0.44%***
(3.36) (1.30) (3.07) (1.69) (3.71)
Panel E: FF5 Risk-Adjusted Returns of Trading Strategies using Different Cut-Offs for Times Predicted to
be Bad / OK / Good
Strategy #1 Strategy #2 Strategy #3 Strategy #4 Strategy #5
α α α α α
High 20% / Medium 60% / Low 20% 0.31%*** 0.29%* 0.40%** 0.35%** 0.38%***
(2.90) (1.82) (2.30) (2.18) (3.36)
High 30% / Medium 40% / Low 30% 0.37%*** 0.36%** 0.52%*** 0.50%*** 0.51%***
(3.00) (2.36) (3.05) (3.13) (3.89)
High 40% / Medium 20% / Low 40% 0.40%*** 0.39%** 0.58%*** 0.56%*** 0.57%***
(3.14) (2.58) (3.44) (3.44) (4.06)
High 50% / Low 50% 0.38%*** 0.38%*** 0.54%*** 0.54%*** 0.54%***
(2.71) (2.71) (3.24) (3.24) (3.24)
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Table 3.9 examines the performance of the trading strategies summarized in Panel A. For
brevity, the discussion focuses on Strategy #1, our main strategy, which buys high-capital banks
and sells low-capital banks during times predicted to be bad and does nothing in other times.
As a first step, Table 3.9 Panel B summarizes banks’ trading performance by presenting their
annualized mean raw returns and their annualized Sharpe ratios. Strategy #1 yields annualized
mean raw returns of 3.32% and has an annualized Sharpe ratio of 0.55.
Table 3.9 Panel C estimates each trading strategy’s risk-adjusted returns.38 Strategy #1 yields
positive and significant risk-adjusted returns ranging from 0.30% to 0.37% per month depending
on the factor model used. This translates into annual returns ranging from 3.60% to 4.44%. The
results in this panel are based on portfolio sorts by bank capital and size, measured as market
capitalization. Table 3.9 Panel D shows that when we instead use (the book value of) total assets
to measure bank size, the results are comparable or stronger. Table 3.9 Panel E changes the stock
return volatility cut-offs to determine bad / OK / good times. We now view months in which
stock return volatility is forecasted to be in the top 20%, 30%, 40%, or 50% to be bad times and,
similarly, times in which it is forecasted to be in the bottom 20%, 30%, 40%, or 50% to be good
times. The results shown all use the Fama-French 5-factor model. The results seem highly robust:
Strategy #1 yields significantly positive risk-adjusted abnormal returns regardless of the cut-offs
used.39
In every panel, the other strategies convey a similar message: results tend to be stronger based
on Strategies #3 and #5, and somewhat weaker for Strategies #2 and #4. This also tends to hold in
the robustness tests presented below. For brevity, the discussion therefore focuses on Strategy #1,
but the results based on the other strategies are in Internet Appendix IA.2.1.
38We obtain comparable results when portfolios are rebalanced annually at the end of June as in Fama and French
(1993). See footnote 23 for further details. (Results available from the authors.)
39In the bottom row, the performance of strategies #1 and #2 is identical, as is the performance of strategies #3 - #5.
The reason is that these strategies differ only in the actions taken during times predicted to be OK. Since the bottom
row only distinguishes between bad and good times (stock return volatility forecasted to be in the top and bottom 50%,
respectively), OK times are non-existent.
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Table 3.10
Trading Performance of High- and Low-Capital Portfolios during Bad Times: Results Controlling
for Gandhi and Lustig (2015)’s Size Effect
This table controls for Gandhi and Lustig (2015)’s size effect. Banks are commercial banks, identified as all firms
listed on NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ in the CRSP database with header SIC code (CRSP item HSICCD) 60 or
historical SIC code (CRSP item SICCD) 6712. The capital ratio is defined as book equity over total assets at the
beginning of month t using the most recent Compustat quarterly financial statements.
The table shows the risk-adjusted returns of trading strategy #1, which buys high-capital banks and sells low-
capital banks during times predicted to be bad, and does nothing during other times. A month is predicted to be a
bad time if that month’s VW bank stock return volatility is forecasted to be greater than the 80th percentile of bank
stock return volatility from Jan. 1984 to month t − 1. Stock return volatility is modeled using an EGARCH(1,1)
model. Risk-adjusted returns are estimated using a linear factor model: Rpt = α +
∑K
i=1 βifit + εit, where Rpt
are monthly portfolio returns in excess of the one-month Treasury bill rate for bank stocks sorted into capital ratio
quintiles (explained below). fit are factor returns in month t obtained using five linear factor models.
Gandhi and Lustig (2015)’s size effect is controlled for by alternatively: 1) excluding banks in the largest size
quintile when computing returns for each capital ratio quintile; and 2) controlling for Gandhi and Lustig (2015)’s size
factor, which is replicated as follows. At the beginning of January in each year of our sample period (1994 - 2015), we
sort bank stocks into deciles based on their market capitalization and compute VW average returns across deciles over
the year. Using these ten portfolios, we estimate residuals from a five factor model, which includes Fama-French’s
three factors and two bond factors: ltg, the monthly change in the 10-year Treasury constant maturity yield less the
one-month Treasury bill rate, and crd, the monthly change in Moody’s Baa yield less the one-month Treasury bill
rate.) We then run a principal component analysis for the residuals. Finally, the size factor is defined as the product of
the normalized weights for the second principal component and the residuals of the ten portfolios.
Portfolios are rebalanced monthly: at the beginning of each month t, we independently sort bank stocks into
quintiles based on their capital ratio and size to form 25 portfolios. Capital is defined as above, while size is defined
as market capitalization at the beginning of month t. Next, we compute monthly VW average returns for the 25
portfolios. We calculate returns for each capital ratio quintile as the simple average of the four smallest size quintile
portfolio returns in the first column, and as the simple average of all five size quintiles in the second column. t-statistics
are in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
Risk-Adjusted Returns of Trading Strategy #1 while:
Excluding Banks in the Largest Size Quintile Controlling for Gandhi and Lustig (2015)’s Size Factor
α α
FF3 0.41%*** FF3 + GL 0.37%***
(4.15) (3.66)
FFC4 0.39%*** FFC4 + GL 0.33%***
(3.91) (3.27)
FF5 0.34%*** FF5 + GL 0.31%***
(3.30) (2.92)
FF5+LQ 0.33%*** FF5+LQ + GL 0.31%***
(3.14) (2.83)
FH9 0.33%*** FH9 + GL 0.30%***
(2.98) (2.71)
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3.3.2.2 Trading performance while controlling for Gandhi and Lustig (2015)’s size effect
Section 3.3.1.3 showed that our in-sample results are not driven by Gandhi and Lustig (2015)’s
size effect. We now examine whether the out-of-sample results are also robust to alternatively
excluding banks in the largest size quintile and controlling for Gandhi and Lustig (2015)’s size
factor.
Table 3.10 shows that we obtain results that are similar to those in the first column of Table
3.9 Panel C, suggesting that our results are not driven by Gandhi and Lustig (2015)’s size effect.
3.3.2.3 Trading performance controlling for bank-specific risk factors
As indicated in Section 3.3.1.6, our use of commonly-used asset pricing models may be in-
appropriate because they may not adequately capture bank-specific risks. We rerun the main out-
of-sample regressions while adding the bank-specific risk factors introduced in that section to the
five factor models. As before, we first add (most of) them one by one and then add all ten factors
to each model.
Table 3.11 shows that Strategy #1 yields positive and significant risk-adjusted returns in every
panel, which is similar to the findings presented in the first column of Table 3.9 Panel C. These
results are obtained while controlling for bank-specific risks, diminishing concerns that our main
results are driven by high-capital banks being riskier than low-capital banks.
3.3.2.4 Trading performance controlling for short sale constraints
Our trading strategies buy high-capital banks and short low-capital banks in times predicted
to be bad. A critical assumption that we have made so far is that bank stocks can be bought
and sold without restrictions. In practice, there may be short-selling constraints which prevent
investors from shorting bank stocks. If it is harder to short low-capital banks, which show far
worse risk-adjusted stock performance than high-capital banks during bad times (-2.18% versus
-0.68%: Table 3.2 Panel B), it is possible that our trading strategies do not yield positive abnormal






















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Our first approach excludes stocks with substantial short sale constraints. In those cases,
there is strong demand to sell such stocks short, while the supply of shares to borrow is limited.
To classify a stock as short sale constrained, we first calculate its short demand, defined as short
interest (i.e., the number of common shares shorted) over the total number of shares outstanding.
Short interest data on a sufficiently large number of stocks are available in Compustat from August
2003 onward, so the sample period for this analysis is restricted to August 2003 through December
2015. In line with the literature on firms in general (Dechow, Hutton, Meulbroek, and Sloan,
2001), the short demand distribution is highly skewed: no short positions are observed for 1%
of the observations; 86% have small short positions; and 13% have over 5% of their outstanding
shares shorted. We view bank stocks as short sale constrained if their short demand is over 5%.40
The second approach excludes a period during which the SEC placed a temporary ban on
short sales in 797 financial stocks (Kolasinski, Reed, and Thornock, 2013; Boehmer, Jones, and
Zhang, 2013). While the ban only lasted a few weeks (Sept. 18 - Oct. 8, 2008), it spanned two
quarters. To be conservative, we therefore exclude 2008:Q3 and 2008:Q4 from our sample period.
The third approach focuses on lending fees. A recent literature argues that borrowing stock
and selling it short is risky since stock loans can be recalled at any time. As a result, future stock
lending fees are uncertain and this hinders short-selling. Muravyev, Pearson, and Pollet (2016),
however, show that investors can avoid this uncertainty because they can use the option market
to establish a synthetic short position at a fixed lending fee. We identify the periods when stocks
are shorted and the NYSE size decile each bank stock belongs to. We adjust stock returns by
the option-implied lending fees obtained from Table 1 in Muravyev, Pearson, and Pollet (2016):
0.250% for size deciles 1 - 4, 0.375% for size deciles 5 - 9, and 1.000% for size decile 10.
Table 3.12 shows that our main findings are intact even after addressing short-sale constraints
using these three approaches.41 This highlights the economic significance of our results.
40Dechow, Hutton, Meulbroek, and Sloan (2001) classify firms with over 0.5% (5%) of outstanding shares shorted
as firms with “high” (“very large”) short positions. If we use the 0.5% cutoff, we lose more than half of the sample. In
that case, the results are weaker but generally remain significant.
41It may be surprising that the effects in first column tend to be stronger (higher alphas and greater significance)
than those in Table 3.9 Panel C. This is driven by the shorter sample period: the results are slightly weaker compared
to results based on a sample from Aug. 2003 - Dec. 2015 that does not drop these stocks (untabulated for brevity).
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Table 3.12
Trading Performance of High- and Low-Capital Portfolios: Results Controlling for Short Sale
Constraints
This table recognizes that short-selling constraints may exist which prevent investors from shorting bank stocks and
uses three alternative approaches to address this. Banks are commercial banks, identified as all firms listed on NYSE,
AMEX, and NASDAQ in the CRSP database with header SIC code (CRSP item HSICCD) 60 or historical SIC code
(CRSP item SICCD) 6712. The capital ratio is defined as book equity over total assets at the beginning of month t
using the most recent Compustat quarterly financial statements.
The table shows the risk-adjusted returns of trading strategy #1, which buys high-capital banks and sells low-
capital banks during times predicted to be bad, and does nothing during other times. A month is predicted to be a
bad time if that month’s VW bank stock return volatility is forecasted to be greater than the 80th percentile of bank
stock return volatility from Jan. 1984 to month t − 1. Stock return volatility is modeled using an EGARCH(1,1)
model. Risk-adjusted returns are estimated using a linear factor model: Rpt = α +
∑K
i=1 βifit + εit, where Rpt
are monthly portfolio returns in excess of the one-month Treasury bill rate for bank stocks sorted into capital ratio
quintiles (explained below). fit are factor returns in month t obtained using five linear factor models.
Results are shown for three short-sale-constraints approaches. (1) Exclude stocks with substantial short sale
constraints. To classify a stock as short sale constrained, we first calculate its short demand, defined as short interest
(i.e., the number of common shares shorted) over the total number of shares outstanding. Short interest data are
available from Compustat from Aug. 2003 onward, so the sample period for this analysis is restricted to Aug. 2003
through Dec. 2015. We view bank stocks as short sale constrained if their short demand is over 5%. (2) Remove
2008:Q3 and 2008:Q4, which includes several weeks (Sept. 18, 2008, through Oct. 8, 2008) during which the SEC
imposed a temporary ban on short sales in 797 financial stocks. (3) Control for option-implied stock lending fees.
Portfolios are rebalanced monthly: at the beginning of each month t, we independently sort bank stocks into
quintiles based on their capital ratio and size to form 25 portfolios. Capital is defined as above, while size is defined
as market capitalization at the beginning of month t. Next, we compute monthly VW average returns for the 25
portfolios. We calculate returns for each capital ratio quintile as the simple average of the five size quintile portfolio
returns. t-statistics are in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
The sample period is from Jan. 1994 - Dec. 2015.
Risk-Adjusted Returns of Trading Strategy #1 while:
(1) (2) (3)
Excluding Bank Stocks with
Short Interest greater than 5%
Excluding SEC’s Temporary
Ban on Short Sales Period
Controlling for Option-
Implied Stock Lending Fees
α α α
FF3 0.53%*** 0.27%*** 0.37%***
(3.23) (2.92) (3.60)
FFC4 0.48%*** 0.23%** 0.33%***
(3.02) (2.50) (3.21)
FF5 0.43%*** 0.26%*** 0.30%***
(2.66) (2.63) (2.85)
FF5+LQ 0.42%** 0.23%** 0.30%***
(2.55) (2.33) (2.76)
FH9 0.50%*** 0.24%** 0.30%***
(2.76) (2.34) (2.67)
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3.3.2.5 Additional robustness checks shown in the Internet Appendix
The Internet Appendix shows that our out-of-sample results: are robust to using alternative
trading strategies (Section IA.2.1), different bad times proxies and their union or intersection (Sec-
tion IA.2.2), and to using regulatory and market-based capital ratios (Section IA.2.3); and continue
to hold even after taking trading costs into account (Frazzini, Israel, and Moskowitz, 2015) (Section
IA.2.4) and when using ex ante expected returns (Section IA.2.5).
3.4 Why Do High-Capital Banks Outperform Low-Capital Banks during Bad Times?
This section addresses the second question: Why do high-capital banks outperform low-
capital banks during bad times? It explores two possible channels: an “Informed Investor Channel”
and a “Surprised Investor Channel.”
3.4.1 “Informed Investor Channel”
It is possible that trading between informed and uninformed investors causes our results. In-
formed investors may be more cognizant than uninformed investors of the benefits of owning
high-capital banks in bad times and may be better able to predict when bad times occur. It is
then conceivable that informed investors continue to sell low-capital stocks to (and/or buy high-
capital stocks from) uninformed investors during bad times, influencing the prices of these banks.
The relative advantage of informed investors can affect the degrees of downward price pressure
on low-capital stocks and upward price pressure on high-capital stocks, and this may explain the
outperformance of high-capital banks during bad times.
To investigate this “Informed Investor Channel,” we focus on institutional investors, who are
generally considered to be informed investors and as such may drive stock returns (Badrinath,
Kale, and Noe, 1995; Bennett, Sias, and Starks, 2003; Irvine, Lipson, and Puckett, 2007; Boehmer
and Kelley, 2009; Campbell, Ramadorai, and Schwartz, 2009; Boulatov, Hendershott, and Livdan,
2013; Hendershott, Livdan, and Schürhoff, 2015). Specifically, we examine whether institutional
investors reduce their holdings of low-capital bank stocks and/or increase their holdings of high-
capital bank stocks during bad times. We obtain quarterly institutional ownership of banks data
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from Thomson Reuters’ 13F (formerly known as CDA/Spectrum) database. Institutional owner-
ship is defined as the number of shares held by institutional investors over the number of shares
outstanding. At each quarter end, we independently sort bank stocks into quintiles based on their
capital ratio (book equity over total assets from Compustat’s quarterly database) and size (market
capitalization) to form 25 portfolio. We compute VW average institutional ownership for each
of these portfolios. Institutional ownership for each capital ratio quintile is then calculated as the
simple average of institutional ownership in the five size quintile portfolios. Since institutional in-
vestor data are only available quarterly, bad times are now quarters during which all three months
are bad (i.e., have high stock return volatility). Internet Appendix Table IA.16 shows similar re-
sults using EW average institutional ownership and when bad times are quarters during which at
least two months are bad.
Table 3.13 Panel A shows that unconditionally, low-capital banks have slightly greater insti-
tutional ownership than high-capital banks (see first column: 29.99% vs 28.64%).42 Importantly,
the last two columns show that institutional ownership of low-capital banks is rather stable across
normal times and bad times, as is their ownership of high-capital banks. Thus, the relative out-
performance of high-capital banks during bad times does not seem to be driven by institutional
investors dumping shares of low-capital banks and/or buying sizeable stakes in high-capital banks
during such times. Figure 3.4, which shows institutional ownership of high- and low-capital banks
over time, seems to corroborate these findings.43 Ownership of low-capital banks tends to be higher
through the middle of 2010, when ownership of high-capital banks increased substantially.44 But
again, for our purposes, it is the difference in ownership across bad and other times that matters
rather than the level of ownership per se. The figure does suggest that during the recent financial
42A recent working paper by Garel, Petit-Romec, and Vander Vennet (2018) shows panel regressions which suggest
the exact opposite. The discrepancy is driven by our definition of bank size: consistent with our main analysis, Table
3.13 defines size to be market capitalization. Internet Appendix Table IA.16 shows that when we instead define bank
size to be total assets, we obtain their result: high-capital banks have higher institutional ownership. Importantly,
however, using either definition we obtain the result (detailed in the rest of this section) that institutional investor
behavior is rather similar across normal times and bad times and hence does not seem to drive our results.
43Figure 3.1 Panel A shows an extra bad time in 2012 because it uses monthly instead of quarterly data.
44It is outside the scope of this paper to examine what drives the big increase in institutional ownership in high-
capital banks after the crisis. It is not driven by outliers: the increase occurs among both small banks (lowest two size
quintiles) and large banks (highest two size quintiles), although the increase is greatest among small banks.
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Table 3.13
Informed Investor Channel: Institutional Ownership of Banks
This table explores the “Informed Investor Channel.” It contains institutional ownership of banks by capital ratio
quintile for the full sample period (1994Q1 - 2015Q4) and separately during bad times and normal times. Institutional
ownership is measured quarterly as the number of shares held by institutional investors in Thomson Reuters’ 13F
database over the total number of shares. At each quarter end, we independently sort bank stocks into quintiles
based on their capital ratio and size to form 25 portfolios. The capital ratio is defined as book equity over total
assets using Compustat’s quarterly financial statements, while size is defined as market capitalization, the number of
shares outstanding times the share price. Next, we compute VW average institutional ownership for the 25 portfolios.
Institutional ownership for each capital ratio quintile is then calculated as the simple average of institutional ownership
in the five size quintile portfolios. Banks are commercial banks, identified as all firms listed on NYSE, AMEX, and
NASDAQ in the CRSP database with header SIC code (CRSP item HSICCD) 60 or historical SIC code (CRSP item
SICCD) 6712. Bad times are the (calendar) quarters during which all three months of the quarter have BTt = 1.
BTt is a dummy = 1 if month t is bad, defined as bank stock return volatility (modeled using an EGARCH(1,1)
model) exceeding the 80th percentile (in sample), and zero otherwise. Normal times represent the (calendar) quarters
excluding bad times.
Panel A shows total institutional ownership of banks by capital ratio quintile. Panels B-D categorize institutional
investors by their investment type, style, or horizon (based on Brian Bushee’s classifications).
Panel A: Institutional Ownership of Banks
Full Sample Normal Times Bad Times
Low capital 29.99% 30.05% 29.64%
2 27.50% 27.71% 26.33%
3 27.13% 27.26% 26.44%
4 26.59% 26.47% 27.28%
High capital 28.64% 28.88% 27.25%

















Low capital 5.54% 1.83% 4.91% 16.67% 0.56% 1.16% 0.15% 2.52%
2 5.75% 1.71% 4.53% 14.65% 0.49% 1.12% 0.25% 2.40%
3 5.76% 1.79% 4.59% 14.16% 0.42% 1.11% 0.25% 2.61%
4 5.50% 1.54% 4.57% 14.69% 0.67% 1.10% 0.18% 2.16%
High capital 4.47% 1.72% 4.94% 17.30% 0.48% 1.09% 0.39% 2.33%
Normal Times
Low capital 5.43% 1.81% 4.93% 16.84% 0.57% 1.16% 0.15% 2.55%
2 5.77% 1.71% 4.56% 14.79% 0.49% 1.14% 0.27% 2.34%
3 5.81% 1.83% 4.63% 14.18% 0.41% 1.10% 0.27% 2.53%
4 5.48% 1.53% 4.52% 14.64% 0.62% 1.11% 0.18% 2.10%
High capital 4.43% 1.67% 5.06% 17.46% 0.48% 1.10% 0.39% 2.40%
Bad Times
Low capital 6.16% 1.89% 4.80% 15.68% 0.49% 1.17% 0.17% 2.36%
2 5.60% 1.65% 4.31% 13.79% 0.46% 1.04% 0.14% 2.73%
3 5.45% 1.60% 4.42% 14.07% 0.46% 1.14% 0.12% 3.01%
4 5.59% 1.58% 4.81% 14.99% 0.96% 1.09% 0.13% 2.45%
High capital 4.72% 2.01% 4.25% 16.40% 0.49% 1.03% 0.34% 1.95%
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Table 3.13 Continued
Panel C: Institutional Ownership of Banks by Investment Style
Type Large/Value Style Large/Growth Style Small/Value Style Small/Growth Style
Full Sample
Low capital 11.61% 5.82% 10.41% 3.77%
2 11.29% 5.59% 8.93% 3.18%
3 10.78% 5.70% 9.40% 3.03%
4 10.29% 5.16% 9.83% 3.20%
High capital 9.96% 5.19% 10.95% 4.65%
Normal Times
Low capital 11.47% 5.93% 10.41% 3.90%
2 11.29% 5.70% 8.97% 3.19%
3 10.77% 5.78% 9.39% 2.94%
4 10.11% 5.18% 9.75% 3.33%
High capital 9.89% 5.33% 10.97% 4.74%
Bad Times
Low capital 12.42% 5.23% 10.45% 3.01%
2 11.34% 4.93% 8.69% 3.12%
3 10.82% 5.23% 9.44% 3.55%
4 11.35% 5.06% 10.31% 2.50%
High capital 10.32% 4.37% 10.80% 4.16%
Panel D: Institutional Ownership of Banks by Investment Horizon
Type Dedicated Quasi-Indexer Transient
Full Sample
Low capital 5.59% 20.36% 6.17%
2 4.82% 19.45% 5.04%
3 4.97% 19.10% 5.12%
4 4.93% 18.42% 5.28%
High capital 6.12% 18.68% 6.31%
Normal Times
Low capital 5.91% 20.28% 5.96%
2 5.22% 19.52% 4.90%
3 5.21% 19.11% 4.96%
4 5.18% 18.27% 5.08%
High capital 6.12% 18.78% 6.18%
Bad Times
Low capital 3.75% 20.84% 7.34%
2 2.52% 19.02% 5.85%
3 3.59% 19.02% 6.07%
4 3.45% 19.34% 6.40%
High capital 6.08% 18.11% 7.08%
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crisis, institutional investors dropped low-capital banks more so than they did high-capital banks.
However, as indicated before, all our results continue to hold when we exclude that crisis.
Figure 3.4
Exploring the Informed Investor Channel: Institutional Ownership of Banks over Time
This figure depicts institutional ownership of high- and low-capital banks over our sample period (Jan. 1994 - Dec.
2015). Banks are commercial banks, identified as all firms listed on NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ in the CRSP
database with header SIC code (CRSP item HSICCD) 60 or historical SIC code (CRSP item SICCD) 6712. The
capital ratio is defined as book equity over total assets at the beginning of month t using the most recent Compustat
quarterly financial statements.
Institutional ownership of high- and low-capital banks is calculated as follows. Portfolios are rebalanced monthly:
at the beginning of each month t, we independently sort bank stocks into quintiles based on their capital ratio and size
to form 25 portfolios. Capital is defined as above, while size is defined as market capitalization, the number of
shares outstanding times the share price. Next, we compute monthly VW average institutional ownership for the 25
portfolios. We calculate ownership for each capital ratio quintile as the simple average of ownership in the five size
quintile portfolios.
It is possible that our focus on total institutional ownership masks dissimilar behaviors by dif-
ferent groups of institutional investors. If one group is better able to anticipate future performance
of banks, only that group trades in a way that drives the return pattern we find. To address this, we
perform three alternative splits using investor classification data from Brian Bushee’s website.45
45See: http://acct.wharton.upenn.edu/faculty/bushee.
114
First, we split institutions by investor type. It is well-known that Spectrum’s investor type code
variable is not reliable after 1998, when Thomson-Reuters integrated data from Technimetrics:
many institutions were improperly classified as “others” (code 5). Bushee corrected these data
and distinguishes between eight investor types, which we use here: banks (Spectrum type code 1),
insurance companies (code 2), investment companies (code 3), independent investment advisors
(type 4), corporate (private) pension funds (code 5), public pension funds (code 5), university and
foundation endowments (code 5), and others (code 5). Second, we classify institutions based on
their investment styles or preferences for firm size and growth into four groups as in Abarbanell,
Bushee, and Smith Raedy (2003): large/value, large/growth, small/value, and small/growth. Third,
we split investors based on their expected investment horizon into three groups as in Bushee (2001):
dedicated investors (long-term investors with large stakes and low turnover), quasi-indexers (long-
term investors with a passive buy-and-hold investment strategy), and transient investors (short-term
investors with high portfolio turnover and highly diversified holdings).
Panels B-D show that, regardless of how we split institutional investors into different groups,
each group’s ownership of low-capital banks is rather similar across normal times and bad times.
The same holds for their ownership of high-capital banks. Thus, it does not seem that differential
institutional investor behavior drives our results.
3.4.2 “Surprised Investor Channel”
Another potential reason for why high-capital bank stocks outperform low-capital bank stocks
during bad times is that investors may be unaware of the value of high capital during bad times or
underestimate the likelihood and severity of bad times ex ante. If so, investors may be surprised by
the better-than-expected performance of high-capital banks (relative to that of low-capital banks)
during such times. As argued in the Introduction, the spread between the prices of high- and
low-capital banks may not be sufficiently high during good times, and there will be a continuing
increase in the price spread between high- and low-capital banks (and thus higher returns for high-
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capital banks) during bad times, consistent with recent theories on banking crises.46 We now
examine this “Surprised Investor Channel.”
We first check if the outperformance of high-capital banks during bad times evolves in a way
suggested by the theories. If the mispricing is resolved slowly over time, we should see that αBT
is the biggest early on during bad times and the smallest toward the end. To test this, we dissect
each bad time into three parts (first month, middle months, and last month) and estimate:47









βifit + εit, (3.4.1)
where BT Firstt = 1 if month t− 1 is not a bad time but month t is; BTMiddlet = 1 if month t is a bad
time but BT Firstt = 0 and BT
Last
t = 0; BT
Last
t = 1 if month t+ 1 is not a bad time but month t is.
Table 3.14 Panel A shows that the outperformance of high-capital banks during bad times is
the greatest during the first month, continues during the middle months, and is insignificant and
small in the last month. This is consistent with expectations and supports the “Surprised Investor
Channel.” A possible concern is that the observed return pattern is driven by bad times being most
(least) severe during the first (last) month. To address this, Panel B shows the level of monthly
stock return volatility. While bad times are clearly more volatile than other times, the first and last
months during bad times tend to be similar in severity, suggesting that this concern is not valid.
Another way of testing this channel is to focus on earnings surprises, commonly captured





46In Gennaioli, Shleifer, and Vishny (2015), investors do not instantaneously and correctly revise their beliefs about
the magnitude of a crisis: they underweight bad news during long-lasting good times, and then they underweight good
news during a long-lasting crisis. Such non-Bayesian learning can lead to slow belief revision. Thakor (2016) shows
that even with rational learning, one can get slow belief revision about the magnitude of the crisis and then a sharp
revision in beliefs if there is “model uncertainty” in addition to uncertainty about the state of the world within a given
model.




Surprised Investor Channel: Risk-Adjusted Returns of High- minus Low-Capital Banks during
the Beginning / Middle / End of Bad Times
This table explores the “Surprised Investor Channel” by examining whether investors learn about the hypothesized
mispricing of high- and low-capital banks as bad times evolve. Banks are commercial banks, identified as all firms
listed on NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ in the CRSP database with header SIC code (CRSP item HSICCD) 60 or
historical SIC code (CRSP item SICCD) 6712. The capital ratio is defined as book equity over total assets at the
beginning of month t using the most recent Compustat quarterly financial statements. We use the fact that bad times
tend to cluster. To test whether αBT is bigger (smaller) in the first (last) months of consecutive bad times than





i=1 βifit + εit, whereBT
First
t = 1 if month t − 1 is not a bad time but month t is a bad time, defined as bank
stock return volatility (modeled using an EGARCH(1,1) model) exceeding the 80th percentile (in sample), and zero
otherwise.BTMiddlet = 1 if month t is a bad time but BT
First
t = 0 and BT
Last
t = 0. BT
Last
t = 1 if month t+ 1 is not
a bad time but month t is. fit are factor returns in month t obtained using five linear factor models. Panel A shows the
results of these regressions. Panel B shows the level of volatility as a proxy for the severity of bad times during the
first, middle, and last months of consecutive bad times.
Portfolios are rebalanced monthly: at the beginning of each month t, we independently sort bank stocks into
quintiles based on their capital ratio and size to form 25 portfolios. Capital is defined as above, while size is defined
as market capitalization at the beginning of month t. Next, we compute monthly VW average returns for the 25
portfolios. We calculate returns for each capital ratio quintile as the simple average of the five size quintile portfolio
returns. t-statistics are in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
The sample period is from Jan. 1994 - Dec. 2015.
Panel A: Risk-Adjusted Returns of High- minus Low-Capital (H-L) Banks during the First, Middle, and
Last Months of Consecutive Bad Times
αFirst of H-L αMiddle of H-L αLast of H-L
FF3 2.25%** 1.79%*** -0.27%
(2.59) (4.19) (-0.32)
FFC4 2.20%** 1.88%*** -0.16%
(2.54) (4.39) (-0.19)
FF5 2.16%** 1.75%*** -0.30%
(2.47) (4.06) (-0.34)
FF5+LQ 2.15%** 1.75%*** -0.30%
(2.44) (4.05) (-0.35)
FH9 2.45%*** 1.91%*** 0.10%
(2.77) (4.40) (0.11)
Panel B: Level of Volatility during the First, Middle, and Last Months of Consecutive Bad Times
No. of Obs. Mean Median Max Min
BTFirst 8 8.26% 7.84% 11.03% 7.30%
BTMiddle 37 9.76% 8.94% 16.04% 7.32%
BTLast 8 7.59% 7.53% 7.88% 7.28%
OtherT imes 211 5.02% 4.98% 7.22% 3.31%
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Table 3.15
Surprised Investor Channel: Earnings Surprises
This table explores the “Surprised Investor Channel” by examining the relation between bank capital and standardized
unexpected earnings (SUEs) during bad times and other times. The SUE is defined as: SUE = EPS
Act−EPSFor
P ×
100, where EPSAct is actual EPS in quarter t reported in I/B/E/S Detail History, EPSFor is the median forecasts for
quarter t reported in I/B/E/S Detail History, and P is the stock price at the end of the previous fiscal quarter. BTt is a
dummy = 1 if month t is a bad time, defined as VW bank stock return volatility exceeding the 80th percentile in sample
(Panel A) or VW bank stock return volatility being forecasted to be greater than the 80th percentile of bank stock return
volatility from Jan. 1984 to month t− 1 (Panel B). Stock return volatility is modeled using an EGARCH(1,1) model.
The capital ratio is the log of book equity over total assets. Size is the log of market capitalization. BTM is the log of
the book-to-market ratio defined as book equity over market capitalization. All independent variables are winsorized
at the 1% and 99% levels. Banks are commercial banks, identified as all firms listed on NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ
in the CRSP database with header SIC code (CRSP item HSICCD) 60 or historical SIC code (CRSP item SICCD)
6712. t-statistics are in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
The sample period is from Jan. 1994 - Dec. 2015.
Panel A: In-Sample Bad Times
Dependent Variable: SUE
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Capital ratio_BT 16.61** 16.70** 17.17** 16.69*** 16.60** 17.31**
(2.58) (2.57) (2.45) (2.62) (2.57) (2.47)
Capital ratio 9.81*** 9.79*** 9.21*** 10.26*** 9.94*** 9.28***
(3.38) (3.34) (3.06) (3.59) (3.39) (3.08)
Size 2.00*** 1.97*** 1.81*** 2.17*** 2.02*** 1.84***
(3.53) (3.48) (3.30) (3.65) (3.49) (3.30)
BTM -4.28*** -4.30*** -4.50*** -4.98*** -4.33*** -4.58***
(-2.72) (-2.73) (-2.77) (-3.01) (-2.80) (-2.84)
Forecast within 90 days 60 days 30 days 90 days 60 days 30 days
Forecast after Fiscal Quarter End Yes Yes Yes No No No
Bank and Year-Month FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 8,852 8,810 8,651 8,852 8,810 8,651
adj. R-sq 0.217 0.219 0.221 0.216 0.220 0.223
Panel B: Out-of-Sample Bad Times
Dependent Variable: SUE
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Capital ratio_BT 13.44** 13.48** 14.54** 13.65** 13.44** 14.66**
(2.43) (2.43) (2.35) (2.50) (2.42) (2.37)
Capital ratio 10.78*** 10.80*** 10.35*** 11.17*** 10.93*** 10.43***
(3.40) (3.38) (3.09) (3.58) (3.41) (3.11)
Size 2.11*** 2.07*** 1.85*** 2.27*** 2.13*** 1.87***
(3.55) (3.51) (3.30) (3.67) (3.52) (3.30)
BTM -4.20*** -4.22*** -4.50*** -4.90*** -4.26*** -4.59***
(-2.65) (-2.65) (-2.77) (-2.93) (-2.71) (-2.84)
Forecast within 90 days 60 days 30 days 90 days 60 days 30 days
Forecast after Fiscal Quarter End Yes Yes Yes No No No
Bank and Year-Month FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 8,852 8,810 8,651 8,852 8,810 8,651
adj. R-sq 0.212 0.214 0.217 0.211 0.215 0.219
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The numerator measures the analyst forecast error, or the difference between actual earnings
per share, EPSAct, and investors’ earnings expectations proxied by the median analyst forecast,
EPSFor. In line with the literature, we use the median (instead of the mean) forecast because
it is less sensitive to outliers. The denominator is the stock price at the end of the fiscal quarter,
P . Results are similar if it is measured 3 days before the earnings announcement date (see Inter-
net Appendix Table IA.17). The EPS numbers are from the I/B/E/S Detail History - Unadjusted
File, and the share price is from CRSP. We use EPSAct and P “as is,” but adjust EPSFor using
CRSP adjustment factors for any stock splits and dividends that took place between the forecast
and earnings release dates.
We regress the SUE on: the log of the capital ratio interacted with a bad times dummy (BT ,
our main in-sample and out-of-sample proxies based on stock return volatility in the banking sec-
tor), the log of the capital ratio (book equity over total assets), the log of bank size (market capital-
ization), the log of the book-to-market ratio (BTM , book equity over market capitalization), and
bank and year-month fixed effects.48 Size and BTM are measured at the end of the fiscal quarter.
There are two important timing issues regarding the measurement of the SUE and bank cap-
ital. The first one is: which capital ratio do investors know on the earnings announcement date?
Financial statements (which contain capital ratios) are released well after earnings are announced:
banks in our sample on average announce their Q1 - Q3 (Q4) earnings 24 (32) days after fiscal-
quarter end and their financial statements 19 (52) days later.49 If we use contemporaneous capital
ratios, meaning that we relate, say, the Q1 SUE to Q1 capital, we may therefore be assuming
that investors have perfect foresight of what Q1 capital will be.50 To address this, we checked
the earnings releases of various banks at different points in time, and found that they all included
information about bank capital. Based on this (small-sample) evidence, it seems appropriate to use
contemporaneous capital in our analysis because investors learn jointly about earnings and capital
48The uninteracted bad times dummy drops out of the regressions due to the inclusion of year-month fixed effects.
This regression setup is inspired by Core, Guay, and Rusticus (2006), who explore earnings surprises as one channel
through which weak governance may cause weak stock returns.
49The respective medians are 22 (26) and 19 (50) days.
50In this case, the relation between capital and the SUE can potentially also be affected by the mechanical positive
relation between capital and earnings, although it is not clear why this would necessarily affect the SUE.
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ratios at the time of the earnings release. Nonetheless, we obtain consistent results using lagged
capital (see Internet Appendix Table IA.17). The second timing issue concerns the choice of the
forecast horizon. We are trying to link SUEs to bank capital during different economic times to
find out whether surprised investors may drive the relative outperformance of high-capital banks
during bad times. It therefore seems proper to use forecasts made relatively close to the earnings
announcement date. Since it is not clear empirically what “close” means and to show robustness
of our results, we use six alternative specifications: forecasts made within 90 / 60 / 30 days of the
earnings announcement date, while alternatively requiring or not requiring that these forecasts are
made after the prior fiscal quarter end.51
Table 3.15 shows the in-sample (Panel A) and out-of-sample (Panel B) results based on con-
temporaneous capital. In both panels, the coefficients on the capital ratio and the capital ratio
interacted with the bad times dummy are positive and significant. To address their economic sig-
nificance, focus on Column (1) in Panel A. The coefficients on the capital ratio of 9.81 and on the
interacted capital ratio of 16.61 suggest that if the capital ratio were 10 percent higher,52 the SUE
would be 0.981 higher during normal times and (1.661 + 0.981 =) 2.642 higher during bad times.
Both effects are sizeable given that the mean SUEs of low- and high-capital banks are -1.01 and
0.05 during normal times, respectively, and -9.18 and -0.35 during bad times, respectively. The
other columns show similar magnitudes of the effects. Thus, high-capital banks have higher SUEs
than low-capital banks during bad times, consistent with the “Surprised Investor Channel.”
As a final way to address this channel, we examine whether the earnings announcement CARs
of high-capital banks are higher than those of low-capital banks during bad times. We focus on
3-day CARs measured from one day before to one day after the announcement date, (-1,+1). We
first calculate daily abnormal returns for the event window using four models: (i) a market model;
51Livnat and Mendenhall (2006) use forecasts made in the 90 days prior to the earnings announcement. Hutton,
Lee, and SHU (2012) and Keskek, Tse, and Tucker (2014) focus on a 30-day window. The mean (median) number of
analyst forecasts during the time periods shown in Table 3.15 are: 2.4, 2.4, 2.4, 7.3, 4.4, and 3.3 (1, 1, 1, 5, 3, and 2),
respectively.
52Recall from Table 3.1 that, on average, the capital ratios of high-capital banks are more than 100 percent higher
than those of low-capital banks: 16.31% versus 6.48%.
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Table 3.16
Surprised Investor Channel: Cumulative Abnormal Returns around Earnings Announcements
This table reports 3-day cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) over (-1,+1) around the earnings announcement date
(Compustat item RDQ): CARt = γ0 +γBBTt + εt. Abnormal returns are computed using: a market model; FF3, the
Fama-French 3-factor model; FFC4, the Carhart 4-factor model; and FF5, the Fama-French 5-factor model. For FF3,
FFC4, and FF5, the pre-estimation period for betas is from t − 250 to t − 21. We compute VW average CARs for
25 portfolios (independently sorted into quintiles by capital ratio and size) and then calculate CARs for each capital
ratio quintile as the EW average of the five size quintiles. In Panel A, BTt is a dummy = 1 if month t is a bad time,
defined as VW bank stock return volatility exceeding the 80th percentile (in sample). In Panel B, BTt is a dummy
= 1 if month t is a bad time, defined as VW bank stock return volatility being forecasted to be greater than the 80th
percentile of bank stock return volatility from Jan. 1984 to month t − 1 (out-of-sample). Stock return volatility is
modeled using an EGARCH(1,1) model. The capital ratio is the log of book equity over total assets. Size is the log of
market capitalization. BTM is the log of the book-to-market ratio defined as book equity over market capitalization.
CARs and capital ratios are measured contemporaneously. Banks are commercial banks, identified as all firms listed
on NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ in the CRSP database with header SIC code (CRSP item HSICCD) 60 or historical
SIC code (CRSP item SICCD) 6712. t-statistics are in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%,
5%, and 1% level, respectively. The sample period runs from Jan. 1994 through Dec. 2015.
Panel A: In-Sample Bad Times
Dependent variable: CAR (-1, +1)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
MktModel FF3 FFC4 FF5 MktModel FF3 FFC4 FF5
Capital ratio_BT 0.73** 0.69** 0.82** 0.77** 1.29* 1.30* 1.28* 1.25*
(2.09) (1.97) (2.50) (2.34) (1.78) (1.80) (1.77) (1.74)
Capital ratio 0.77** 0.68* 0.45 0.46 0.82 0.77 0.72 0.71
(2.31) (1.88) (1.49) (1.51) (1.53) (1.55) (1.46) (1.42)
Size -0.59*** -0.52*** -0.48*** -0.47*** -1.17*** -0.99*** -0.96*** -0.98***
(-4.81) (-3.99) (-3.82) (-3.85) (-4.75) (-4.15) (-3.94) (-4.25)
BTM 0.49* 0.49* 0.44* 0.54** -0.29 -0.20 -0.30 -0.16
(1.92) (1.84) (1.69) (2.07) (-0.66) (-0.50) (-0.73) (-0.40)
SUE 0.05*** 0.04*** 0.04*** 0.04***
(4.15) (3.65) (3.64) (3.72)
Bank & Yr-Month FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 46,002 44,842 44,829 44,818 8,448 8,400 8,398 8,397
adj. R-sq 0.040 0.036 0.036 0.038 0.092 0.071 0.064 0.069
Panel B: Out-of-Sample Bad Times
Dependent variable: CAR (-1, +1)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
MktModel FF3 FFC4 FF5 MktModel FF3 FFC4 FF5
Capital ratio_BT 0.76** 0.72** 0.83** 0.82** 2.07*** 2.19*** 2.17*** 2.10***
(2.30) (2.03) (2.43) (2.40) (3.42) (3.59) (3.47) (3.44)
Capital ratio 0.76** 0.66* 0.44 0.44 0.49 0.38 0.33 0.34
(2.17) (1.72) (1.32) (1.30) (0.97) (0.80) (0.70) (0.70)
Size -0.59*** -0.52*** -0.48*** -0.47*** -1.18*** -1.00*** -0.97*** -0.98***
(-4.83) (-3.99) (-3.83) (-3.86) (-4.83) (-4.21) (-4.00) (-4.31)
BTM 0.49* 0.49* 0.44* 0.54** -0.26 -0.17 -0.26 -0.13
(1.90) (1.83) (1.67) (2.05) (-0.61) (-0.42) (-0.65) (-0.32)
SUE 0.04*** 0.04*** 0.04*** 0.04***
(4.11) (3.61) (3.60) (3.68)
Bank & Yr-Month FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 46,002 44,842 44,829 44,818 8,448 8,400 8,398 8,397
adj. R-sq 0.040 0.036 0.036 0.038 0.093 0.073 0.066 0.070
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(ii) FF3; (iii) FFC4; and (iv) FF5.53 For FF3, FFC4, and FF5, we use a pre-estimation period
from t − 250 to t − 21. Each CAR is calculated by summing the abnormal returns over the 3-
day window. We compute VW average CARs for the 25 portfolios (obtained by independently
sorting bank stocks into quintiles based on their capital ratio and size as in our main analysis) and
then calculate CARs for each capital ratio quintile as the simple average of the five size quintile
portfolio CARs.
Table 3.16 Panels A and B show the in-sample and out-of-sample results, respectively. The
first four columns in each panel show the results using the four asset pricing models and include
the same independent variables as Table 3.15. The coefficient on the capital ratio is positive but not
always significant, while the coefficient on the capital ratio interacted with the bad times dummy
is positive and significant in all cases. This suggests that the CAR is not significantly greater for
banks with higher capital ratios during normal times, but it is during bad times. The last four
columns add the SUE as an additional regressor. The sample sizes drop because only observations
for which the SUE could be calculated are included. Not surprisingly, the coefficient on the SUE is
positive and significant: bigger earnings surprises are associated with higher CARs. Interestingly,
the coefficient on capital interacted with the bad times dummy remains positive and significant,
implying that higher capital is associated with higher CARs over and above the earnings surprise
effect.
The results here collectively suggest that investors slowly update their beliefs during bad
times, and are surprised about the better-than-expected performance of high-capital banks (relative
to low-capital banks) during bad times as evidenced by higher SUEs and CARs, consistent with
the “Surprised Investor Channel.”
3.5 Conclusion
This paper addressed two related questions. The first question is: Do high-capital banks
show better risk-adjusted stock performance than low-capital banks and does the effect differ dur-
53We cannot use two models used in our main analyses, FF5+LQ and FH9, because daily data are not available for
all of the factors included in those models.
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ing normal times and bad times? We find strong evidence that high-capital banks exhibit better
risk-adjusted stock performance than low-capital banks in bad times, but not during other times.
This holds in sample and using out-of-sample trading strategies. The results are robust to: using
different bad times and capital definitions, alternative asset pricing models, and ex-ante expected
returns; controlling for performance-type delistings, short-sale constraints, and trading costs; and
dropping the largest or smallest banks. The second question is: What drives the outperformance
of high-capital banks during bad times? We investigate two channels and conclude that, consistent
with recent behavioral theories of financial crises, our results seem to be driven by a “Surprised
Investor Channel” rather than an “Informed Investor Channel.”
While our paper does not examine bank stock performance after regulators impose higher
capital requirements, our results suggest that additional capital held by banks can be beneficial to
shareholders in bad times, without significantly affecting stock performance in normal times.
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4. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
This dissertation studies intermediary asset pricing. In particular, I am interested in theoretical
and empirical analyses of the role of financial intermediaries in asset markets, which has been
emphasized since the financial crisis.
The first paper, titled “Heterogeneous Intermediary Capital and the Cross-Section of Stock
Returns”, investigates how heterogeneity in intermediary capital affects trading activity of inter-
mediaries and the cross-section of stock returns. Prior studies have attempted to empirically find
that intermediary capital affects asset returns. However, depending on how they measure interme-
diary capital, it could be either procyclical or countercyclical. Existing models based on a single
representative intermediary can not fully explain these empirical patterns. Therefore, I develop
a model of heterogeneous intermediary capital in which heterogeneous risk preferences between
high- and low-capital intermediaries leads to time-varying risk aversion as well as a risk premium.
My model can explain that (1) an intermediary with a risk-averse manager builds higher capital
than one with a risk-tolerant manager, (2) dispersion of intermediary capital between high- and
low-capital intermediaries is positively associated with the aggregate risk aversion of the market,
and (3) the dispersion of intermediary capital is negatively priced in the cross-section of asset
returns. Consistent with these predictions, I empirically find that the dispersion of intermediary
capital is indeed priced in the cross-section of stock returns and generates a risk premium of 7.0%
- 8.4% per year.
The second paper, titled “Bank Capital and Bank Stock Performance”, examines how bank
capital affects its stock returns. We find that investors fail to correctly price bank capital in an-
ticipation of bad times so that high-capital banks have higher abnormal returns than low-capital
banks in bad times. This could happen if investors are unaware of the value of high capital dur-
ing bad times or underestimate the likelihood and severity of bad times and revise their beliefs
too sluggishly as bad times evolve. If so, the spread between the prices of high- and low-capital
banks during good times is not sufficiently high, and there will be a continuing increase in the price
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spread between these banks during bad times. Consistent with the argument, we find that earnings
surprises are significantly higher for high-capital banks than low-capital banks during bad times,
supporting “Surprised Investor Channel.”
Overall, the theoretical and empirical evidence from my dissertation emphasizes that interme-
diary capital is important to explain asset prices and helps to identify mechanisms that are missing
from existing asset pricing models.
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. From (2.6.4) and
∆c1 = g+ σcε1, the surplus consumption ratio of specialist H (SH1 ) is lower than that of specialist
















Thus, specialist H has higher risk aversion than specialist L at t = 1, or ΓH1 > Γ
L
1 .
In addition, a more risk-averse specialist will require higher risk premium (i.e., expected






































Therefore, specialist L allocates a higher portion of her wealth into the risky asset than specialist
H at t = 1, or αH1 < α
L
1 . 





































. Using (2.6.12), I obtain that
ψLt =






− ψHt and ψHt =


























































(αLt − αHt )
=








Thus, if κ̃ > κ̃∗, ψHt > ψ
L
t , that is the household purchases more equity capital from intermediary
H than from intermediary L. 
Proof of Proposition 3. From (2.6.6), ∂CI0/∂φ













− CI1 . This implies that specialist H has larger wealth to form an
intermediary than specialist L at t = 1, or wH1 > w
L




















Therefore, if the minimum capital requirement is sufficiently high, say κ̃ > κ̃∗, the specialist who
has higher (lower) risk aversion forms an intermediary with higher (lower) capital. 
Proof of Proposition 4. Let me derive the percentage change of intermediary capital to the shock
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. Therefore, the difference in


























































































































































in the following relationship between the shock in the risky asset and the dispersion in consumption
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Proof of Proposition 5. First, I prove that if a negative shock arrives in the risky asset, ε2 < 0, then
aggregate risk aversion rises:



















































































































































































































> CH2 E [C2]
1
ΓH2

































































































































































Finally, combining (A.0.7) and (A.0.8) gives:
ε2Γ2 < 0. (A.0.9)
As such, the shock in the risky asset and aggregate risk aversion are inversely related at t = 2. 
Proof of Proposition 6. Proposition 4 implies that the dispersion of intermediary capital and the
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1 + αL1 (µ2 + σ2ε2) + r
f
2

































































































































1 + αL1 (µ2 + σ2ε2) + r
f
2
])2 × (αH1 − αL1 ) < 0.






Γ2 > 0. (A.0.10)
At t = 2, the dispersion of intermediary capital is positively associated with the aggregate risk
aversion of the market. 
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APPENDIX B
OTHER CASES OF THE HOUSEHOLD PROBLEM IN SECTION 2.6.3
In this section, I consider the cases where the minimum capital requirement in (2.6.12) and/or
the capital constraints in (2.6.13) are not slack. That is, at least one of θCt , θ
H
t , and θ
L
t is nonzero.
Case 1: θHt > 0 and θLt > 0
In this case, capital constraints for both intermediaries hold, so the solution is immediate from
(2.6.18) and (2.6.19); ψHt = m
wHt
whht
> ψLt = m
wLt
whht
. Thus, the household allocates larger wealth
to intermediary H than to intermediary L.
Case 2: θHt > 0 and θLt = 0
I considers the case where the capital constraint for specialistH binds, but that for specialist L does





















0. Equation (2.6.15) implies that θHt = 0, so this case does not have a feasible solution. If





from (2.6.18), and ψLt =
















, I have that ψHt > ψ
L
t . Again, the household purchases more
equity capital from intermediary H than from intermediary L.
Case 3: θHt = 0 and θLt > 0
Suppose that the capital constraint for specialist L binds, but that for specialist H does not. If





















From Equation (2.6.16), θLt = 0, so this case does not have a feasible solution, similar to Case 2. If





from (2.6.19), and ψHt =













that satisfies ψHt = ψ
L
t . Thus, if the minimum
capital requirement is sufficiently high, say κ̃ > κ̃∗∗, the household allocates a larger portion of
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her wealth to intermediary H than to intermediary L (i.e., ψHt > ψ
L
t ).
Case 4: θHt = 0 and θLt = 0
Finally, I examine the case where capital constraints for both intermediaries does not bind, but
the minimum capital requirement binds. Because θCt > 0, (2.6.15) and (2.6.16) can be rewritten







































































. The minimum capital κ̃∗, defined in Proposition 2, satisfies ψHt = ψ
L
t . Again,
if the minimum capital requirement is sufficiently high, say κ̃ > κ̃∗, the household purchases more








This table lists 118 intermediaries in the sample. The intermediaries are identified as all firms listed on NYSE, AMEX,
or NASDAQ whose header SIC code or historical SIC code is 6000-6200 or 6712. The largest 30 intermediaries are
identified based on their market capitalization at the end of each quarter from 1973/Q1 to 2016/Q4. The nonfinancial
firms are identified as all firms listed on NYSE, AMEX, or NASDAQ excluding financial firms (header SIC code or
historical SIC code 6).
Intermediary Name Intermediary Name Intermediary Name
AFFILIATED MANAGERS GROUP INC FEDERAL NATIONAL MORTGAGE ASSN NEW YORK COMMUNITY BANCORP INC
ALLY FINANCIAL INC FIRST CHARTER FINL CORP NORTH FORK BANCORPORATION NY INC
AMERICAN EXPRESS CO FIRST CHICAGO CORP NORTHERN TRUST CORP
AMERIPRISE FINANCIAL INC FIRST CHICAGO N B D CORP P N C FINANCIAL SERVICES GRP INC
AMERITRUST CORP FIRST FIDELITY BANCORP PAINE WEBBER INC
ASSOCIATES FIRST CAPITAL CORP FIRST INTL BANCSHARES INC PEOPLES UNITED FINANCIAL INC
B B & T CORP FIRST PENNSYLVANIA CORP PROVIDIAN FINANCIAL CORP
BACHE GROUP INC FIRST REPUBLIC BANK S F PRUDENTIAL FINANCIAL INC
BANK NEW ENGLAND CORP FIRST SECURITY CORP DE REGIONS FINANCIAL CORP
BANK OF AMERICA CORP FIRST TENNESSEE NATIONAL CORP REPUBLICBANK CORP
BANK OF NEW YORK MELLON CORP FIRSTAR CORP RYDER SYSTEMS INC
BANK ONE CORP FLEETBOSTON FINANCIAL CORP S & P GLOBAL INC
BANKAMERICA CORP FRANKLIN RESOURCES INC S L M CORP
BANKBOSTON CORP GOLDEN WEST FINANCIAL CORP SALOMON INC
BANKERS TRUST CORP GOLDMAN SACHS GROUP INC SCHWAB CHARLES CORP
BEAR STEARNS COMPANIES INC GREAT WESTERN FINANCIAL CORP SHAWMUT NATIONAL CORP
BLACKROCK INC HARRIS BANKCORP INC SHEARSON LOEB RHOADES INC
BLOCK H & R INC HOUSEHOLD INTERNATIONAL INC SOCIETY CORP
C & S SOVRAN CORP HUDSON CITY BANCORP INC SOUTHTRUST CORP
C I T GROUP INC HUTTON E F GROUP INC SOUTHWEST BANCSHARES INC
C M E GROUP INC I T T HARTFORD GROUP INC SOVRAN FINANCIAL CORP
CAPITAL ONE FINANCIAL CORP INTERCONTINENTALEXCHANGE GRP INC STATE STREET CORP
CHARTER COMPANY JPMORGAN CHASE & CO SUNAMERICA INC
CHARTER NEW YORK CORP KEYCORP SUNTRUST BANKS INC
CHASE MANHATTAN CORP LEGG MASON INC T D AMERITRADE HOLDING CORP
CITICORP LEHMAN BROTHERS HOLDINGS INC T ROWE PRICE GROUP INC
CITIGROUP INC M & T BANK CORP TEXAS COMMERCE BANCSHARES INC
CITIZENS & SOUTHERN CORP GA M B N A CORP U S BANCORP DEL
CITIZENS FINANCIAL GROUP INC M CORP UNION BANCORP INC
COMERICA INC M N C FINANCIAL INC UNIONBANCAL CORP
CONCORD E F S INC MANUFACTURERS HANOVER CORP UNITED VIRGINIA BANKSHARES INC
CONTINENTAL ILL CORP MARINE MIDLAND BKS INC VALLEY NATIONAL CORP AZ
CORESTATES FINANCIAL CORP MELLON FINANCIAL CORP VISA INC
COUNTRYWIDE FINANCIAL CORP MERCANTILE BANCORPORATION INC WACHOVIA CORP
CROCKER NATIONAL CORP MERRILL LYNCH & CO INC WACHOVIA CORP NEW
DEAN WITTER DISCOVER & CO MORGAN STANLEY DEAN WITTER & CO WASHINGTON MUTUAL INC
DISCOVER FINANCIAL SERVICES N Y S E EURONEXT WELLS FARGO & CO
DREYFUS CORP NASDAQ INC WELLS FARGO & CO NEW
FEDERAL HOME LOAN MORTGAGE CORP NATIONAL CITY CORP WESTERN BANCORPORATION
WESTERN UNION CO
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